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ABSTRACT
This dissertation develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of oligopolistic 
rivalry through cost-reducing research and development (R&D) expenditures in an 
environment where firms cannot fully appropriate the results of their R&D investment.
This framework is developed in order to examine the incentives of firms to invest in R&D 
in oligopolistic markets, the implications for the structure and performance of industries 
subject to such spillovers and the nature of public policy in this context.
Two lines of research are followed: one focuses on technological factors affecting 
incentives and performance, the other on the influence of strategic behaviour. With respect 
to technological factors, it is argued that the impact of research spillovers on market 
incentives and performance, and on the desirability of a public policy of R&D subsidies, 
depends crucially on the specific assumptions made about how a firm’s production process 
is affected by its own R&D and that of its rivals. These assumptions are embodied in the 
knowledge production function and the associated cost function facing each firm.
Issues of substitutability and complementarity between a firm’s research and that of 
its rivals and between various components of a firm’s own research are central in 
determining the impact of spillovers. The level and composition of R&D investment, 
production and profitability, concentration and monopoly power are all influenced by the 
impact of rivals’ research on the marginal productivity of a firm’s own research. Optimal 
subsidies are similarly influenced. This suggests that the effectiveness of such policies 
towards R&D investment depends on the nature of technology and on specific appropri­
ability characteristics of industries.
With respect to strategic behaviour, the dissertation extends previous research in the 
context of a multi-stage model of international competition in R&D to the case where R&D 
is subject to spillovers. This allows an examination of the importance of different 
behavioural assumptions (one-stage vs. multi-stage decision-making) on the impact of 
spillovers. The analysis also questions the results of strategic models obtained with full 
appropriability of R&D, whereby strategic behaviour results in higher equilibrium levels of 
R&D and production and lower profits. Strategic behaviour can result in lower R&D and 
higher profitability if research is difficult to appropriate. The conditions under which this 
occurs are explored fully.
The characteristics of industrial policy in the context of strategic international 
competition are then explored. Models that assume fully appropriable R&D suggest the 
optimality of a policy of positive subsidies to the R&D expenditures of domestic firms.
The existence of spillovers may reverse this result. The analysis thus casts doubt on the 
efficacy of a government policy of R&D subsidies in a strategy of "precommitment". This 
goes beyond the usual retaliatory arguments against such behaviour and points to the limits 
of such an interventionist approach in an international environment where R&D has some 
characteristics typical of public goods.
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CHAPTER ONE
RESEARCH SPILLOVERS: 
THEORY, EVIDENCE AND POLICY
I. Introduction
In the context of the economics of technological change, it is widely held that by 
its nature, innovation has certain characteristics typical of public goods. These 
characteristics imply that firms which invest in research and development (R&D) 
activities often find that the fruits of their efforts are being used by other firms or 
industries without adequate compensation being paid. R&D efforts by firms therefore 
generate external effects which affect the marginal decisions of other firms. These 
external effects linked to innovative activities have been labelled "research spillovers" 1.
Research spillovers have an important role to play in determining the incentives of 
private firms to invest in R&D activities, and in shaping the performance and character­
istics of industries that rely heavily on product and process innovation. As a result, they 
are receiving increasing attention, both in the theoretical literature on innovation, and by 
policy-makers seeking to formulate policies in science and technology 2.
The increasingly global characteristics of research activities and international trade 
of R&D-intensive products have added a new dimension to the issues raised by research 
spillovers. To the extent that trade occurs in oligopolistic markets where firms rely on 
innovation to gain a competitive advantage, research by one firm can potentially benefit 
its international competitors. Such international spillovers have implications for the 
predictions of strategic trade theories and for public policy that attempts to support 
domestic firms by subsidising R&D.
10 n e  recent attempt at a  definition describes research spillovers a s  "any original, valuable 
knowledge generated in the research process which becomes publicly accessible, whether it be 
knowledge fully characterising an innovation, or knowledge of a  more intermediate sort” (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1989, p. 571).
*This dissertation is concerned with the microeconomic aspect of spillovers: their effect on firm 
incentives and behaviour, and on industry structure and performance. The macroeconomic 
counterpart of this is the importance of knowledge spillovers for long-term rates of growth in the 
economy. This is increasingly central in the new growth theories where technology is an 
endogenous factor in the production process. S ee  for example Romer (1990).
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In order to address some of these issues, this dissertation develops models of 
oligopolistic competition through R&D expenditures in which research spillovers are 
modelled explicitly. These models allow the examination of the incentives to invest in 
R&D, the characteristics of industrial structure and performance, as well as of the 
desirability of a public policy of R&D subsidies in an environment characterised by less 
than perfect appropriability of research.
a. Characteristics and limitations of the approach
The models that are developed in the main body of the dissertation belong to the 
literature which takes into account the interaction between competing firms and focuses 
on the incentives to spend on R&D and on static industry equilibrium. In particular, of 
all the factors influencing innovative activity (technological opportunity, demand and 
appropriability conditions), we follow others in focusing on the impact of spillovers. 
Appropriability is however modelled here in a richer analytical setup and that makes it 
possible to question and reinterpret some of the existing results, as well as to lay a better 
claim on accounting for the impact of spillovers on incentives and performance.
In oligopolistic markets where competition occurs through the development of 
innovations, there are three supply-side channels through which R&D influences a 
firm’s profits: via outputs, unit production costs, and the R&D costs themselves. The 
explicit modelling of research spillovers in this context implies the introduction of a 
"borrowed research" variable alongside a firm’s own research expenditures. A firm’s 
production of knowledge then depends on the level of its own R&D expenditures and 
on the size of the knowledge pool that it can draw upon.
In analysing the effect of R&D expenditures in a spillover environment on 
incentives and performance, a number of factors need to be taken into account. One is 
direct: both own R&D and the "borrowed" R&D of competitors (via the spillover rate)
2
affect a firm’s production costs, and through that its output and earnings. Another 
effect is indirect: a firm’s own R&D expenditures influences the production costs of its 
competitors, and therefore their output and industry price. It therefore has an indirect 
effect on own earnings. Finally, own R&D can have an effect on a firm’s own 
production cost by influencing its capacity to take advantage of competitors’ R&D 
expenditures. These effects determine the impact of spillovers; they represent the 
building blocks for the models that are developed below.
For a particular firm or industry therefore, research spillovers represent outside 
knowledge capital (Griliches, 1979). Their existence implies that the production of 
knowledge achieved by the firm or the industry depends not only on its own research 
efforts but also on outside efforts or more generally on the level and nature of the 
knowledge pool available to it. Moreover, the productivity of own research be affected 
by the size and nature of the knowledge pool that it can draw upon.
The main value-added of the approach followed in this dissertation comes from 
the fact that in analysing the effects of inappropriability, the models developed pay 
particular attention to different types of R&D expenditures, to technological factors 
affecting incentives and performance, and on the influence of strategic behaviour.
These three factors together determine the impact of inappropriability of research on the 
incentives of firms to invest in R&D, and on industrial structure and performance.
Specifically, the models in the chapters that follow innovate in a number of ways. 
First, R&D is not assumed to be homogeneous. Instead, it is broken down into two 
parts with different appropriability characteristics: a basic research part that is subject to 
spillovers, and a development part, which is taken to be fully appropriable. This 
distinction between basic research and development research in terms of appropriability 
(chapters two and three) is complemented by one in terms of timing in chapter four.
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The distinction between the two parts of R&D is meant to capture the 
fundamental differences between that part of the innovation process where new 
knowledge is still of the generic type and therefore widely applicable and the part where 
the R&D output has been focused to a particular range of applications. Both types of 
R&D may of course in practice be partially or fully non-appropriable and the restriction 
of spillovers to the basic research part of R&D does carry an implicit assumption that 
development knowledge cannot be reverse-engineered, either because of patent 
protection or because the cost of imitation is prohibitive.
Basic research is closer to the idea of innovation as knowledge creation. It is 
therefore more reasonable to assign to it alone the public good properties of R&D. In 
effect, the difficulty of patenting basic research has long been identified as a main 
reason for underinvestment in this type of R&D (Nelson, 1959). Furthermore, it is 
widely held that social returns from basic research are significant and higher than 
private returns (Mansfield, 1980; Rosenberg, 1990); this in turn has been used as a 
justification for substantial public support3. The modelling of spillover effects may go 
some way towards providing a plausible theoretical explanation.
The second distinguishing feature of the models developed below is the focus on 
technological factors and in particular the treatment of "own" and "borrowed" research. 
Previous theoretical explorations of spillovers have for the most part treated the 
research of rivals as a perfect substitute for a firm’s own research. Empirical evidence 
suggests that this is often not the case. Consequently closer attention needs to be paid to 
the way R&D inputs combine to produce cost-reducing innovations.
3 In the US, for example, government funds have accounted for the largest fraction of the total 
funds devoted to basic research. Even though the federal share has declined in recent years, it 
still represents roughly two-thirds of the total outlays. See  National Science Foundation (1986) 
for details.
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The impact of research spillovers on incentives for R&D investment, industry 
profitability and structure, and for optimal R&D subsidies, depend crucially on the 
specific assumptions made about how a firm’s production process is affected by its own 
R&D and that of its rivals. In the models that follow, these assumptions are embodied 
in the knowledge production function and the associated cost function facing each firm.
Issues of substitutability and complementarity between a firm’s research and that 
of its rivals and between various components of a firm’s own research are shown to be 
central in determining the impact of spillovers. The level and composition of R&D 
investment, production and profitability, concentration and monopoly power are all 
influenced by the impact of rivals’ research on the marginal productivity of a firm’s 
own research. Optimal subsidies are similarly influenced. This suggests that the 
effectiveness of such policies towards R&D investment depends on differences in the 
nature of technology and on specific appropriability characteristics of industries.
The third characteristic concerns assumptions about behaviour. Chapters two and 
three develop models where firms act as Cournot oligopolists, choosing the levels of 
R&D and output in a one-stage game. This is the approach taken in most of the 
literature on spillovers. Chapter four develops a strategic game, where firms choose 
basic research expenditures, development research expenditures and output levels in 
three distinct stages. This allows an analysis of the importance of different behavioural 
assumptions (simultaneous vs. sequential moves in each firm’s decision-making on 
R&D expenditures and output production) on the impact of spillovers 4. It also allows 
us to question the results of strategic models that assume full appropriability of R&D, 
particularly their prediction that strategic behaviour results in higher equilibrium levels
4 Firms move simultaneously in all models, including the strategic model in chapter four. 
Sequential moves here mean all firms choosing simultaneously R&D levels before choosing 
output levels, rather than one firm making a  move before another.
of R&D and production and lower profits. It is established that strategic behaviour can 
result in lower R&D and higher profitability if research is difficult to appropriate. The 
conditions under which this occurs are explored fully.
The framework of the strategic model allows also an extension of multi-stage 
models of international competition in R&D to the case where R&D is subject to 
spillovers and an analysis of the characteristics of industrial policy in this context. 
Models that assume fully appropriable R&D suggest the optimality of a policy of 
profit-shifting positive subsidies to R&D expenditures of domestic firms. The existence 
of spillovers suggests that the externality involved may reverse this result. The analysis 
of chapter five casts doubt on the efficacy of a government policy of R&D subsidies in 
a strategy of "precommitment". This goes beyond the usual retaliatory arguments 
against such behaviour and points to the limits of such an interventionist approach in an 
international environment where R&D has some characteristics typical of public goods.
Other general characteristics of the models that are developed in this dissertation 
are: the greater importance attached to conditions of appropriability relative to techno­
logical opportunity for shaping firms * incentives and industry structure and 
performance; the focus on process rather than product innovations; and the assumption 
that firms are integrated ie they operate on the whole range of activities ranging from 
knowledge creation to output production.
These model attributes seem to be reflecting fairly well the dominant character­
istics of R&D-intensive but technologically maturing oligopolistic industries. These 
would be well represented by the "science-based" industries in Pavitt’s (1984) industrial 
classification or by the high technology sectors in the OECD’s classification based on
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R&D intensity5. In general, these are industries where all firms are expected to commit 
substantial resources to R&D activities, and which also depend considerably on external 
sources of generic knowledge (Nelson and Levin, 1986).
Other characteristics of these industries are the small number of participants, all 
covering the whole range from basic research to production (Gort and Klepper, 1982). 
Cost-saving advances represent substantial contributions in total effort while the techno­
logical environment of these established and well-defined industries is characterised by 
a body of previously developed knowledge on which firms build. Relatedly, since firms 
of this type operate within a particular technological trajectory, the relative importance 
of technological opportunities has declined. Therefore, the conditions of appropriability 
are very important in an environment where a small group of rivals innovates 
continuously and incrementally in order to maintain a competitive advantage.
These characteristics aside, the approach followed has certain limiting features.
All models are static and deterministic, and as such abstract from some of the most 
important aspects of the innovation process. Their timeless nature makes them 
incapable of identifying the speed o f research, and consequently it is not possible to 
analyse how this characteristic is related to inappropriability of R&D. No account is 
taken of uncertainty; neither is there recognition of the risk inherent in every part of the 
innovation process. This implies that in the firm's calculus decisions related to 
innovative activities are reduced to the size of R&D expenditures. In practice, firms 
decide not only on their R&D budget, but also on which projects to undertake, based on 
their expected probability and timing of success.
“Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy organises industrial activities according to (i) the sources from which 
firms obtain their technology; (ii) the main users of products and the role technology plays in 
their demand; and (iii) the m eans available to firms for appropriation of commercial benefits. 
This allows three broad sectoral categories to emerge: supplier dominated, production-intensive 
and science-based industries. The science-based group includes aircraft, pharmaceuticals and 
other chemicals, computers and semiconductors and scientific instruments.
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Other limiting features relate to the nature of the equilibria examined. Attention is 
restricted to symmetric equilibria only, so that the Schumpeterian process of "creative 
destruction" (Schumpeter, 1975, ch. 7) cannot be adequately represented. Strict 
symmetry implies both identical research outlays and simultaneous innovation by all 
players; we cannot therefore look at imitation and at the relative size of firms.
A final important limitation relates to the spillover rate itself. Throughout, it is 
treated as an exogenous parameter in the models. Its size is taken as a datum by the 
firm and in turn the firm’s behaviour has no influence on the extent to which its 
research becomes available to rivals. In reality, not only is the firm partially in control 
over how much of its research is proprietary, but also technological change itself has an 
effect on the underlying conditions that determine the size and productivity of spillovers 
(Levin and Reiss, 1989). Furthermore, the channels through which spillovers occur are 
ignored. Different channels (patents, licensing agreements, joint ventures or imitation) 
may generate different types of spillovers with distinct effects on cost reduction and on 
the rate of R&D investment (Bernstein, 1988). Endogenising the spillover rate would 
be an important step in obtaining a more precise relationship between the effect of 
appropriability and the institutional environment.
It should be evident from these limitations that the models developed in this 
dissertation are quite constrained in the type of questions they can address. Asking a 
limited set of questions can however yield some clear answers and useful insights. Thus 
the representation of spillovers in this simplest of environments, where particular 
attention is paid to technological and behavioural factors, allows for a more 
comprehensive examination of their possible effects.
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b. An outline of the chapter
In this first chapter of the dissertation we attempt to motivate the theoretical 
approach taken in the chapters that follow by asking a number of questions: what is 
meant by "research spillovers"?; do such spillovers exist?; do they matter?; what does 
economic theory tell us about their impact on incentives, structure and performance?; 
and what are the weaknesses in current approaches?
The next section of the chapter examines the evidence about the existence of 
research spillovers and their effects on the incentives of firms to invest in R&D. Rather 
than attempting a comprehensive survey of the empirical literature on the subject, the 
aim is to present some apparent contradictions between received theory and empirical 
research. These contradictions are further explored in the context of the economic 
theory of innovation and form the motivation for the development of the theory in the 
subsequent chapters of the dissertation. The section concludes with a discussion of 
some policy concerns that arise from the existence of spillovers.
Section three examines the main insights revealed by the economic theory of 
innovation, as these relate to research spillovers. The discussion follows the 
development of arguments in the area, starting from those that emphasise the static 
welfare externalities associated with the production of knowledge, and moving on to 
approaches that stress the dynamic nature of the innovation process and the associated 
externalities related to the systemic characteristics of technological advance. The main 
attempts to date to model spillovers in an explicitly oligopolistic context are then briefly 
reviewed. The section concludes with a discussion of strategic behaviour arguments in 
international trade, as these impact on the issues at hand when trade occurs through the 
development of new products and processes. Finally, section four gives an outline of 
the structure of the main body of the dissertation.
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II. Issues of definition, empirical evidence and policy concerns
The diversity of approaches in the empirical investigation of inappropriability of 
research is best understood in the context of a conceptual distinction between two types 
of research spillovers. The first type is a question of price measurement: '’spillovers" in 
this case occur because R&D-intensive inputs and outputs are not priced in their fully 
hedonic value. The second type is a matter of knowledge transmission *.
The first type of spillovers relates to purchases of R&D-intensive inputs. In the 
situation where the price at which inputs are purchased do not fully reflect their 
increased value, in addition to generating an increase in producer surplus in the 
innovating firm or industry, the innovation lowers the input prices for the purchasing 
firms or industries and increases their producer surplus (Mohnen, 1989). Through these 
embodied "spillovers" therefore, the R&D conducted in one firm or industry will have 
welfare side-effects 7.
The second concept of spillovers refers to the transfer of scientific and engineering 
knowledge. Such transfers have been labelled disembodied or real knowledge 
spillovers to emphasize that they do not necessarily come embodied in any piece of
#Griliches (1979) and Schankerman (1979) discuss this conceptual distinction and its 
implication for empirical work.
7 There are two possible reasons why we may not have fully "hedonic" (quality-adjusted) prices. 
The first relates to market conditions: only a perfectly discriminating monopolist with a  secure 
market condition would be able to appropriate all the social returns ("quasi-rents") to the 
innovation. Failing that, products are sold to using industries at prices that are lower than their 
true social cost. The second is a  technical reason: in the calculation of price indices, 
adjustment is not made for "costless" quality improvements to new products. New products 
tend to be "linked" in at their introductory price with the index unchanged. Quality adjustments 
in the price index therefore reflect only the original private returns of the inventor and the 
consumer surplus arising from the erosion of the original monopolistic market position, rather 
than the full social return associated with the invention.
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machinery or equipment. It is implicit to most definitions that they refer to cases where 
one firm or industry can use the knowledge developed elsewhere without providing 
adequate compensation 8.
There are a number of channels through which the knowledge generated by one 
firm circulates to other firms. It may be embodied in research personnel which moves 
between firms or be the result of reverse-engineering on the part of a firm on the 
products of its rivals. It may be contained in descriptions of new products or processes 
that are found in publications, catalogues or patent applications or be disseminated in 
conferences or seminars. Finally, knowledge spillovers may be the by-product of 
mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures or other forms of inter-firm cooperation 9.
Whatever the channel through which they operate, disembodied or pure 
knowledge spillovers imply that discoveries made by one firm serve as an inspiration 
for the research of other firms. They can create new ideas, force research in new 
directions or make previously unsuccessful research come to successful conclusions. 
This allows these firms to introduce more efficient processes for production or develop 
new products. The invention of synthetic fibres for example by the chemical industry 
found great applications in the textile industry. Similarly, new materials like hard alloy 
steel could only be exploited when appropriate machinery was developed that allowed 
its efficient use. Unlike however the case of embodied spillovers, this type of
®This dissertation develops models of oligopolistic rivalry where firms sell homogeneous goods 
and where the knowledge production function of a  firm is augmented to include the R&D 
expenditures of rivals, in addition to its own R&D expenditures. The channels through which the 
R&D expenditures of rivals affect a  firm’s knowledge production function and production costs 
are not specified. They could be via purchases, at which point we would be looking at 
embodied R&D spillovers due to non-hedonic prices. Or they could be through the simple 
transfer of knowledge ie via disembodied (knowledge) spillovers. In principle therefore, the 
insights of the models developed below are quite general and do not depend on the nature of 
spillovers assum ed.
• Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter (1987) provide som e information based on evidence from 
surveys on the importance of various channels of knowledge transmission.
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borrowing is not necessarily related to input purchase flows 10. The photographing 
equipment industry and the scientific instruments industry may not be particularly 
strongly connected in terms of input purchases; they do nevertheless benefit from each 
other’s research (Griliches, 1979). In either case, as knowledge expands for the 
receiving firms, spillovers contribute to cost-reduction and demand-expansion.
To the extent that firms are rivals in the product market the impact of spillovers 
has an additional dimension. If one firm can use the results of the research performed 
by other firms without compensation, the private investment incentive may be too low 
because the firm spending the R&D does not count the spillover as a benefit. When 
spillovers benefit competitors, however, the incentive of the potential innovator to 
invest in R&D can be further lowered relative to the social incentive. Furthermore, the 
R&D conducted by a firm can increase the effectiveness of the R&D conducted by 
rivals. In this case therefore, in addition to their cost-reducing aspect, spillovers also 
affect incentives and the structure of competition in the industry.
This discussion has been couched in terms which suggest that spillovers are 
domestic, occurring amongst firms or industries located within a single country. The 
international aspect of spillovers can however be of at least equal importance to the 
domestic aspect. To the extent that many R&D-intensive oligopolistic industries are 
heavily internationalised, with competition occurring primarily amongst large firms 
located in different countries, knowledge will also circulate amongst firms located in 
different countries, as well as amongst firms located within the same country.
10This implies that in contrast to embodied spillovers, non-embodied spillovers may affect the 
productivity of the user firm or industry even if prices fully reflect quality improvements. This is 
because technology developed in one firm may affect the productivity in other firms or industries 
without the transaction of intermediate and investment goods.
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There is furthermore no a priori reason to believe that international spillovers 
occur in any different way than domestic spillovers, nor that their impact on the 
incentives of firms to invest in R&D or on industry performance differs in the two 
cases. If the fact that a firm cannot appropriate its R&D expenditures acts as a 
disincentive for the level of R&D investment by its domestic rivals, it will also reduce 
R&D expenditures by foreign rivals. If it also reduces the industry-wide cost of 
achieving a given level of cost reduction, it will do so whether the industry is national or 
international.
a. Incidence and Impact of spillovers
The starting point of empirical studies that have investigated the issue of appropri­
ability of research is a relatively simple observation: once new knowledge has been 
created, it can often be imitated relatively easily, cheaply and quickly. The studies that 
have explored the implications of this empirically demonstrated stylized fact fall 
broadly into two main categories. In the first are attempts to measure the gap between 
private and social rates of return to R&D without explicitly identifying the interindustry 
or intraindustry links through which spillovers can operate. Their main conclusion is 
that the social returns from R&D (and from basic research especially) are significant 
and higher than private returns u .
11 Mansfield (1985) and Mansfield et al. (1977) for example have shown that only a  fraction of 
the benefits of inventions are captured by the inventor or the innovating firm even when there 
exist patent rights to protect the newly created knowledge. In the 1977 paper private benefits 
are m easured by the innovator’s profits, net of any costs for producing and marketing the 
innovation, and net of the profits that the innovator would have earned on products displaced by 
the innovation and with adjustment for unsuccessful R&D. Social benefits are obtained by 
adding to the private benefits the change in consumer surplus due to lower prices and profits by 
innovators minus the R&D costs incurred by firms other than the innovating firm. They conclude 
that the social rate of return greatly exceeds the private rate (a median of 56% against a  median 
private rate of return of 25%), with the private rate too low in many cases to justify undertaking 
the project. Another method of estimating the social rate of return on R&D involves estimating 
the marginal product, profitability or cost reduction from R&D by introducing the R&D stock of 
knowledge as  an input into a  production, profit or cost function (see Schankerman, 1981, for the 
interpretation of the resulting estimate). On this basis Mansfield (1980) disaggregated R&D into 
a  basic and a  development part and obtained that the return to R&D comes overwhelmingly 
from basic research.
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The second group of studies has explicitly modelled the channels of transmission 
of spillovers by introducing an outside or borrowed stock of knowledge as an input into 
the production process alongside a firm’s (or industry’s) own accumulated R&D stock 
or expenditures. A number of techniques have been employed, depending on whether 
the focus is on embodied or on knowledge spillovers and on spillovers between 
industries or within them n . Since our interest is to examine the impact of spillovers on 
costs, incentives, and profitability we concentrate here on empirical studies that provide 
information on these matters 13.
12 In a  survey of work in the area, Mohnen (1990) identifies six approaches. The first approach 
m easures the influence of the R&D spillover econometrically by treating spillovers as  an 
unweighted sum of the R&D of all other firms or industries. Examples are Levin and Reiss 
(1984,1988), Levin (1988), Bernstein (1988), and Bernstein and Nadiri (1989). In the second 
approach, the R&D spillover variable is measured as a  weighted sum of all the outside R&D. 
The papers following this latter approach can be further subdivided into four sub-groups, 
according to the proximity measure used to construct the weights. Papers in the first sub-group 
use weights proportional to the flows of intermediate input purchases, as revealed by input- 
output transactions; this approach is associated with the work of Terleckyj (1974), Griliches and 
Lichtenberg (1984), Bresnahan (1986), and Goto and Suzuki (1989). The second group uses 
flows of patents. Scherer, F.M. (1982a, 1982b and 1984), carrying on the lines first suggested 
by Schmookler (1966), is the best known work using this approach; other papers include 
Schankerman (1979), Pakes and Schankerman, M. (1984); Englander, Evenson and Hanazaki 
(1988). The third group focuses on the flows of innovations between firms and industries as in 
Robson, Townsend and Pavitt (1988), while the fourth uses patent data and the concept of 
technological distance (Jaffe, 1986, following on an idea originally suggested by Griliches). The 
idea here is to look at the correlation of the position vectors of industries in a  technology space, 
where each element in the technological position vector of each sector is the fraction of the 
sector's R&D expenditures in a  particular technological area. Finally, the last approach adopts 
a  framework whereby each outside R&D is introduced directly and separately. Bernstein (1988) 
is an example.
13 In empirical work on spillovers a  sharp distinction is made between intra- and inter-industry 
spillovers. This distinction is data-driven; for theoretical work on the impact of spillovers, 
however, it is less useful. Thus, in the context of the oligopolistic models developed in this 
dissertation, the boundaries of an "industry" are simply defined by the product rivalry and 
assumption of product homogeneity.
It should also be emphasized that it is not easy to identify separately in empirical work 
embodied R&D spillovers and knowledge spillovers. Since both types of spillovers can occur 
between industries and within industries (in the SIC sense  of the word "industry"), a  distinction 
between /nfraindustry and /nfe/industry spillovers does not help. The key here is the particular 
links used in the analysis. Thus, the use of intermediate input transactions as weights for other 
sectors’ R&D when investigating interindustry spillovers suggests that one is looking at 
embodied spillovers due to measurement errors; conversely, the position in a  technology space, 
the unweighted sum of others’ R&D or a  direct estimation approach all are closer to identifying 
knowledge spillovers. Patent flows are more problematic. When used a s  carriers of R&D and 
in order to define "technological closeness”, they are closer to identifying links due to knowledge 
spillovers. When however they are used as proxies for input purchases, they also capture 
some of the spillover due to incorrect price measurement.
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The cost-reducing effect of spillovers is generally confirmed in empirical investi­
gations. Levin and Reiss (1984,1988) were able to reject the hypothesis that appropri­
ability conditions do not matter. They concluded that the extent of spillovers is higher 
for processes than for products and that it varies considerably between industries, with 
electronics industries appearing to have significantly higher spillovers than other 
industries14. Levin (1988), based on survey data, came to similar conclusions and also 
identified the importance of different channels of spillovers. Bernstein (1988) estimated 
the effects of intra- and interindustry spillovers in seven Canadian industries (food and 
beverages, pulp and paper, metal fabricating, non-electrical machinery, aircraft and 
parts, electrical products, and chemical products). He concluded that both types of 
spillover affect production costs, with interindustry spillovers exerting greater 
downward pressure on costs of production than intraindustry spillovers.
These empirical studies address two related questions. The first is whether 
spillovers affect costs of production. The overwhelming response is that they signifi­
cantly reduce them. The second question is whether spillovers alter incentives to invest 
in R&D. Here, the answer is more qualified. Levin and Reiss (1988) find evidence that 
suggests that variations in the degree of substitution between own and rival R&D may 
affect private incentives to conduct R&D. In estimating a model that allows possibility 
that own and rival R&D are imperfect substitutes, they establish that diminished 
appropriability does not necessarily reduce R&D expenditures.
Bernstein (1988) finds evidence that the response of firms to intraindustry 
spillovers depends on the nature of the industry they operate in. Firms operating in
14 Levin and Reiss (1988) estimate a  model where the industry R&D pool consists of own R&D 
expenditures plus a  fraction of the sum of all others’ R&D expenditures. They are able to 
estimate separately the productivity of the spillover from the extent of the spillover and to 
separate the spillover effect due to (cost-reducing) process and (demand-creating) product 
R&D.
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industries with relatively low propensities to invest in R&D (small R&D cost share) 
tend to substitute their rivals' R&D for their own. In contrast, in industries with 
relatively higher R&D propensities there is a complementary relationship between 
firms' own and their rivals’ R&D. There is therefore a positive incentive effect of 
spillovers on the demand for R&D in industries with larger R&D cost shares.
Levin (1988), using a different methodology, arrives to similar conclusions.
Based on survey data, he uses cluster analysis to conclude that industries reporting the 
highest levels of spillovers (primarily electronics-related) are also those with average 
rates of innovation higher than industries relying upon independent R&D. He suggests 
that his results support the hypothesis that spillovers are conducive to rapid technical 
progress but not the hypothesis that they discourage R&D investment.
Finally, Bernstein and Nadiri (1989) provide some evidence that supports the 
traditional disincentive effects of spillovers. In a sample of four US industries 
(chemicals, petroleum, machinery and instruments), they observed that both the short- 
and the long-run demand for R&D capital (and for physical capital) decreased in 
response to an increase in the intraindustry spillover. They did not find any comple­
mentarity effects between intraindustry spillovers and firms' own R&D. Rather, own 
and borrowed R&D appeared to be substitutes.
Jaffe (1986), using the concept of "technological distance", attempts to establish 
the importance of spillovers by looking at the effect of other firms’ R&D on the produc­
tivity of own R&D. His starting point is that since spillovers depend on the techno­
logical similarity of the research efforts of different firms, a firm's R&D success is 
affected by a "potential spillover pool", defined as the weighted sum of other firms’ 
R&D, with weights proportional to the proximity of firms in a technology space.
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The framework adopted by Jaffe examines the two distinct effects of spillovers: 
the purely technological effect, whereby R&D spillovers constitute an unambiguously 
positive externality for receiving firms; and the economic effect, due to the effect of 
others’ research on a firm’s profits. His estimations lead him to conclude that the 
productivity of a firm’s R&D is increased by the R&D of "technological neighbours" 
(R&D of other firms increases the knowledge output of the firm directly, and also 
increases the elasticity with respect to own R&D); neighbours R&D however reduces 
profits (and market value) of low R&D-intensity firms15.
While therefore evidence from empirical studies suggests that spillovers exist in 
practice, it is not conclusive on their impact on R&D incentives and on the productivity 
of R&D expenditures. In some cases the R&D-incentive impact of spillovers goes in 
the opposite direction than what theory has until now suggested. In section II below we 
explore some arguments that try to shed light on this result; a theoretical framework that 
attempts to understand it more fully is developed in the main body of the dissertation.
b. Policy concerns
A general feeling among policy-makers that resources spent on R&D by private 
firms acting in isolation are in some sense insufficient (often explicitly because of the 
existence of research spillovers) has led to the implementation of a number of types of 
policy aimed at closing the gap between private and public returns to R&D. The more 
widely used are: direct or indirect subsidies to restore incentives; strengthening 
appropriability rights; and encouraging cooperation amongst firms at the research stage.
18 Jaffe notes that in order to understand the implications of spillovers for industrial structure and 
public policy it is necessary to focus on variations in the extent of spillovers in different 
technology areas (he assum es uniform spillover rates) and to examine spillovers in a  context 
where their implications for firms’ strategic behaviour are recognized.
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Tax policies and direct subsidies are used widely to raise private R&D incentives. 
In the US for example, 47% of the total spent on private R&D in 1988 came from direct 
government subsidies16. The aim is to lower the costs to individual firms for 
undertaking research and thus counter some of the disincentives associated with low 
appropriability of R&D. While however it has been established that a policy of relying 
on subsidies can counteract effectively the disincentive effect of spillovers (Spence, 
1984), such a policy does not address the other side of the coin: the insufficient dissemi­
nation of R&D results. Moreover, evidence shows that the social cost of R&D 
subsidies may be substantial: firms may classify as R&D projects unrelated to research 
in order to be eligible for subsidies or tax breaks 17.
Another problem with subsidies, addressed directly in the main body of the disser­
tation, is that they may in fact further distort incentives rather than correct them. In 
some industries, spillovers may act as a spur to R&D expenditures, rather than as a 
disincentive. Since subsidies usually do not discriminate between industrial sectors on 
the basis of their appropriability, technological and behavioural characteristics, they 
may be too blunt an instrument for encouraging R&D w.
Subsidies to R&D often also have an explicitly international dimension. Countries 
deliberately intervene in order to support "national champions" that are engaged in 
international competition through product and process innovations. By subsidising the 
R&D expenditures of domestic firms, governments aim to increase their rate of 
innovation and thereby increase their market share and profits at the expense of rivals.
16 Cited in Katz and Ordover (1990) from Economic Report of the President (1989, p.226).
17 In the US, Brown (1984) found discrepancies between the increases in R&D expenditures as 
reported in tax forms and increases in R&D spending as reported in independent surveys.
18 Other problems associated with subsidies are related to the fact that they involve resource 
shifting between sectors (Dixit and Grossman, 1986). When they are targeted, they imply an 
ability on the part of the government to "pick winners", which is widely debated. Finally, raising 
the subsidy funds through taxes gives rise to "deadweight losses” (Grossman, 1989).
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Such profit-shifting subsidies may however be counter-productive in international 
environments characterised by low levels of appropriability of research. In circum­
stances where spillovers are extensive, industrial subsidies in support of domestic firms 
also benefit foreign rivals. This negative externality can outweigh the increased 
positive incentives for additional R&D, making such policies counter-productive. The 
circumstances where this can occur are explored in chapter five below.
Restoring appropriability by creating or extending property rights to knowledge 
through patents and licensing is another approach that has been followed. If a firm can 
patent or licence an innovation, it can recapture some of the costs associated with R&D 
and restore appropriability and incentives. The temporary monopolistic power 
conferred by a patent over the prospective benefits associated with an innovation 
constitutes an incentive for investment in the creation of the innovation (Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1982). As Katz and Ordover (1990) point out, stronger property rights 
improve appropriability in two ways. First, if the firm chooses not to share its R&D 
results, it will be shielded from the effects of spillovers. Second, if it does, licensing of 
the results will be made more profitable. This in turn will raise incentives for R&D 
outlays and may also increase the dissemination of R&D results.
Patents however have time limits, are sector-specific, and are usually narrowly 
defined so that they can in many instances be easily evaded. They are therefore an 
imperfect instrument for restoring appropriability and can never fully offset the large 
externalities associated with private innovation. They may also, as Arrow (1962) and 
Spence (1984) separately pointed out, reduce the efficient sharing of R&D. This is 
because spillovers have the socially beneficial effect of forcing dissemination of 
research at or near its marginal cost of transmission, which for knowledge can be almost
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zero19. Strengthening intellectual property rights will have the effect of incorrectly 
pricing the (essentially public) good that R&D has created. Even then where this does 
not inhibit the diffusion of research findings, research dissemination will occur at 
inefficient prices and will therefore be at a level that is less than socially optimal.
Encouraging cooperation amongst firms at the R&D stage is a third policy tool 
which is receiving increasing attention as both the number and variety of such industrial 
structures are proliferating. The idea is that by sharing research output, research joint 
ventures can increase the efficiency of R&D efforts and eliminate duplication. Simulta­
neously, cost sharing agreements restore some of the incentives to conduct R&D so that 
a technology cooperation agreement may serve as a mechanism to internalise the 
externalities created by spillovers20. The policy is implemented mainly by relaxing the 
antitrust treatment of joint ventures 21. The desirability however of public policy to 
encourage the formation of joint research ventures will depend on a number of factors, 
including the structural characteristics of the relevant research and product markets, the 
objectives of the venture and the strategies of the participants 22.
19 This argument, together with its pitfalls and limitations, is elaborated in the next section.
20 Beside problems of low appropriability of the results of R&D, other factors that underlie the 
formation of technical cooperation agreements between firms include the high and rising costs 
of innovation, the requirements of a  widened scientific and technological base and issues of 
access to international markets. For a  recent review see  F. Chesnais (1988). In general, the 
equilibrium characteristics of industries characterised by firms engaged in research joint 
ventures a s  a  response to the existence of research spillovers are analysed in a  number of 
recent papers, such as d’ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Vonortas (1989) and Henriques 
(1990). These models are in a  sense a  counterpart of the types of models developed in the 
chapters that follow. They investigate the characteristics of cooperative equilibria characterised 
by spillovers, while we look at the characteristics of non-cooperative equilibria.
21 For an analysis of the public policy implications of research joint ventures from the standpoint 
of reform of antitrust legislation, see  Grossman and Shapiro (1984).
“ Katz (1984) and Katz and Ordover (1990). They point out that ex ante cooperation (ie 
cooperation in research) will not necessarily lead to a  greater amount or greater efficiency of 
R&D investment. An assessm ent of the effects of ex ante cooperation is only meaningful in the 
context of analysis that compares R&D levels and efficiency of research consortia both with 
those in the absence of cooperation and with the case  where firms engage in ex post 
cooperation (such as patent licensing).
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III. Spillovers and Economic Theory
Innovation policy and empirical studies have one preoccupation in common: the 
former assume and the latter test for the existence of a tradeoff between incentives to 
undertake R&D expenditures and the efficiency with which a given level of cost 
reduction is in fact achieved. In this section we discuss the theory behind this apparent 
tradeoff, together with some arguments that suggest that it may be overstated. We then 
examine some attempts to model spillovers in an oligopolistic context that addresses 
this issue. We conclude with a discussion of strategic behaviour arguments and their 
implications for the impact of spillovers, especially in the context of international trade.
a. Static welfare externalities
For the efficient operation of the innovation process, markets must provide 
adequate and appropriate incentives and rewards to inventors and innovators, while 
ensuring efficient selection and ranking amongst alternatives in terms of resource 
allocations. Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959) are credited as being the first to identify a 
number of reasons why the market might support insufficient scientific effort and 
allocate this effort in an inefficient manner. Their analysis derives from the characteri­
sation of invention as the production of information or knowledge. They consequently 
focus on the "public good" aspect of knowledge, the externalities associated with its 
production and the resulting divergence between private and social costs and benefits.
Knowledge has a number of characteristics that complicate its provision by private 
agents in a market system. The two fundamental characteristics here are attributes 
possessed in varying degrees by any economic good: rivalry and excludability. An 
input is rival if its use by one person precludes it being used by another. A good is 
excludable if the owner can preclude others from using it. Knowledge is widely 
considered to be a partially excludable and non-rivalrous good (Romer, 1990).
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Private goods are perfectly excludable; public goods are not. Knowledge 
possesses the public good attribute of not being excludable in that it is difficult for 
agents that have devoted resources to generating innovations to appropriate the benefits 
and prevent others from using the knowledge without adequate compensation. It is 
however considered to be only imperfectly excludable, in that innovators capture at 
least part of the social benefits associated with the development of knowledge 23. Such 
knowledge "spillovers" imply that in situations where some of the inventive activity is 
not fully appropriable, there exists an ex ante negative externality operating on reduced 
incentives to spend on R&D. In such situations, the market may be providing 
insufficient incentives for the socially optimal provision of knowledge.
Non-rivalry is another characteristic of knowledge and a feature typical of public 
goods. When a piece of knowledge or information about a particular innovation is 
non-rival, the number of people using it (consuming the services rendered) can be 
increased without additional costs, at least up to some capacity constraintu . A welfare 
optimum in this situation requires that the price of the associated product be equal to the 
marginal variable cost of transmitting the information. Once produced therefore, 
efficient allocation of R&D requires near-free dissemination and therefore low 
appropriability. To the extent that because of instruments (such as patents) or restrictive 
practices arising out of some monopoly situation price diverges from marginal cost, 
R&D will be under-utilised and the welfare optimum will not be achieved.
"R om er (1990) notes that in order to reconcile private provision of innovation with perfect 
non-excludability of knowledge it is necessary to consider innovation as  the unintended 
consequence of some other activity, such as investment in (traditional) capital or in education. 
In that situation, it is not possible to account for R&D activities by private firms.
" T h e  "lumpiness" of knowledge is important here. To the extent that cost-reducing 
expenditures are fixed costs of production, the main element of R&D expenditures is the initial 
outlay. The marginal cost of production is then simply the cost of the transmission of the new 
information to other firms, which is near zero.
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While therefore low appropriability points to an ex ante negative externality 
associated with reduced incentives, the non-rivalrous aspect of knowledge indicates the 
existence of an ex post positive externality of cost reduction. High spillovers can 
therefore reduce the industry’s R&D cost of achieving a given level of product cost 
reduction and thereby increase dynamic performance. This suggests that a problem 
exists in reconciling the opposite aims of a framework that must provide innovators 
with an environment which stimulates innovative activity (by restricting use of the 
innovation and thereby guaranteeing some gains to the innovator) while at the same 
time allowing maximum use of its product (by keeping its price low and thereby 
ensuring imitation, adoption and diffusion)25.
b. Dynamic externalities and systemic factors
The characterisation of innovation as the production of information and its 
associated public good characteristics have given rise to the argument that there exists a 
tradeoff between an ex ante negative externality operating on reduced incentives to 
conduct R&D and an ex post positive externality operating on cost reduction. A 
number of issues however related to the dynamic nature of innovation and its systemic 
characteristics have contributed to a more complete understanding of the forces guiding 
incentives and performance in markets characterised by innovative activities.
The first concerns the heterogeneity of knowledge. Nelson (1980), among others, 
has drawn a distinction between two types of technological knowledge: the generic (or 
basic research) part, consisting of inferences about how things work, the identification 
of constraints and of possible ways of overcoming them, and heuristics relative to the
25 Another potential source of market failure is the (often uninsurable) risk and uncertainty 
inherent in the research process, and especially at the basic research end of the spectrum. 
These are not problems unique to research. They are not the focus of this thesis and are 
therefore only mentioned here. For an analysis that does justice to their implications see  
Dasgupta (1987) and Dasgupta and Maskin (1987).
23
problems at hand; and the "operative techniques" (or development) part, consisting of 
particular ways to make things work which are specific to the task at hand. The generic 
part is the one possessing the "public good" features to a great extent, since generic 
knowledge has a wide range of applications, can be communicated without major 
learning costs, and could considerably limit the capabilities of those denied access. The 
"techniques" part often possesses the public good properties only to a limited extent; the 
range of "technique" applicability is narrow, its learning entails high costs because it 
needs to be applied to the specific needs of the user, and denial of access may not 
eliminate chances for technological success if the generic part has been assimilated.
In a more general sense, most technological knowledge is "information" that, 
while being generally applicable and easily reproducible, is specific to particular firms 
and applications, can be embodied in products and processes, and varies amongst 
industries in its source and direction (Pavitt, 1984). As a consequence, the concept of a 
"pool" of knowledge underlying Arrow’s analysis misses the firm-specific or process- 
and product-specific and differentiated nature of most of the expenditures necessary to 
produce a new technique or product. Specificity and localisation are determining 
characteristics of most innovations, both in terms of functional applications and in terms 
of the ability of the innovating firm to appropriate relevant knowledge26. This implies 
that the cost of acquiring technological knowledge in a usable form may be high. 
Evidence suggests that the resources spent on reverse-engineering or spying are in fact 
substantial (Levin, 1988), implying that spillovers are not free 27.
20 The "localised" nature of technological progress is a  concept first introduced by Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1969). As Stiglitz (1987) points out, it is related to the distinction m ade between basic 
knowledge, with wide applicability, and technical knowledge, which is much more specific and 
localised.
”  In an early treatment of the subject of spillovers, Nordhaus (1969, p. 37) draws a  distinction 
between the transmission costs of information, which are almost certainly low, and the 
absorption costs, which may require the investment of substantial resources.
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One interpretation of these attributes of innovation that dilute its public good 
characteristics is that they should be seen in the context of the current "technological 
trajectory" and its dominant characteristics 28. Trajectories have different degrees of 
generality in different technologies and industrial sectors; the general hypothesis 
however is that innovation activities are strongly selective, formed in certain directions 
and that they embody a particular pattern of search for new techniques and a resulting 
combination of variety and regularities in the outcome of the innovation process.
Current technological trajectories have a number of dominant characteristics.
One of them is the cumulativeness of technological change at firm, country or world 
level (Chesnais, 1986) which points to the importance of learning processes and restricts 
the "free pool" nature of new technology. It implies that the probability of success in 
innovating is a function of the level of achieved results. What firms do in the future 
therefore is strongly conditioned by what they have done in the past. Search processes 
involved in technological learning are localised around groups of agents and are 
path-dependant29.
Interindustry differences in the nature of technology that relate to the cumula­
tiveness of technological change have been suggested as possible explanations for the 
observed phenomenon of industries characterised both by a low degree of 
appropriability (high spillovers) and by a high R&D intensity. Levin (1988) has argued 
that the disincentive effect of appropriability should be expected to prevail only in 
industries characterised by "discrete" technologies, ie where innovations represent in
“ "Technological trajectories" are defined as directions of advance within particular "techno­
logical paradigms”, themselves defined as "..an ’outlook’, a  set of procedures, a  definition of the 
’relevant’ problems and of the specific knowledge related to their solution." (Dosi, 1982, p. 148).
“ Stiglitz (1987). He also points out that while localised learning enhances the accumulation of 
knowledge along a  given "trajectory”, it creates the possibility that agents (firms, industries or 
countries) can be effectively ”locked-in" to particular trajectories. The welfare implications are 
not clear, however, because they depend on whether one "locks-in" to the socially efficient 
trajectory.
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effect isolated discoveries. In such an environment, knowledge of one firm’s 
innovation may lower the marginal productivity of the R&D investment of its rivals by 
making any additional effort duplicative30. The chemical and drug industries (before 
the revolution in genetic engineering) may be considered examples of such industries.
Technical advance can instead be "cumulative", as seems to have been the case in 
electronics industries, with each advance building on previous technology and incoipo- 
rating many of the features of the displaced products and processes. Spillovers from the 
R&D conducted by one firm can in this case raise the marginal product of the R&D 
conducted by its rivals 31. In such an environment, spillovers can affect positively the 
cost of production and at the same time act as a spur to R&D investment.
The idea that technological advance can be of a "cumulative" nature leads 
naturally to the centrality of the notion of "learning" in the behaviour of firms. Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989) have in fact suggested that in addition to generating new 
innovations, research and development expenditures enhance the firm’s ability to 
assimilate and exploit information in the public domain. The recognition of this second 
role of R&D suggests that the ease of learning within an industry will have a direct 
effect on the level of R&D expenditures and will indirectly determine the influence that 
conditions of appropriability have on R&D investment.
30 This implies that "own" and "borrowed" research can be assum ed to be perfect substitutes, as 
in Spence (1984) and in chapter two below (for basic research only).
31 Katz and Ordover (1990) label this the effect of intermediate technological spillovers. In the 
context of their model, an increase in the R&D level of one firm will increase the effectiveness of 
R&D conducted by rivals when an R&D project consists of a  number of stages that must be 
completed before a  patent can be obtained, and one firm can learn how to complete a  stage by 
observing a  rival’s  success. Put another way, the rival’s probability of success, conditional on 
not being pre-empted, rises. They distinguish this from final R&D spillovers, whereby even 
though one firm may have won the patent race, rival firms may benefit form the product or 
process that the winner has developed. This distinction alludes to substitutability and comple­
mentarity effects between the research of different firms and is an alternative interpretation to 
the nature of technology argument.
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This line of argument recognizes a dual role for R&D: in addition to developing a 
product --new information— , R&D also develops the capability of firms to utilise more 
efficiently already existing information, as well as to learn to anticipate and follow 
future developments. This second aspect has been referred to as "learning to learn" or 
learning by learning, as distinct from "learning by doing" 32. R&D helps firms identify, 
track and potentially take advantage of knowledge initially developed elsewhere: it 
develops firms’ "absorptive" capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).
A number of authors have drawn attention in the past to the role of learning. 
Tilton (1971) has asserted that one of the main reasons why firms invest in R&D in the 
semiconductor industry is in order to "facilitate the assimilation of new technology 
developed elsewhere" 33. Rosenberg (1976) and Nelson and Winter (1977) have argued 
that in order for firms to be able to use freely available knowledge they often have to 
invest in R&D. Rosenberg (1990) has likened performance in (basic) research as "a 
ticket of admission to an information network". In all cases, authors argued that these 
expenditures were necessary because, rather than knowledge being "on the shelf', it 
often requires a substantial research capability in order to understand and assimilate the 
knowledge that is in principle in the public domain.
While the recognition of the role of R&D in learning is not new, its implications 
for the ability of firms to appropriate publicly available knowledge have not been 
explored until recently 34. Imitation costs have been interpreted as primarily consisting
“ Learning by doing refers to a  process by which the firm becom es more efficient in what it is 
already doing. Learning to learn allows a  firm to acquire outside knowledge that will help it to do 
something different (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Therefore just as experience in production 
increases one’s productivity in producing (learning by doing), so  experience in learning may 
increase one’s  productivity in learning (Stiglitz, 1987).
“ Tilton (1971), p. 71 as cited in Cohen and Levinthal (1989).
“ The papers of Stiglitz (1987) and Cohen and Levinthal (1989) are two examples of 
approaches that develop theoretical frameworks in which the capacity to absorb new 
information is enhanced by one’s learning experience.
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of the cost of transmission of information, ie as being of a static nature, and small when 
compared to the cost of generating the innovation. Such costs however may depend 
crucially on the technological level achieved by a firm (its stock of accumulated R&D). 
The capacity to imitate and take advantage of technological developments elsewhere 
may depend crucially on own R&D expenditures.
The question of what determines the costs of assimilating technological 
knowledge is central to the impact of spillovers. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue that 
these costs are low when the firm has already invested in the development of its 
absorptive capacity in the relevant field. This suggests that the long-run cost of learning 
may be substantial and that it is borne by the development of a stock of knowledge. 
Consequently, in an environment characterised by spillovers and where it is possible to 
learn from competitors, the incentives for R&D investment should be influenced by the 
knowledge that they themselves contribute to that learning.
The extent to which R&D is critical to the development of a firm’s absorptive 
capacity (and therefore implicitly to the "cost” of spillovers) depends on the character­
istics of outside knowledge. In addition to the degree to which a particular field of 
knowledge is cumulative, identified also by other authors, Cohen and Levinthal suggest 
that the complexity of the knowledge to be assimilated, the degree to which the outside 
knowledge is targeted to the specific needs of the firm, and a field’s pace of advance all 
have a role to play. The more complex outside knowledge is and the more generic and 
less targeted its nature, the more important are R&D expenditures for identifying and 
allowing the exploitation of valuable knowledge. Similarly, the faster the pace of 
advance of the field, the greater is the effort required to keep up with developments.
From the above discussion it should be clear that the simple statement that 
problems of appropriability reduce the incentives that firms have in R&D needs to be
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heavily qualified. The costs involved in imitation, learning curve effects, and the nature 
of technological advance itself point to a more complicated picture where the public 
good nature of R&D is considerably weakened. This is reinforced by the existence of a 
whole array of other appropriability devices, apart from patents and commercial 
secrecy, such as lead times, superior sales and service efforts, or differential technical 
efficiency related to scale economies. It follows that any welfare criteria that are 
developed in order to guide policy-making need to take into account the differential 
importance of the appropriability problem depending on the market structure and 
characteristics for which the relevant innovation is intended.
c. Modelling research spillovers
Modelling spillovers is relatively recent. While the importance of appropriability 
for innovative activity has been recognized and modelled since Arrow’s (1962) seminal 
article, it has not been until recently that models appeared in the literature taking 
explicitly into account the effect of a firm’s inventive activity on other firms by 
formulating "borrowing" functions that allow for an interaction between the size of 
individual and aggregate R&D effort.
These models have grown out of a literature that attempted to formalise 
Schumpeter’s original insights about market structure and innovation 35 by focusing on 
firm behaviour with respect to incentives for R&D investments, and on the character­
istics of the resulting industrial structure and performance. R&D was treated as fully 
appropriable (no spillovers) and the degree of innovation was either taken to depend on 
an exogenous market structure, or alternatively market structure and innovation were
"N am ely that there is a  positive relationship between innovation and monopoly power and that 
large firms are more innovative than small firms Schumpeter (1975). The second postulate is 
often attributed to Galbraith (1953). See also the discussion of Dasgupta (1987) about the 
debate on what Schumpeter really meant.
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treated as endogenous variables that are determined simultaneously. In this latter case, 
the characteristics of both industrial structure and innovative performance were traced 
to more fundamental factors: the structure of demand or extent of the market 
(Schmookler, 1966); the nature of technological opportunities (Rosenberg, 1976); and 
the technological and institutional conditions that determine the appropriability of R&D 
benefits by firms36.
Published papers that develop a theoretical framework incorporating spillovers in 
the context of an oligopolistic industry include Levin and Reiss (1983,1989), Hartwick 
(1983), Spence (1984), Cohen and Levinthal (1989). Some unpublished work is by 
Leung (1983) and Vonortas (1987,1988)37. These models take into account the
31 Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) is a  representative example of the type of models that focus on
the incentives that firms have for R&D expenditures and on the resulting industrial structure and 
performance. Since the model in chapter two of this dissertation is an extension of their model,
their main results are reviewed in the beginning of the next chapter. Another type of models in
the economics of innovation focus on the speed of technological development by formulating 
R&D competition as a  race to innovate. Representative examples are Loury (1979), Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz (1980b), Lee and Wilde (1980), and Reinganum (1982,1984,1985). These models 
deal with the time-cost tradeoff of research. Firms are assum ed to move sequentially in 
repeated games that are "tournaments” (in the expression of Dasgupta, 1986) ie where firm 
performance is rewarded on the basis of rank within the set of all realized performances. This 
necessitates asymmetric behaviour on the part of firms. In these models It is possible for firms
to duplicate each other’s research with the result that the market can generate too much, rather 
than too little, R&D relative to the social optimum.
Both these types of models are based on the principles of maximisation and equilibrium. An 
altogether different approach is taken in "evolutionary theory”-type models (Nelson and Winter 
1977,1982). They treat the Schumpetarian hypothesis as a  process of evolutionary change 
and argue that the concepts of equilibrium and maximisation are incompatible with the process 
of evolution; they rely instead on "routines", "rules of thumb" and stochastic elements to 
describe firm behaviour. The approach yields useful insights, but the generality adopted has its 
price: the models are not analytically tractable and are only open to simulation techniques.
37 There are important precursors to these models in attempts to model spillovers outside an 
oligopolistic framework. Nordhaus (1969, ch. 3) developed a  model of technological change in 
a  competitive market where firms take into account that som e of their research "spills out" and 
benefits other firms. Their productivity depends on the research inputs of ail firms via an explicit 
spillover parameter. Griliches (1979) and Schankerman (1979) have also developed simple 
models that allow for an interaction between individual and aggregate research effort. While 
Griliches introduces exogenous (to the firm) knowledge as an additional input into a  conven­
tional production function, Schankerman specifies (and estimates) a  knowledge production 
function that includes "borrowed" research. He also develops a  simple general equilibrium 
model in order to examine the question of underinvestment in R&D due to spillovers and the 
issue of optimal subsidies. His model leads him to conclude that spillovers do not necessarily 
imply underinvestment in R&D.
30
interaction between competing firms and focus on the determinants of R&D 
expenditures at firm and industry level and on the implications for industrial structure.
Hartwick (1984), Leung (1983) and Vonortas (1987) are all simple extensions of 
the Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) model for the case of spillovers. Hartwick expands 
the firm’s unit production cost function to include the R&D expenditures of all other 
firms. There is no spillover parameter as such; a firm’s own and the total of its rivals’ 
R&D enter into a Cobb-Douglas specification with differential elasticities of cost 
reduction with respect to R&D38. This implies a certain amount of complementarity 
between own and rival R&D. His simulations lead him to conclude that the socially 
optimal outcome may involve more than one firm operating 39. Unlike in the Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz (1980a) model, the market outcome involves R&D and production levels 
that are below the social optimum. Subsidies to R&D for each firm in the market can 
therefore improve welfare.
Leung (1983) and Vonortas (1987) similarly extend the Dasgupta and Stiglitz 
(1980) framework by formulating a marginal cost function where the part of rivals’
“ Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) use a  unit production cost function of the form c, = c(^,), where x, 
is the firm’s own R&D expenditures, which for the derivation of explicit results they parameterize 
as  Cj = p*r°\ where 1/p is the scientific level of the industry and a  is the elasticity of own reduction
with respect to R&D. Hartwick extends this to the form c, = c(x„x,) where x, -  X This he
i * i
parameterizes as ct = where y is the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to rival R&D.
“ "Letting a  thousand flowers bloom”, an old idea in R&D economics that can be traced back to 
Nelson (1961). In the simulations that deliver these results however, the parameters chosen 
exhibit increasing returns to scale to R&D expenditures; in addition, the elasticity of cost 
reduction with respect to rivals’ R&D is greater than that with respect to own R&D.
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R&D that spills out is a perfect substitute for a firm’s own R&D. Leung obtains the 
result that an industry characterised by higher spillovers will be less concentrated, while 
spillovers will act as a disincentive to R&D when demand for the product is inelastic 40.
Levin and Reiss (1984) generalise the cost formulation by including industry-wide 
R&D alongside a firm’s own R&D expenditures41. They distinguish between three 
dimensions of appropriability. The first is a technological dimension. To the extent 
that unit cost reduction is very elastic with respect to increments in the industry-wide 
R&D (holding own R&D constant), costless imitation is relatively easy and R&D is 
(technologically) inappropriable. The second dimension is structural: for any given 
technology of R&D and market size, a firm’s appropriable benefits from increasing the 
common pool of knowledge depend on its market share (which in symmetry is the 
reverse of the number of firms). Finally, the third dimension is behavioural'. Levin and 
Reiss examine the firm’s response to the existence of a pool of knowledge it can use (ie 
be a free rider and cut back on own R&D or not) by a conjectural variation parameter42.
40Leung’s functional specification of the cost function Is c, = + ® ^ xj j^  where 0 is the spillover
rate. Vonortas (1987) breaks R&D into basic (x) and development research (y) and uses a  cost
function of the form c, = (*<■+ wher e 8 is the firm's absorptive capacity (assumed
exogenous) and y is the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to own development research 
expenditures. Rather than examining the impact of spillovers however, his primary interest is in 
comparing the noncooperative equilibrium with the one that results when firms cooperate in 
(non-appropriable) basic research.
41 Their cost specification is c, = c(pc»X) where X represents the pool of industry-wide R&D. They 
also use the functional form c, =
42 All three dimensions of appropriability are reflected in the models developed in the following 
chapters. The technological dimension is captured through the assumptions about substitut­
ability and complementarity implicit in the use of different functional forms for the knowledge 
production functions; the structural dimension is captured by endogenising the determination of 
the equilibrium number of firms. Also both these dimensions are reflected in the spillover rate. 
Finally the behavioural dimension is captured in the construction of the strategic model and the 
comparison with the Cournot (one stage) model. Such an approach seem s to be preferable to 
varying exogenously a  conjectural variations parameter, as the notion of "reaction" is not very 
meaningful in a  one-stage game.
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The model by Spence (1984) is essentially static, but with dynamic connotations: a 
firm’s unit costs depend on its accumulated knowledge. Additions to that knowledge 
depend on own R&D expenditures and on the part of the R&D expenditures of rivals 
that spill over. The underlying assumption is that a firm’s own R&D capital is a perfect 
substitute for borrowed R&D capital. He examines the impact of spillovers on 
incentives and on industry performance. For incentives, his interest is twofold: he 
analyses the effect of spillovers on the comparison between private and social 
incentives to invest in R&D and also the sign of their effect on private R&D investment.
Spence’s main conclusion is that while spillovers reduce the incentives for cost 
reduction, they also reduce the costs at the industry level of achieving a given level of 
cost reduction. Put another way, with appropriability of R&D, the achievable surplus of 
the market is lower because a high rate of cost reduction can only be achieved with 
significant R&D outlays. He constructs a simple example that demonstrates that for a 
given number of firms, the incentives of the market decline with the spillover rate; for a 
given spillover rate, they decline as the industry becomes less concentrated (except at 
low spillover rates, where some competition increases the amount of cost reduction) 43, 
In the absence of subsidies, the market performs best with moderate spillovers (which 
reduce industry R&D without excessively removing incentives).
If the government subsidises R&D, Spence shows that both firm incentives and 
market performance increase with the spillover rate (for a given number of firms); for a 
given spillover rate, as the number of firms increases, incentives and performance first 
rise and then fall beyond the point where the redundancy costs overwhelm the
43 Incentives are reflected In a  function that accounts for the present value of the effect of own 
and of borrowed R&D on a firm’s earnings gross of R&D investment. They are expressed as 
the ratio of these benefits implicitly recognized by the market to the optimal surplus. Market 
performance is evaluated by calculating total surplus net of the cost of R&D and of any R&D 
subsidies. Relative market performance is then the ratio of the surplus actually achieved by the 
market to the first best optimal surplus.
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competitive effect on margins. At very high spillover rates however they just rise with 
the number of firms because of the absence of the redundancy problem. Finally, 
optimal subsidies are always positive when research is less than fully appropriable and 
rise with the spillover rate.
In a more recent paper, Levin and Reiss (1989) extend the approach taken in their 
earlier model by assuming that R&D can be demand-creating, as well as cost-reducing. 
Technological opportunities and the degree of appropriability differ between 
(cost-reducing) process R&D and (demand-creating) product R&D; the authors thus 
examine the effect of spillovers on both the amount and the type of R&D. They also 
allow for the possibility that own and rival R&D are imperfect substitutes; this permits 
the consideration of how variations in the degree of substitution between own and rival 
R&D affect incentives to undertake R&D 44.
When R&D is cost-reducing only, they obtain that concentration and (process) 
R&D intensity fall with increases in the extent of spillovers but rise with increases in the 
productivity of spillovers. The latter result appears because, in a situation where own 
and rival R&D are imperfect substitutes, own R&D is enhanced by increases in industry 
knowledge. When R&D is both cost-reducing and demand-creating, it is not possible to 
sign unambiguously the comparative statics of the complete system. Nevertheless,
44The cost specification in general form in the Levin and Reiss 1989 model is similar to their 
1984 model ie c( =  c(xitx ) where X  represents the pool of industry-wide R&D. It is further
assum ed th a t*  = * ,.+ 0£  *,. They parameterize this as  c, = + xiy. While in the
specification of industry-wide process R&D own and rival R&D are perfect substitutes, the effect 
of /mperfect substitutability is obtained by including separately own R&D and the pool consisting 
of own and rival R&D in the cost function. They therefore calculate two separate elasticities of 
unit costs with respect to each type of process R&D. This allows a  distinction to be made 
between the extent of spillovers (how much R&D leaks out) and the productivity of spillovers 
(how much borrowed R&D reduces costs).
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under certain circumstances45, increases in the extent of process and product R&D 
spillovers decrease concentration and R&D intensity, while increases in the productivity 
of spillovers have the opposite effect. When the extent of spillovers is near zero 
however, an increase in the extent of spillovers may increase the intensity of R&D.
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) assume that firms invest in R&D for two reasons: in 
order to produce innovations and in order to learn from competitors and from 
knowledge sources outside the industry (universities, labs). The ease o f learning within 
an industry will therefore affect incentives to spend on R&D; it will also determine the 
impact of appropriability and of technological opportunity on these incentives. 
Spillovers in this setting can encourage equilibrium R&D expenditures.
Their model follows Spence (1984) in assuming in the specification of the 
determination of the firm’s stock of knowledge that extra-firm R&D expenditures are a 
simple addition to a firm’s own R&D expenditures; unlike Spence however, the 
proportion of this knowledge that can actually be absorbed by the firm depends on its 
absorptive capacity. The latter is an endogenous variable, determined by a firm’s own 
R&D expenditures and by a variable reflecting the characteristics of outside knowledge 
that make own R&D more or less important to the development of absorptive capacity.
The endogeneity of absorptive capacity implies that contrary to the standard 
proposition, the effect of spillovers on incentives to invest in R&D is now ambiguous. 
Thee are two offsetting effects: the loss associated with the diminished appropriability 
as spillovers increase; and the benefit to the firm of increasing its absorptive capacity. 
This latter positive absorption effect may therefore offset the negative appropriability
49These circumstances relate to the case when the Jacobian of the system is positive. The 
authors claim that this is indeed the case when it is evaluated using the estimates that they 
obtain in the empirical part of the paper.
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incentive, with the result that spillovers can act as a spur to R&D investment. 
Furthermore, the more learning becomes dependent on own R&D, the more increasing 
technological opportunity or spillovers will tend to induce R&D effort.
Despite their differences, these models suggest in any attempt to model spillovers, 
the type of environment firms are assumed to be operating in is important. It is an 
environment where there exist substantial opportunities for cost reduction through R&D 
expenditures, but where the cost of achieving them are substantial, though not 
prohibitive. Put another way, R&D is neither ineffective in reducing costs, nor very 
effective and cheap. There is therefore a conflict between allocative efficiency and 
dynamic technical efficiency (Spence, 1984); in those circumstances, there are potential 
incentive and performance problems associated with spillovers.
d. Strategic arguments and the International dimension
A number of authors have explicitly or implicitly modelled firm behaviour as a 
multi-stage process, where the decision on the amount to produce takes place after the 
expenditures on R&D have already been made. In addition to being a more faithful 
representation of the timing in actual decision-making, this procedure has interesting 
implications for firms’ strategies with respect to R&D. In particular, in a situation 
where R&D reduces marginal costs, a multi-stage decision process gives rise to an 
incentive on the part of firms to shift resources to the "sunk" category of costs in the 
early (R&D-related) stages of the game so as to gain a strategic advantage in the later 
(output) stage of the game, where production takes place in an imperfectly competitive 
market (Brander and Spencer, 1983a). Even therefore in the situation where R&D is
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cost-reducing only, the elaboration of such a framework allows firms to perceive and 
act upon more complex strategies that go beyond the use of R&D for straight 
cost-minimisation46.
The extension of these models to the case where R&D is subject to spillovers 
allows an examination of issues related to the interaction of strategic behaviour and 
inappropriability of research findings47. In this context it is possible to perform 
comparisons along two lines: (i) between the multi-stage equilibrium with spillovers 
and the multi-stage equilibrium with full appropriability; and (ii) between the strategic 
(multi-stage) equilibrium and the Cournot (one stage) equilibrium when in both cases 
R&D is subject to spillovers. These comparisons help to answer two related questions: 
whether or how spillovers affect the incentives of firms to invest in R&D and the 
performance of the industry when firms use R&D strategically; and whether the effect 
of strategic behaviour on R&D expenditures, output and profitability of industries is 
altered in the presence of spillovers.
Strategic behaviour related to R&D also has wide implications for international 
trade issues and for government behaviour. Firms often seem to be investing heavily in 
research and development in the direction of previously unexplored, but potentially 
profitable, areas with the explicit aim of making it too expensive for rivals to enter an 
international market. The implication is that the evolution and industrial structure 
characteristics of certain international oligopolistic markets will depend largely on such
44 The argument for the strategic use of R&D is similar to "credible threat" arguments in oligopoly
theory, such as those developed in Spence (1977,1979) or Dixit (1980). These models
em phasise the role of irreversible investments in establishing market power.
47 Of the spillover models reviewed in the previous section, only Spence (1984) and Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989) take partly into account strategic consideration. Their models are implicitly 
two-stage, in the sense that when deciding on R&D levels, firms take into account the influence 
of their expenditures on their rivals’ cost, production and earnings, and the feedback on their 
own profits. Spence also compares this setup with a  situation where firms "ignore” the effect of 
their R&D on rivals (the equivalent to a  one-stage Cournot equilibrium).
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a strategic use of R&D, rather than on considerations of efficient resource allocation. In 
this second-best world, substantial government support of research and development 
efforts in particular industrial sectors over extended time periods may be justified48.
These type of arguments have often provided the theoretical rationale for a number 
of government measures in technology and trade policy. They are based on the 
recognition that with trade today seeming to reflect temporary advantages resulting 
from shifting leads in technological races (Krugman, 1986), the capacity for innovation 
is critical for international competitiveness and in order to maintain world export shares. 
The importance of non-price factors in competitiveness (such as quality, reliability, 
technical flexibility and sophistication) and of imperfectly competitive environments 
points to a pattern of international competition through process and product innovation 
within which firms commit substantial resources in order to maintain a competitive 
advantage and countries intervene in order to support "national champions” 49.
Such arguments implicitly or explicitly recognize that a national government is a 
player in a multi-stage international game involving both domestic and foreign firms 
engaged in innovative activities. By virtue of their power, national governments can 
change the rules of the game, define new strategies, preempt old ones or alter the
46 For an elaboration of these arguments see  the papers by Krugman and Brander in Krugman 
(ed.t 1986). In the sam e volume, Grossman provides a  powerful critique. For an analysis that
deals with these issues in the context of the debate for an industrial strategy in Europe, see
Pearce and Sutton (1986).
49 Note that this rationale for government intervention in international markets does not hinge on 
assumptions that the process of international competitiveness is assum ed to converge to a  long 
run equilibrium. Instead, it is held that at each point in time there exist profitable opportunities 
for intervention by national governments in international markets in which competition is 
imperfect and where a  number of participants are making positive profits. This is because the 
division of profits between competitors cannot be determined a  priori on grounds of efficiency: it 
depends largely on their strategic interaction. For an elaboration of this argument see  Justm an 
and Teubal (1986), Pearce and Sutton (1986) and Lyons (1987).
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payoffs to the other players, thus affecting the outcome of international competition 
through new products and processes. In this way, they can attempt to reverse the 
comparative advantage rooted in the cumulative effect of past technologies5#.
The question that arises in the context of the concerns of this dissertation is 
whether these arguments survive in an environment where research is subject to 
spillovers. With R&D less than fully appropriable, some of the research of the domestic 
firm(s) spills over to foreign rivals. This should affect the incentives to invest in R&D 
and the structure of international production. Since however there is no a priori reason 
to believe that international intrasectoral spillovers are of a different nature from 
domestic intrasectoral spillovers, firm incentives and industry performance in the 
international case are affected in the same way as they are in the case of domestic 
spillovers. If spillovers among domestic rivals acts as a disincentive for R&D, so 
should spillovers among international rivals.
When considering public policy however, these similarities give way to important 
differences. To the extent that part of the knowledge generated by an R&D subsidy is
“ For a  concrete example assum e the existence of two firms (or countries) producing two differ­
entiated products making positive profits. Assume also that given their presence a  third firm (or 
country) would make losses if it entered the market, whatever its product specification. Given 
that the identity of the firms (or countries) is undetermined, the role of a  national industrial policy 
is taken to be to tilt the balance in favour of a  domestic potential entrant into the market over 
one of the foreign rivals. By using subsidies that reduce costs to a  domestic firm or 
procurement policies or tariffs which raise its potential revenues while reducing that of foreign 
rivals, public policy can in general change the (several) available configurations. Alternatively, a  
large country by blocking access to its domestic market might exclude an otherwise available 
situation in which a  foreign producer entered. Such policies work by changing the product-de- 
velopment strategies of foreign producers (and only to the extent that they do so). They affect 
foreign producers’ decisions by altering their profitable strategies.
This stylized example illustrates the possibility of using an international competitive strategy in 
order to enter profitably a new market or forestall entry of a  foreign producer. The argument is 
however equally applicable in the case where a  number of firms are sharing an established 
international market and making profits. By subsidising R&D or exports a  national government 
can decrease the production costs of its domestic firm and thereby increase its market share 
and profits at the expense of rivals. Relative to export subsidies, however, an R&D subsidy has 
the advantage of effective subsidisation of an earliest stage of the production process (as 
opposed to output subsidies) and is as a  consequence less likely to invite retaliation, or be 
illegal on the basis of international codes of acceptable behaviour (such a s  GATT rules).
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available to a domestic firm’s foreign competitor, a public policy of subsidising R&D 
has an important externality attached to it, not previously present when spillovers were 
absent. In an analogous fashion, when a foreign firm cannot appropriate part of its 
R&D investment, a foreign government’s subsidisation of the research of its national 
champion cannot be "contained" within that country’s national borders. This externality 
is fundamentally different to the one in the case of domestic competition and domestic 
R&D subsidies. In that case, the government’s objective is to maximise domestic 
welfare, which involves all firms that are recipients of the subsidy. In the case of 
international competition, the objective of the subsidy is profit-shifting; in setting 
subsidy rates the government is only concerned with the interests of the domestic firm.
Attempts to model international competition through R&D in a framework where 
firms use R&D for strategic purposes have not until now examined the implication of 
research spillovers for the characteristics of the resulting equilibria and for the 
appropriate role of public policy. Similarly, spillovers have been exclusively modelled 
in a domestic framework; the implications of international spillovers for public policy 
have not been explored. The model developed in chapter five of this dissertation 
attempts to fill this gap. It addresses the question of whether or how the presence of 
externalities in R&D in the strategic model alters the incentives on the part of 
governments to subsidise R&D and how it affects more generally the characteristics of 
the noncooperative international equilibrium.
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IV. Structure of the dissertation
The main body of the thesis consists of four chapters. The structure of chapter two 
is as follows. After an introductory section, section II develops an framework where n 
firms compete by setting simultaneously output and R&D expenditures. We derive the 
equilibrium levels of R&D expenditures and output in the presence of spillovers in basic 
research under the assumption that "own" and "borrowed" basic research are perfect 
substitutes, and that basic and development research enter as inputs into a knowledge 
production function of a Cobb-Douglas form. Both the case where there exist barriers 
to entry and where free entry results in firms earning zero profits in equilibrium are 
examined. We look at how the key variables at the firm or industry level (R&D levels 
and composition, cost reduction, profits and industry structure) vary with the degree of 
appropriability (the extent of spillovers), and we examine whether the main results of 
similar models that omit spillovers stand in the presence of inappropriability.
In section IQ of that chapter we turn to the case where the industry is socially 
managed and derive the optimal levels of output and R&D in the presence of spillovers. 
These levels serve as a benchmark against which the performance of the market and the 
incentives it provides for cost reduction through R&D are compared (section IV). In 
section IV, we also examine how a government policy of subsidising basic research 
affects the incentives to invest in the partially appropriable part of R&D. Optimal 
subsidy rates are derived and their determinants are examined. Section V pulls together 
the main conclusions of the chapter.
Chapter three focuses on the importance of the nature of technology for the impact 
of spillovers by adopting a knowledge production function of a constant elasticity of 
substitution form; this allows varying degrees of substitutability and complementarity 
between three research inputs: a firm’s own basic research, the basic research of its
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rivals and its own development research. Section I discusses the approach taken. 
Section II solves for the equilibrium levels of R&D expenditures and output in an 
/i-firm oligopoly both when there are barriers to entry for the case of free entry. The 
effect of spillovers on R&D levels, costs, output and profit under this new parameter­
ization of the knowledge production function are examined. Section HI develops the 
solution for the socially-managed industry and enquires on whether the socially optimal 
outcome in this case can involve more than one firm operating.
Section IV examines the implications of these results for the incentives of the 
market to conduct basic research as well as its performance relative to the socially 
optimal case. A government policy of subsidising basic research is also examined; it is 
established that its nature and effectiveness depends on the characteristics of the 
underlying knowledge production function. Section V presents a numerical simulation 
that illustrates the main results of chapters two and three. Under two alternative 
functional forms of the knowledge production function, we examine the response of key 
variables (such as the composition of R&D, R&D intensity, relative costs and market 
performance, etc.) to variations in the spillover rate and the degree of concentration in 
the industry. Finally, section VI concludes with a discussion that allows direct 
comparison of the main conclusions to emerge with those of chapter two.
Chapter four consists of four sections. Section I presents the rationale for 
developing a strategic model of R&D with spillovers where firms choose the levels of 
research expenditures and their output levels in a multi-stage game. Section two 
develops a three-stage model with spillovers in basic research in general form and 
compares its equilibrium with that of the one-stage (Cournot) model developed in the 
previous chapters. We examine the effects of different assumptions about basic and 
development research inappropriability on the comparative statics properties of the
42
model and compare the resulting equilibrium with that of the non-strategic model.
An explicit solution to a two-stage model that does not distinguish between basic 
and development research is derived in section HI on the basis of two different specifi­
cations of the knowledge production function: (i) one that assumes perfect substitut­
ability between "own” and "borrowed" R&D; and (ii) a constant elasticity of 
substitution knowledge production function. These specifications allow us to solve for 
the case of rt symmetric firms and compare R&D levels, output and profits in the 
strategic model with the corresponding levels in the non-strategic model.
Section IV summarises the conclusions of the chapter and relates these to the 
approach taken in chapters two and three with the help of a simple schema. The schema 
focuses on the two sets of factors that have been explored throughout these chapters: 
technology factors, relating to the industry-specific characteristics of technical advance 
and to the way that a firm’s own R&D combines with that of its rivals to reduce costs; 
and factors relating to the behaviour of firms and to the precise nature of the 
oligopolistic game being played through R&D. The combination of these factors 
determine the nature of the impact of spillovers on the incentives that firms have to 
invest on R&D, on firm profitability, and on industrial structure and performance.
Finally, chapter five is a direct application of the strategic framework with 
spillovers decveloped in chapter four to international trade. A duopoly model of 
international competition with spillovers in R&D is developed and its equilibrium 
characteristics are analysed. The model is then extended to accommodate the 
possibility of governments subsidising the R&D of their domestic firm in a policy of 
"precommitment". Under these circumstances, we explore the effect of a domestic 
subsidy to R&D on R&D expenditures, the nature of optimal subsidies and the rate of 
return of such government intervention.
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CHAPTER TWO
R&D SPILLOVERS AND INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE 
BASIC RESEARCH AS A PUBLIC GOOD
I. The framework
In this chapter we develop a framework that incorporates "spillover effects" of a 
firm’s inventive activity to other firms. "Spillovers" are defined here as that part of the 
firm’s research and development (R&D) expenditures 1 that cannot be appropriated by 
means of patents, market power or otherwise and which is potentially usable by other 
firms (perhaps at a cost to them) without any compensation to the firm that originated 
the research. Given however that the product of R&D —new knowledge-- has some 
features typical of public goods, the fact that some of the R&D expenditures spill over 
to other firms does not preclude the full use of the resulting R&D knowledge by the 
innovating firm as well.
Research spillovers can be mfrasectoral or intersectoral; some of the R&D may 
leak to rivals in the same industrial sector or to firms in other sectors with which the 
innovating firm is technologically linked. Given that the models developed in this and 
the following chapters are of oligopolistic rivaliy, the focus is on spillovers of the first 
type only. There is no doubt that a comprehensive theoretical treatment of the effects of 
spillovers would require the inclusion of both types of spillovers; the exclusion of the 
inter-industry effects may be at the expense of understating the cost-reducing effect of 
low appropriability.
1 What "spills out" in effect is the knowledge created as a  result of expenditures in research and 
development; spillovers in other words operate on the outcome of R&D expenditures, ie the 
resulting process or product innovation. Given that the product of R&D - th e  innovation- is 
often intangible, it is usually proxied by, among other things, the patent right acquired by the 
innovator for the protection of rent accruing from the commercialisation of the innovation. 
Patents however (their number, cost of acquiring or renewal rate) are at best a  m easure of the 
private, a s  opposed to the social, value of the innovation (on this, see  Schankerman and Pakes 
(1986)); a s  such, they are an imperfect tool for the purpose of examining in a  theoretical 
framework the effect of inappropriability of the fruits of research on firm incentives and industry 
performance. R&D expenditures therefore remain the best proxy available, although the use of 
an input as  a  proxy for the output of a  certain production process (the generation of knowledge 
in this case) does abstract from the question of the productivity of the use of the input.
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Within an industrial sector, two different types of competition between firms are 
recognized: competition in R&D and competition in output. R&D itself is broken 
down into two parts/stages: basic (or pure) research R, and development (or applied) 
research D. Spillovers are presumed to exist in the basic research stage whereas 
development research is taken to be fully appropriable 2.
The fraction of the basic research of a firm’s rivals that "spills-over" and can be 
observed constitutes a "pool" of basic research that is available to the firm. This 
potential basic research spillover pool is transformed into actual "borrowed" research by 
taking into account the firm’s "absorptive capacity". "Own" and "borrowed" basic 
research, together with development research, are then transformed into cost saving 
innovations after taking into account the firm’s opportunities for cost reduction and the 
scientific level of the industry.
The basic sources of technological knowledge utilised by the firm therefore are: its 
own basic research expenditures, the knowledge originating with the spillovers from the 
basic research expenditures of the other firms in the same industry; and its own 
development research expenditures.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section n, we develop a model of 
oligopoly where n firms compete by setting simultaneously output and the level of R&D 
expenditures. We initially derive the equilibrium levels of basic and development 
research expenditures, as well as of output for the firm and the industry in the presence
2 Traditionally, R&D is broken down into basic research, defined as experimental or theoretical 
work with the aim of acquiring new knowledge and not focused on any particular application; 
applied research, defined a s  original work directed primarily towards a  particular practical 
objective; and development, that is systematic work drawing on existing knowledge and directed 
towards new processes and products (for official definitions see  OECD (1981)). For our 
purposes, the distinction between basic research (subject to spillovers) and development 
research (fully appropriable) will suffice.
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of spillovers in basic research. Both the case where there exist barriers to entry and 
where free entry results in firms earning zero profits in equilibrium are examined. The 
level of R&D expenditures, cost reduction, profit and industry performance are then 
compared to the case where spillovers are absent, and we examine whether the main 
results of similar models that omit spillovers stand in the presence of inappropriability. 
Furthermore, we look at how the key variables at the firm or industry level vary with the 
degree of appropriability (the extent of spillovers), as well as how sensitive they are to 
parameters such as the elasticity of demand for the product, the scientific base of an 
industry or the opportunities for cost reduction through R&D facing a firm.
In section III we turn to the case where the industry is socially managed and derive 
the optimal levels of output and R&D in the presence of spillovers. These levels serve 
as a benchmark against which the performance of the market and the incentives it 
provides for cost reduction through R&D are compared (section IV). In section IV, we 
also examine how a government policy of subsidising basic research affects the 
incentives to invest in the partially appropriable part of R&D. Optimal subsidy rates are 
derived and their determinants are examined. Section V pulls together the main 
conclusions.
46
II. A model of oligopoly with spillovers
This section analyzes an rt-firm oligopoly in both product and R&D in the 
presence of intrasectoral spillovers. Firms are assumed to be integrated, in that they 
both conduct R&D and market the resulting product, identical for all firms 3. R&D is 
cost-reducing only; it is like a fixed cost but its level is a decision variable for the firm 4.
The model takes as its starting point the paper by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a — 
henceforth denoted as D&S). In that work, a model of cost-reduction through R&D is 
developed with firms competing in R&D and output in an oligopolistic market. Both 
the case of an exogenous (because of barriers to entry) and an endogenous market 
structure are examined; in the latter case the zero-profit condition determines entry and 
industrial structure (proxied by the equilibrium number of firms). The model is 
symmetric, timeless and devoid of uncertainty. The possibility of learning and imitating 
among firms is ignored; also, R&D is taken to be homogeneous 5.
* Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) defend the use of an identical product assumption in an 
oligopolistic market by supposing that preferences are defined over characteristics of 
commodities. Firms compete to produce different commodities with the sam e characteristics; 
commodities are therefore perfect substitutes in consumption and will as  a  result be subject to 
the sam e price.
4 R&D is of course in principle aimed at both process and product innovations. The two are 
however in a  sense  similar a s  Spence (1984) points out. His argument is along the sam e lines 
as  the defence of the identical good assumption. Let products deliver services s  to consumers
with inverted demand P(s). These services are delivered through goods x  with a  cost function 
c(x). Let f(q) be the quantity of services per unit of good so  that s*f(q)x\ the cost of producing s 
is then c[s/f(q)]. If f(q)>0 and q is raised by product-development R&D the effect is to reduce 
the cost of services. Formally therefore, this kind of product development is equivalent to cost 
reduction.
6 It should also be noted that in the D&S model it is implicitly assum ed that competition occurs 
amongst n domestic firms. The model could also be interpreted as one of international 
competition amongst n symmetric firms located in different countries (or a  combination of 
domestic and foreign firms). For this we would require to assum e conditions of free trade and 
no government intervention, leading to one world price for the product. The "industry" over 
which total R&D expenditures or output are defined would then cover many countries. The 
sam e interpretation can also be carried over to the model developed in this chapter, if we 
recognize that research spillovers amongst firms in an oligopolistic industry can be international, 
as  well as national.
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The main predictions of that model are as follows. A positive association between 
concentration and R&D intensity is established for industries characterised by the same 
elasticity of demand, but differentiated in terms of their innovative opportunities; no 
causality is implied however, since both are determined simultaneously. In industries 
differing only in the size of their output market and their underlying scientific base, 
firms spend the same amount of R&D relative to their size. Growth in industxy demand 
stimulates R&D activity and industries facing greater innovative opportunities are more 
concentrated. Finally, the market may be characterised both by excessive expenditure 
on R&D and too low a rate of technical progress when compared to a socially managed 
industry 6.
By modifying and extending the D&S framework it is possible to allow for 
spillovers in the knowledge generated by one part of R&D (basic research), while 
allowing another part of R&D (development research) to be fully appropriable.. Let R: 
represent the pool of basic research knowledge available to each firm i (/=l,...,n). It is 
determined by the firm’s own basic research expenditures x{ and by the proportion of 
the basic research expenditure of each of all the other firms in the industry xA 
(-i denotes all firms other than i), that spills over and that can be absorbed. Let y,- be the 
development research expenditures of firm i. The unit cost of production c, is then 
taken to depend on the pool of basic research R; and on the development research
• The Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) model provides a  framework that accounts for a  number of 
empirical observations in the economics of innovation (Dasgupta, 1986): namely that the 
innovative process does not display any economies of scale with respect to the size of firms; 
that there is a  positive association between the degree of concentration in an industry and its 
innovative activity, as long as concentration is not too great; that industries facing greater 
technological opportunities are more concentrated; that growth in demand for the products of 
industry stimulates R&D activity within it; that research activity is strongest in industries where 
entry barriers are neither too high nor too low; and that there is a  positive relationship between a 
firm’s R&D activity and its profits. The model cannot account for the observation that past R&D 
successes lead to greater current R&D effort on the part of successful firms and that imitation is 
a  pervasive phenomenon that should influence the incentives to invest in R&D.
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expenditure y,- and to be independent of output (constant unit production cost)7. R&D 
expenditures are therefore in this setup like a fixed cost to the firm. This fixed cost 
however is a choice variable and firms can spend more or less on basic and 
development research expenditures, with the result being reflected in a lower or higher 
marginal production cost.
The basic structure of the model is then given by the following equations:
(2.1) P = P(Q) where Q = t q ,i-i
(2 .2) ct =  c [R (*„*_, 5 ,, 0), y j
where 0£0,. £ 1, 0 < 5, £ 1 and x_i = 'L Xj
j * i
and where q, and Q are firm and industry output respectively, with P the market price of 
the resulting product.
We assume that the unit cost c; is a decreasing function of own and competitors* 
basic research expenditures, ie that dcjdxi < 0 and dcjdxj < 0 or alternatively that the 
underlying knowledge production function for basic research is an increasing function 
of own and borrowed basic research, ie that dRJdxi > 0 and dRJdXj > 0. On the other 
hand, <?C;ldxf > 0 and <?c{/d x j >  0 so that there are decreasing returns to both own and 
borrowed basic research expenditures. Basic research knowledge increases with the
7 There is nothing in the model to distinguish development research expenditures //from  any 
other cost-reducing inputs that are not R&D-related. The reader can interpret y, as any of a  
number of other expenditures, that are for example labour or capital related. In such a  case, x, 
should be understood as representing R&D expenditures in general, with spillovers operating on 
the total of R&D, and the substitution possibilities between x  and /  should be reinterpreted as 
referring to substitution between R&D in general and non R&D-related inputs.
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spillover rate QR./dQ. > 0) and with the degree of absorptive capacity 0/?(/35;(- > 0)- 
Finally, development research expenditures reduce unit production costs (9c,/3y; < 0) 
and exhibit decreasing returns > 0).
In expression (2.2), the vector of spillover rates from all firms’ basic research 
expenditures is given by 0 = (0lf..., 0„). The degree therefore to which the basic 
research expenditures of any firm become potentially available for use by other firms is 
given by the parameter 0y , where 0 ^  0; < 1. A value of zero indicates that there are no 
spillovers: the results of basic research are exclusively appropriated by the firm that 
originates it —basic research is in effect a private good. A value of one on the other 
hand means that spillovers are perfect: the basic research effort of one firm is entirely in 
the public domain and increases the potentially borrowable research pool available to 
other firms by the full amount of the original basic research expenditures. For 
0 < 0y < 1, spillovers are imperfect.
The spillover parameter may of course vary from one firm to another, depending, 
among other things, on the firm’s capacity to retain proprietary knowledge. We will 
however assume that it is identical across firms in the same industry (so that 0, = 0, = 0), 
reflecting instead exogenous factors such as patent policy as well as the 
industry-specific nature of the knowledge created. We also assume 0,- = 1 for firm i, so 
that each firm can make full use of its own basic research.
The proportion of the "potentially usable" basic research pool that firm i actually 
absorbs is given in (2.2) by 5, = (8i;, ..., 5„,). The parameter 5yj in this context indicates 
the proportion of the "non-appropriable" basic research from firm j  that firm i can 
actually use. We assume that 0 <, 5y/ < 1. When 5y/ = 1, the firm absorbs all knowledge 
in the public domain. Alternatively, when 5y, = 0, it absorbs none. This parameter has 
in other work (Cohen and Levinthal (1989)) been interpreted as indicating imitation
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costs, by linking the capacity to absorb externally generated knowledge to the R&D 
effort that is required to maintain that capacity. In the context of this model, we will 
initially make no specific assumption about the allocation of investment to imitative 
effort, so that the vector 8/7 is taken to be predetermined. This assumption is later 
relaxed, and a firm’s absorptive capacity is assumed to be a function of a firm’s own 
basic research expenditures (ie 8 = 8 ;(*,)) in the sense that higher own basic research 
expenditures enhance the ability to imitate rivals’ basic research. In any case however, 
we assume 8,,- = 8*,- = 8, so that each firm’s absorptive capacity, while specific to it, does 
not vary with the source of outside knowledge, while 8,-, = 1, ie a firm can fully absorb 
its own basic research.
The appropriation of other firms’ research is therefore achieved through the 
interaction of the absorptive capacity parameter 8, and the spillover parameter 0. The 
firm can only potentially use the fraction of its competitors’ basic research that is not 
appropriated. Of that fraction, it actually uses only a certain part, the part being 
determined by its capacity to recognize the spillovers and integrate the results of that 
public knowledge into its own production mechanism. In this sense, and carrying in the
context of the specific model an analogy found elsewhere in economics, 8,0 X x}
j * i
represents the effective flow of spillovers, in contrast to the nominal flow, given by
0 X Xj *. The firm’s basic research knowledge could therefore consist only of the fruits
j*>
of its own basic research expenditures either because other firms can fully appropriate 
the results of their own basic research expenditures or because the firm lacks the 
capability to use that publicly available knowledge.
8 The distinction between nominal and effective spillovers is equivalent to that in Schankerman 
(1979) between borrowable and borrowed research.
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Firms are assumed to aim to maximize profits net of R&D expenditures. In order 
to do so, they choose basic research expenditures xh development research expenditures 
yf- and output qt simultaneously in a one-stage game. We are interested in the properties 
of the resulting Nash-Coumot equilibrium in output and R&D expenditures (both basic 
research and development research). The firm’s objective function is therefore to 
maximize
(2.3) n,. = n,(?„ Q-,,x„x_i, 0,8;, y,) = {P (Q )-c[R  (x;,x^, 5,, 0), y,1}q,-x, -  y,
Wt’*
The free-entry equilibrium is given by the combination
(2.4) [n \ (<fi,x',y’)........ (q',x% y ‘)...... . (q’„,x’n, y *))
where for each firm i:
(2.5) {P(Q’) -  c [R(x%C  Sj, 0), >,*]}?;- x ’ -  y ' >
> {p [%i q‘ +?' ] -  c 5 ■ > e)> yj} ~ x‘ -
and
(2.6) {P(Q’ +qk) -  ck[(xk,Xi, Sj, 0), y,]}qt - x l - y k <, 0
Condition (2.5) ensures that the firm’s behaviour is suboptimal if at equilibrium it 
chooses (x,y ,q )&  (x \ y*,q*)\ the condition in other words requires that the firm’s 
profits be lower if, when the rest of the firms in the industry are at their equilibrium 
output and R&D expenditures, it chooses a different combination. Expression (2.6) is 
the free-entry condition: when the optimal number of firms, output levels and R&D 
expenditures have been reached any new entrant makes negative profits at the free-entry 
equilibrium.
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The first-order conditions for the firm’s maximizing problem with respect to 
output, basic research and development research expenditures respectively are:
(2.7) P[ 1 -  e(<2>,] = C 'lR tf'jC , 0), y*]
(2 .8) -9c;/dx;]q; = i
(2 .9) = i
where e(Q) is the inverse elasticity of demand and s~qJQ is the individual firm’s
share in industry output. For the second-order conditions to hold we need decreasing 
returns to scale in R&D expenditures ie > 0 and cfcjdyf > 0 as well as the own
effects on marginal profit to exceed the cross effects ie that 
n „ n „ > r g ?, n xxn yy>Il£y and n ^ n ^ > n ^ .  This we assume*.
Inspection of the first-order conditions (2.7)-(2.9) reveals a number of properties 
of the equilibrium solution, noted also in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) and Levin and 
Reiss (1984)10. From (2.7), price deviates from the marginal cost of production so that 
the market solution is not expected to lead to an optimal allocation of resources. The 
deviation from optimal pricing depends on the share of each firm in industry output st 
(as the number of firms increases, st —» 0 and P -> c{) and on the demand elasticity.
• The specific conditions for which a symmetric equilibrium (Q7n,x\y) with barriers to entry and 
a  free-entry symmetric equilibrium (ri,q,x,y) exist as a  solution to the model described by the 
first-order conditions (2.7’)-(2.10’) below are examined in the appendix to this chapter. They 
hold for the particular parametarizations given below ie where the inverse demand function is 
given by (2.12) and where the (basic) knowledge production function and the associated cost 
function are given by (2.13) and (2.14).
10 In those models however, given that R&D is treated as being homogeneous, the discussion is 
in terms of output q and an aggregate R&D variable, equivalent here to x+y.
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Similarly, the left-hand sides of (2.8) and (2.9) indicate that private marginal benefit 
from basic and development research depends on the firm’s own output q{; social 
optimality would require industry output Q instead11.
For the symmetric solution the Nash equilibrium is (n , q*t x*, y*). Letting 
therefore <?,=#, *,=*, y,=y, s==l/n and 5y = 5, the first-order conditions now become:
(2.7’) P{Q') [1 - =  c [R(x,(n  -  l ) x \ 5,0),y ']
(2.8’) - 0 c  [ /? ( / ,(n -  l ) x \ 8,0),y*]/9jt}(Q*ln) = 1
(2.9’) -{a c [ /? ( /,( /i* -l) / ,8 ,0 ) ,y #]/3y}(0V/l*)= 1
With symmetry, the free-entry condition (2.6) becomes:
(2.6’) {P{Q '+ q) - c [/?(*,(n -  1)*,5,0),y]}q - x - y < ,0
which implies that for the representative firm’s {q yX*,y*), industry equilibrium 
must give non-negative profits ie
(2.10) { /> (0 * )-c [/? (^ ,(/t* -l)/,5 ,0 ),y * ]} (2 ^ (^  + y > *
11 Note that the marginal return to a  firm’s basic research here (equation (2.8)) takes account 
only of the direct effect of own basic research on own profits ie lX(, and not of the indirect effects
of own basic research on competitors’ basic research knowledge R} =*; +05y*_; and through that 
on price and own profit ie of 0 Z SyllJ,. This is due to the nature of decision-making of the
i * i  J
model: firms simultaneously decide on R&D and production levels. Other writers, such as 
Spence (1984) or Cohen and Levinthal (1989), solving recursively an implicit two-stage game, 
with the decision to spend on R&D in one stage and the decision on the level of production in 
another, take both direct and indirect effects into account in deriving the marginal benefit of 
R&D expenditures. Spence (1984) in particular has interpreted the absence of the indirect 
effect in the firm’s first-order conditions as a  situation where firms imperfectly anticipate or 
totally ignore the effects of their own R&D investments on the costs of other firms and on 
industry prices; he offers this as an explanation for the empirical observation that in certain 
industries high spillovers may coincide with a  high degree of dynamic efficiency. (This 
argument is taken up again in chapter three of the thesis, while a  multi-stage framework is 
developed in chapter four).
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Under the assumption that free-entry results in firms earning negligible profits at 
equilibrium, we can replace (2.10) by a zero-profit condition:
(2.10’) {/,O2*)-cP?(x*,(»*-l)x*fi 0 ) fy*]}fi* = (jc* + y V
Using the first-order condition (2.7’) and the zero-profit condition (2.10’) we 
derive the following relationship:
(2.11) lM* =  [ l /e (e * )] [ i? * + Z /]
where l/n is the index of concentration in an industry and R=nxfPQ and D-nyfPQ 
are respectively industry basic research and development expenditures as a proportion 
of sales. R* and D* can therefore be interpreted as the optimal basic and development 
research intensities with R*+D* the optimal R&D intensity.
Expression (2.11) is similar to the one derived in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a); in 
their paper R&D is treated as homogeneous so that they derive instead 1 In* = Z*ft{Q*) 
where Z*=nx*/P(Q*)Q* stands for optimal R&D expenditures. The expression derived 
here implies that without spillovers or for a given spillover rate, in a cross-section of 
industries with the same elasticity of demand but differing in terms o f scientific base or 
opportunities for cost reduction through R&D, R&D intensity and the degree o f concen­
tration in an industry would be positively related12. More concentrated industries 
would tend to be more R&D intensive and vice versa. Given however that both 
concentration and R&D are simultaneously determined, no causality is implied.
Instead, industrial concentration and R&D intensity are both uniquely determined by a
12 "For a  given spillover rate" is an expression that discounts the effect of partial inappropriability 
of R&D on the interpretation of equation (2.11). Unlike in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a), in this 
model under free entry the optimal number of firms is a  function of the spillover rate ie n*=n\Q ). 
Similarly for the optimal R&D intensity so  that the degree of inappropriability affects both sides 
of (2.11).
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host of other variables, such as the demand and cost elasticities, the size of the industry, 
its scientific base, and, more importantly for the present model, by the degree of 
appropriability (the spillover rate). This result does not depend on any particular 
functional form of the (constant marginal) cost function.
The same expression further implies that, for given n, industries with small 
elasticity of demand (ie large £) would be expected to have high R&D intensity. The 
reasoning here is that a small demand elasticity allows for high mark-ups so that the 
equilibrium is maintained by expenditures on R&D rather than by entry (with n fixed). 
This result reflects the role of R&D as an effective barrier to entry in the manner that 
Schumpeter argued.
a. Parameterization of the cost function
In order to take the analysis further it is necessary to specify the functional forms 
of the price and costs functions. This will allow for a sharper characterization of 
equilibrium and for the derivation of some comparative statics resultsl3.
The specification of the cost function is crucial to the analysis of equilibrium and 
of the effects of spillovers on R&D expenditures, given that it determines the 
relationship between own and "borrowed" basic research, that between basic and 
development research, and the one between both and cost reduction. It is for this reason 
that in this and the next chapter we will examine two alternative knowledge production 
functions and their associated cost functions embodying different assumptions about the 
manner in which knowledge inputs combine to reduce costs. Throughout, market 
demand will be assumed to be of the iso-elastic form and given by:
13 Rather than exhaustively covering all variables, in the derivation of the comparative statics 
results we focus particularly on those results that show more clearly the impact of the 
assumptions made about appropriability conditions.
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(2.12) P(Q) = cQ~* a ,e>  0
where a  indicates the size of the market.
Initially assume that the basic research knowledge production function is of the
form:
(2.13) *,.=*,.+I  8,,0,*,-
The associated unit cost function is of the form:
(2.14) c{ = P RJ* = p [*, + X djiOlXjTa where a, P, y > 0
j * i
In this expression 1/p is a measure of the scientific base of the industry (a lower p
implies a higher scientific base) and a  and y indicate the responsiveness of cost to basic 
and development research expenditures. While however y is the elasticity of cost 
reduction with respect to a firm’s own development research expenditures, a  is the 
elasticity of cost reduction with respect to the total pool of basic research expenditures. 
The cost elasticity of the firm’s own basic research expenditures is then 
a/[l + S0(rc -1 )] in the symmetric case. This implies that as spillovers decline (appro­
priability increases), a firm is better able to translate its basic research expenditures into 
cost-saving innovations.
This cost function exhibits certain characteristics which will be seen to be crucial 
for the impact of spillovers on incentives to spend on R&D and on industry 
performance. The underlying (basic) knowledge production function R; = xt + X 5y,0,x;- 
assumes that "own" and "borrowed" basic research are perfect substitutes (or 
equivalently that own and rivals’ basic research can be substituted at the rate 1/80). It 
does introduce a cost to the borrowing firm for using the non-appropriable part of other
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firms * expenditures through the parameter 5, but that cost is independent of the amount 
borrowed. It can therefore be interpreted as a "search cost" which forces the borrowing
j
firm to use less than the total basic research spillover pool. Furthermore the specifi­
cation of the cost function assumes a Cobb-Douglas-type relationship between the basic 
research of the industry as a whole and the development research of the individual firm, 
so that the elasticity of substitution between the two is unity14.
Under the functional forms assumed in expressions (2.12) and (2.14) the 
first-order conditions for the symmetric solution become:
(2.15) o ( G T [ l  - e ( 6 > ‘] = p / n * T V f
(2.16) < x p ^ - v r ' V r ( e V ) = i
(2.17) - y p i r v n / f - '  (Q’ln )  = 1 
where K  = [1 + 80(/i * — 1)].
The variable K  has a straightforward interpretation in this context. It is the ratio of 
the marginal social productivity of basic research to its marginal private productivity. 
Marginal private productivity takes into account only the effect of basic research 
expenditures on own marginal cost and is defined from (2.8) as ^[dc*/dx*]q*. Marginal 
social productivity on the other hand takes also into account the effect of own basic 
research expenditures on the costs of all other firms via the spillover rate; it is therefore 
defined as -[(3c,/3x,) + Both of these relate to the technological (ie
cost-reducing) effects of spillovers, as opposed to their pecuniary effects (ie their effects
14 Underlying the cost function is a  Cobb-Douglas production function of the form 
q ^ L ^ i  yp'j/p where L, is the level of all other inputs.
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on profits). In symmetry, their ratio is given by k  -  [i + 50(w* _ i)]. Thus, when basic 
research is fully appropriable (0 = 0), the two are equal. For positive spillovers, the 
"wedge" between social and private marginal productivity of basic research increases 
with the spillover rate or with the number of firms in the industry15.
b. Oligopoly with barriers to entry
We now assume for the moment that there exist barriers to entry so that the 
number of firms in the industry n is exogenously given. Routine algebraic manipu­
lations enable us then to solve for the equilibrium level of output, and of basic and 
development research expenditures at firm level (</, x*, ym):
(2.18) q '=  [a“ p-, f o It|’ ( l-E /n ),tp «-«l t '')]14" p<' ' E)1
(2.19) * '=  '( I * )
(2.20) /  = [a00-' 1 pe_l -e /n )/!-*]11'" ^ 1-' 11
where p = a+y.
Profit for the individual firm in equilibrium is then given by:
(2.21) rf= [a“<I-e)pt‘ Y 1‘e)o (l-e /n )n "e],'Ie' p<l' e>1 {e/(n-e)-[Y+(a/AT)]}
18 As an illustration, in a  duopoly with 0=0.50, the marginal social productivity of basic research 
is 1.5 times the marginal private productivity. For 8 firms, the ratio rises to 4.5. With complete 
spillovers on the other hand (0 = 1), marginal social productivity of basic research is twice the 
marginal private productivity in a  duopoly and eight times in an industry with eight firms.
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For the comparative statics results, we assume that £ -  p(l -£ )  > 0 holds. This
condition is satisfied for inelastic demand (£ > 1) or for demand not too elastic and is 
given by the second-order conditions for the existence of equilibrium (see the appendix 
at the end of the chapter).
A number of observations can now be made. First, and in line with Schmookler’s 
(1966) demand-inducement theories, R&D and profits are higher in larger markets. 
Given that price is a constant mark-up on average cost16, as output increases 
(dq*/dc > 0) with an unchanged cost function, the rise in total revenue increases profits 
(3ll7da > 0). Similarly, as output increases, basic and development research 
expenditures are higher (dx*/d<3 > 0 and dy*/da > 0).
Secondly, an improvement in the scientific level o f the industry raises production. 
It increases (decreases) profits and R&D expenditures when demand is elastic 
(inelastic). dq*/d$ < 0 while 9IT/3P > 0 (< 0) when e > 1 (< 1) or equivalently when 
1/e < 1 (> 1). As the scientific base of the industry improves (p falls), the average cost 
curve shifts down. With a downward-sloping demand curve output expands. Since 
price is a constant mark-up on average cost, profit is a fixed fraction of total revenue 
and the expansion in output increases (decreases) profits when demand is elastic 
(inelastic). Furthermore, for constant profits (or zero profits in the free-entry solution) 
to be maintained, the increase (decrease) in total revenue brought about by the 
improvement in the scientific base when demand is elastic (inelastic) implies an 
increase in total costs. R&D expenditures therefore increase with 1/p when demand is 
elastic and fall when it is inelastic so that 3x75p > 0 (< 0) as £ > 1 (< 1) (and 
9y70p > 0 (< 0) as £ > 1 (< 1)).
1# When the firm maximizes total costs L^x^y, (with L, the level of all non-R&D inputs) subject to 
a  production function of the form given in note 13 above then MC  = AC( 1+ p) so that 
P/AC = !/[(! -  e/n)(1+ p)] is a  constant for given n.
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The above results mirror those of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a). In the 
framework of the present model however, the intensity of R&D and the firm’s profit­
ability are also influenced by the degree of appropriability of basic research, that is by 
the spillover rate 0. In the case where there are barriers to entry, greater spillover 
opportunities reduce basic research expenditures 0x700 < 0), while leaving 
development research expenditures and output unchanged (dy790 = dq*/d9 = 0). 
Because the basic research of rivals that leaks out and that can be absorbed is a perfect 
substitute for a firm’s own, firms cut down on their own basic research expenditures as 
more of the basic research expenditures by their rivals becomes available to them, so 
that their direct unit production costs are invariant to the spillover rate ie 9c7d0 = 0. 
Since therefore spillovers in the basic research of rivals affect a firm’s basic research 
expenditures only (ie reduce fixed costs), while leaving the other part of fixed costs, 
development research expenditures, and marginal cost unchanged, they lead to higher 
profits 011700 > 0). We summarise these effects of spillovers in the case where there 
are barriers to entry as Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: When demand and cost functions are given by (2.12) and (2.14),
in the Nash-Cournot equilibrium (q*9 x*9 y*) with barriers to entry 
spillovers in basic research:
(i) reduce basic research expenditures;
(ii) leave unchanged development research expenditures, 
marginal cost and output;
(iii) increase profits.
It is important to emphasise at this point the precise mechanism by which a higher 
spillover rate reduces firms’ basic research expenditures. The disincentive effect here is 
not due to the indirect effect whereby firms, perceiving that their own basic research 
expenditures serve to decrease their rivals’ costs, respond by cutting down their own 
basic research expenditures. Such a behavioural sequence necessitates a multi-stage
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model with R&D decisions preceding output decisions. This type of model is 
developed in Spence (1984), Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and in chapter four below. In 
the case at hand, the disincentive effect is more direct and due to two factors: (i) the fact 
that firms perceive that their own marginal costs depend on their rivals’ basic research 
expenditures via the spillover rate; and (ii) that own and rival basic research 
expenditures are perfect substitutes in (basic) knowledge production. Due to the 
simultaneous nature of decision making in this model (decisions on R&D and output are 
taken by all firms simultaneously in a one-stage game), the additional indirect 
disincentive effect that exists in multi-stage games is absent. It is as if firms, while 
cognisant of the fact that their rivals’ basic research reduces their own production costs, 
fail to perceive (and therefore do not take into account) the fact that their own basic 
research expenditures enter as arguments in their rivals’ marginal cost functions. This 
in effect makes their R&D strategies more aggressive.
While spillovers reduce the incentives at firm and industry level to invest in basic 
research, they also reduce the costs at the industry level of achieving a particular cost 
reduction (or basic knowledge generation). This is not immediately obvious from the 
above given that it was established that dc 739 = 0, ie that higher spillovers leave 
marginal costs unaffected. It can be seen however from the following. For a given 
level of basic knowledge R, to be generated, basic research expenditures equal to 
X{ + are needed. In a symmetric equilibrium therefore, basic research expenditures 
at industry level are X  = nR/K, where K  = 1 + 86(n -  1). For a given level of basic 
research knowledge therefore (and, correspondingly, given also development research 
expenditures, for a given level of cost reduction), higher spillovers reduce the necessary 
industry-wide basic research expenditures needed to bring it about. We can therefore 
conclude:
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Corollary 1.1: When demand and cost functions are given by (2.12) and (2.14),
spillovers in basic research reduce (ex ante) incentives for cost 
reduction while also reducing (ex post) the costs at industry level 
of achieving a given level of cost reduction.
The impact of a firm’s absorptive capacity 5 on its incentives to invest in R&D
depends crucially on whether it is taken to be exogenous (like the spillover rate) or not. 
If it is exogenous, its effect on incentives to spend on R&D mirror those of the spillover 
rate. A higher capacity to incorporate rivals’ basic research into one’s own production 
acts as a substitute for own expenditures on basic research 0x735 < 0). It does not 
affect development research, marginal cost or output (3y735 = 3c735 = 3^735 = 0) and 
therefore increases profits (3II735 > 0).
In the case therefore where there exist barriers to entry and the market structure is 
taken as a datum, high spillovers (or a high absorptive capacity) are associated with low 
levels of basic research at the firm and industry level. The greater the degree of 
inappropriability, the higher are the benefits for the individual firm and the lower are the 
firm and industry incentives to spend on the part of R&D that is not fully appropriable.
c. A digression: endogenous absorptive capacity
We will now digress a little in order to explore briefly whether the results obtained 
above and in particular the disincentive aspect of spillovers hold in the case where a 
firm’s capacity to absorb the basic knowledge that its rivals cannot appropriate is no 
longer taken as given, and is instead assumed to depend on the firm’s own basic 
research expenditures. In this case therefore, assimilation of externally available 
knowledge is no longer passive or costless; it depends instead on the level of own 
commitment to basic research expenditures.
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The motivation behind the assumption that a firm’s absorptive capacity should be 
treated as an endogenous variable in the model, depending on the firm’s own basic 
research expenditures, can be traced to the findings of a number of empirical studies 17, 
as well as to casual observation of particular industries. A common finding is that while 
widespread spillovers are thought to exist, they do not seem to be associated with 
reduced incentives to spend on R&D. High R&D-intensity industries, such as 
electronics, which exhibit a low degree of appropriability of R&D-related expenditures, 
also often have a high degree of dynamic efficiency.
One possible explanation rests on the understanding that R&D (or in the context of 
this model basic research) has a dual role: in addition to directly helping to develop 
innovations, R&D may also serve as a learning tool18. By spending on basic research, 
firms learn how to better follow developments elsewhere in the industry. This means 
that they are in a better position to take advantage of the basic research of their rivals 
that spills over: for given spillovers, their absorptive capacity improves w.
The logic of this argument leads us to the assumption that absorptive capacity be 
made to depend on a firm’s own basic research expenditures, so that 8 = 8(x{) 20. Higher 
basic research expenditures improve this capacity (5* = d8/dx, > 0), but at a diminishing 
rate (5,, = (fS/dx? < 0). It can be shown that under this assumption the effect of 
spillovers on the incentives to spend on basic research is no longer clear-cut.
17 see, for example, Levin (1988) or Levin and Reiss (1988).
18 see  Cohen and Levinthal (1989). The argument was developed in chapter one above.
19 Endogenising absorptive capacity is only one way of modelling the observation that high 
spillovers need not necessarily act as a  disincentive for R&D expenditures. The idea that firms 
learn through own R&D so that in the presence of spillovers they might benefit from 
expenditures on basic research can also be modelled directly through particular assumptions 
about the nature of the firm’s cost function. This approach is followed in chapter three below.
20 It has been argued (Vonortas (1987)) that in addition to being a  function of basic research 
expenditures, absorptive capacity probably depends on a  number of other factors, such as the 
technological environment that the firm operates in, the type of industry involved, the ea se  of
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Let Ej be the firm’s earnings gross of R&D expenditures, ie 
Ei = {P(Q)~c  [*(*„*_,, 5,, 0), y,]}?, and let £J be the firm’s marginal benefit with 
respect to the knowledge generated by basic research expenditures. In the context of the 
model with exogenous absorptive capacity, E'Ri = E'Xi = —[dc*/dx*]q* from equation (2.8), 
or ERj = EXj = o$K~a~l(x*)~a~1 (y*)^ (Q* In) = 1 for the specific parameterization of the 
cost function in equation (2.14). It was then shown that 0x700 < 0, so that higher 
spillovers acted as a disincentive for expenditures on basic research. In the case where 
absorptive capacity is endogenous and given as 5 = 5(x,), the marginal benefit from the 
knowledge generated by expenditures on basic research is given by:
(2.8’) E ‘{(1 + 8 ,0*J ■ - Q c fa f i  (1 + Z f x jq ;
where 5, = 35/0X, > 0 and where x_i = X xr  For the particular parameterization of the
j * >
cost function given by (2.14), expression (2.8’) becomes for the symmetric case:
(2.16’) £^(1+5,0*,,) s  a P K - '- 'fr 'f1' 1 ( y ' f  (Q'/n)K, = 1
where K  = [1 + 8(x,)0(n -1 )] and Kx = [1 + 8x0(/i -  l)x*]
A number of observations can now be made. Comparing (2.8) and (2.8’) it is 
apparent that the marginal benefit of cost reduction due to basic research is, ceteris 
paribus, larger in the case where absorptive capacity is a function of the firm’s own 
basic research expenditures. This is because in addition to directly reducing costs, basic
learning and communication between firms, the organisation of research within firms 
themselves, etc. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) have incorporated som e of these factors by 
stipulating that 6 = 5(*,;p), where p is a  variable determined by the characteristics of the 
underlying knowledge that affects the ea se  of learning. They assum e 8,P>0 and 6P< 0, so that 
increasing p increases the marginal effect of R&D on absorptive capacity, but diminishes the 
level of absorptive capacity. In our case, we stick with S = 6(*,), since we endogenise absorptive 
capacity only to investigate the effect on incentives to spend on basic research.
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research expenditures now also indirectly increase the firm’s ability to absorb externally 
available knowledge (the second term in the parenthesis of expression (2.8’)). Given 
that costs and profits depend also on this external knowledge, the marginal benefit of 
investing in basic research is higher.
Related to this is the effect of spillovers on the equilibrium basic research 
expenditures x  in the case where absorptive capacity is an endogenous variable. The 
sign of the effect is now given by 21:
(2.22) sign {3x790} = sign {f^R etl + §*0(w -1 )* ]+  ERhx{n -  l)x}
In this expression, E '^kO represents the diminishing returns to basic research,
R'% > 0 is the marginal effect of spillovers on the flow of basic research knowledge and 
E'Rjbx{n -  l)x represents the benefit to the firm from increasing its absorptive capacity.
An inspection of (2.22) reveals that in contrast to the previously derived result 
with exogenous absorptive capacity that increasing spillovers decreases incentives to 
invest in basic research, the sign of 9x790 is ambiguous. The end result will depend on 
the relative strength of two countervailing forces: the negative incentive coming from 
the diminishing returns to basic research (the first term in (2.22)), and the positive 
adoption incentive (the second term). If diminishing returns to basic research are very 
strong, they may outweigh the effect due to the endogeneity of absorptive capacity and 
the disincentive effect of spillovers will remain. If however the extra benefits conferred
21 E^nR&l +bxQ(n -  l)uc] +£*8,(n -  l)x is the result of the differentiation of the expression for the
marginal benefit due to basic research when absorptive capacity is endogenous (ie 
£^(1+8,6^)) with respect to the spillover rate 0. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) show in a  similar
setting that expression (2.22) will hold as long as  output reaction functions are downward 
sloping. The effect of spillovers on equilibrium basic research expenditures can therefore be 
deduced from the impact of spillovers on the marginal benefit due to basic research knowledge.
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to the firm by the fact that an increased absorptive capacity increases its pool of 
available basic research knowledge outweigh the effect of diminishing returns, then 
spillovers will spur further investment in basic research 22.
d. Oligopoly with free entry
Going back to the case where absorptive capacity is determined outside the model 
and is taken as a datum by firms, when we relax the assumption that positive profits are 
maintained because of barriers to entry, we can solve for the equilibrium number of 
firms in the free-entry Nash equilibrium. From (2.21) we have23:
(2.23) n* = e ( ^ ^ )  where AT =  (1 +  50(«*- 1)].
The first thing to note is that when there are no spillovers (ie 0 = 0), K -\  and 
expression (2.22) becomes n* =  e(1 +  p)/p where p = a + y. This is a relationship 
equivalent to that derived by Dasgupta and Stiglitz for the case where R&D is 
homogeneous and fully appropriable. The Dasgupta and Stiglitz result therefore falls 
out as a special case of our model. Furthermore, for n>0 it is the case that
22 It would be interesting to contrast our approach with the one followed in Cohen and Levinthal 
(1989). They ignore the effect of diminishing returns and obtain the sam e result of ambiguity by 
balancing two offsetting effects: a  negative appropriability incentive and a  positive absorption 
incentive. The latter is the sam e as  the one here: it is based on the benefit to the firm of 
increasing its absorptive capacity. The former however is associated with the diminished 
appropriabilty of rents as spillovers increase and is based on the marginal cost to the firm of 
increasing R&D expenditures due to the fact that its own R&D expenditures enter as an 
argument in competitors’ knowledge production functions Rt  This indirect effect feeds back into 
the firm’s own earning function via market output and price, so  that EJ < 0. Taking it into
account implicitly assum es a  two-stage procedure, a s  discussed further above and in chapter 
four.
23 While n has to be an Integer, the right-hand-side of (2.23) will not necessarily be one. For a  
free-entry equilibrium therefore we define n to be the largest integer not exceeding
e[l +y+ (a/*T)]/[Y+ (a/K)]. For details, see  the appendix to this chapter.
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e(l + p)/p <, n < e(l + y)/y (see the appendix to this chapter). The equilibrium number 
of firms therefore derived in (2.23) corresponds to that derived by Dasgupta and Stiglitz 
only when spillovers are zero. If spillovers are positive, the equilibrium number o f 
firms that a free-entry oligopoly can sustain in the presence o f spillovers is greater than 
the free-entry equilibrium number o f firms when spillovers are absent.
If therefore freedom of entry results in the number of firms n to be sufficiently 
large for profits to be zero, the resulting number of firms in equilibrium will be a 
function of the spillover rate so that n* = n*(Q). Furthermore, dn*/dQ > 0, so that 
greater spillover opportunities increase the number of firms in equilibrium 24. This is 
because higher spillovers reduce basic research expenditures at the level of the firm and 
lead to positive profits. For the free-entry equilibrium to be maintained, the number of 
firms in the industry increases through entry. Other things being equal therefore, the 
degree of industrial concentration should be expected to be higher in industries where 
the degree of appropriability of basic research is high (ie where 0 is low). We 
summarise this result in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: When demand and cost functions are given by (2.12) and (2.14),
the free-entry Nash-Cournot equilibrium (n*9 q*9 y )  with 
imperfectly appropriable basic research is characterised by a less 
concentrated industry than the same equilibrium with perfect 
appropriability. Furthermore, the degree of industrial concen­
tration varies directly with the degree of appropriability (ie 
indirectly with the spillover rate).
24 The derivation of this result requires some explanation. Given that K  = [1+80(n‘ -1)],
expression (2.23) for the optimal number of firms n can be rewritten as 
[e -  p(n* -  e)]+ 80(» * — 1) [e— *—e)]=0. By totally differentiating this expression we obtain that
siga{drt*/dQ} = sign{8(« -1 )  [e—y(/i* — e)]/[(p — e69)+ 76©[(n* — 1)+ («*-£)]]}. Since [E-y(/i*-E)]>0
by the conditions for the existence of the free-entry equilibrium derived in the appendix, 
sign{dn*/dQ} = sign{(p- e 8 0 ) - 1)+ (n*- e)]}. For dn*/dQ > 0, it is then necessary and 
sufficient that n*>(l/2){£(l+y)/Y+l-(p/y50)}. From the condition n >  0 for the existence of 
equilibrium however we have n < e (1 + y)/y. Simple manipulation then yields that dn'/dd > 0 for 
0 > -{p/8[E -  7(1 -  e )]}. For a  positive spillover rate therefore, dn*/dQ > 0.
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The degree of concentration 1 /n is not necessarily the best index of the extent of 
monopoly power in the industry. Dasgupta and Stiglitz in fact show that in their model 
the equilibrium can sustain simultaneously a large number of firms and high price 
margins. The same result can be generated here when 0=0 , so that n* — e(l + p)/p and 
P(Q*)/c[x*,(n* -  l)jt\y*] = 1 + p . It would then be possible for an industry to exhibit 
both low concentration (high rt) and high price margins if demand was highly inelastic 
(large e), leading to large n \  and if simultaneously firms had significant opportunities 
for cost reduction through R&D (large p), leading to high P/c ratios.
In the case where spillovers are positive however, the ratio of price to production 
cost is given by P(Q*)lc [x*, (n -  l)x*, y*] = 1/[1 -  e/n*(0)]. For a given spillover rate 
therefore and for given elasticities of cost reduction with respect to R&D, a highly 
inelastic demand will lead to high n and low price margins. Furthermore, since 
dn*/dQ> 0 it follows that d(P/c)/d9 < 0. Higher spillovers reduce price-cost margins 
and thereby promote allocative efficiency 25. In the context of the free-entry 
equilibrium derived above (based on the functional forms given by (2.12) and (2.14) 
and following on Proposition 2, we can therefore state:
Corollary 2.1: In a cross-section of industries facing the same elasticity of
demand and with the same opportunities of cost reduction 
through R&D, but differing in terms of the degree of appropri­
ability of basic research, one would expect to observe that the 
industries that exhibit the least appropriability of basic research 
would be the ones least concentrated and with the weakest 
monopoly power.
28 While the sign of d(Plc)/dQ is unambiguously negative, the signs of dPfdQ and dcldQ depend 
on the signs of expressions {-e+p[(n* -  e)-  e]} and {«* -1  -  e} respectively. For n - 1  -  e > 0 
spillovers may increase or decrease prices, the net effect depending on the resolution of entry 
on industry output. Marginal production cost increases however, due to the cutbacks in R&D 
expenditures, and sufficiently so for the reduction in price-cost margins. If on the other hand 
n - 1 -  e<  0, marginal costs decline, while industry output rises and prices fall sufficiently for a  
reduction in price-cost margins.
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In the situation where barriers to entry allow firms to maintain positive profits, we 
showed that for given n spillovers reduce basic research expenditures at firm and 
industry level, while leaving development research expenditures, marginal cost and 
output unchanged. In contrast, when free entry pushes profits to zero, spillovers affect 
all variables at firm and industry level. Under the assumed functional forms dx*ldQ < 0 
and at the same time dX*/dQ = d(n*x*)/dO < 0. Spillovers induce a reduction in firm 
basic research expenditures at the free-entry equilibrium. Furthermore, despite the fact 
that with higher spillovers the free-entry equilibrium can sustain a larger number of 
firms, so that the number of firms undertaking basic research increases, industry-wide 
basic research expenditures suffer as well26. In a free-entry oligopoly therefore 
inappropriability of basic research acts as a disincentive for basic research 
expenditures at both the firm and industry-wide level.
The effect of inappropriability of basic research on free-entry development 
research expenditures at firm and industry level is less clear cut. The sign of dy*/dQ 
and dY*/dQ = d(n*y*)/dQ depends on the sign of the expressions 1+ E-n*  and 
{£- p(l —e)(/i* — £)}. For n* > 1 + e development research expenditures at firm level 
decline; industry-wide however, the total effect may be carried by the entry of new 
firms. Conversely, for n* < 1 + £ both firm and industry development research 
expenditures increase in response to a higher spillover rate. Similarly, for total (ie 
basic and development) R&D expenditures at firm level, the effect of spillovers will be 
determined by the sign of the expression {-«*[£ - p ( l  -£ )]-£ (« * -1  -  £)}. For
*  The sign of d(x*ydQ and d(X*)/dQ is given by the sign of expressions 
{-n *[e-p (l - e)] -  (n - 1 - e) [e-tfn * - e)]} and
{-^ w *(n *-e)[e-p (l-e )]-E [(n *-1)-  p(l - e)] [e-y(n*-  e)]} respectively.
70
industry-wide R&D, the sign of rf(x* + y*)/dO ls given by the sign of the expression 
{-[(«* - 1)-  p(l - e)]}. For rc* > 1+£ total R&D at firm and industry level decrease 21. 
We can therefore summarise these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 3: When demand and cost functions are given by (2.12) and (2.14),
in the free-entry Nash-Cournot equilibrium (n , q ,  y )  
spillovers in basic research:
(i) reduce firm and industry basic research expenditures;
(ii) reduce firm development research expenditures (for
n ^ 1 +e);
(iii) reduce firm and industry total R&D expenditures;
For n < 1 +e, spillovers increase firm and industry development
research expenditures.
A related question is the effect of spillovers on the R&D intensity in a certain 
industry. We defined R&D intensity as the fraction of an industry’s combined basic and 
development research expenditures in total sales, ie R*+D*=n*(x +y*)/P(Q*)Q*• In the 
absence of spillovers, R* +D* = p/(l + p). Given the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, expenditures in R&D are a constant fraction of total cost. With free entry and 
zero profits, total costs equal total revenues and R&D expenditures are therefore also a 
fixed fraction of total revenue. That fraction is determined only by the elasticity of cost 
reduction with respect to total R&D (which can be interpreted as a firm’s technological
27 In order to be able to sign the results, we have to sign the expression n - 1 -  e. In the 
appendix to this chapter we show that e ( l+ p)/p ^  n <> e(l + y)/y. From this result and equation
(2.23) for optimal n it can be established that for n < 1+e to hold, we need demand to be 
inelastic (e > 1) and in addition p > e > y. This implies that e/p < 1. For n £ 1+ e on the other 
hand, we need e £ p > y. This is satisfied for an elastic or inelastic demand. The question that 
arises here is what values of e and p are reasonable for the existence of a  free-entry symmetric 
Nash equilibrium where firms earn negligible profits. Since we established n £ e(l+p)/p 
(n* = e ( l+ p)/p for 0=0), n will be an integer at least as large as  the smallest Integer exceeding 
e(l+p)/p. This implies that for an equilibrium number of firms "large” enough for zero profits to 
forestall entry, the smallest integer exceeding e(l + p)/p needs to be "large”. This will be the 
case  if e/p is "large”, which seem s to rule out e/p < 1, a  condition necessary for n < 1 +e to hold. 
We therefore interpret n* £ 1+ eto  hold as a  general case.
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opportunity), and is independent of the size of the market and of the scientific base of 
the industry. When a part of basic research expenditures cannot be appropriated 
however, R&D intensity also depends on the spillover rate. R*+D* = £/ n*(Q) and 
d(R* +D*)/dQ = -[£/ «2(0)] (d n * Id 0) < 0 so that when the number of firms is large 
enough for firms to earn zero profits in the free-entry equilibrium, optimal R&D 
intensity is negatively related to the spillover rate. For the free-entry solution therefore:
Corollary 3.1: Inappropriability in basic research is associated with less R&D
intensive industries, with the level of R&D intensity varying 
inversely with the spillover rate.
Given the spillover rate however, it is still the case that industries with high elasti­
cities of cost reduction with respect to basic and development research expenditures will 
have higher R&D intensities and be more concentrated. The higher these technological 
opportunities are the greater will the difference be between overall average and 
marginal costs, since MC = AC/( 1 + p). This implies a low mark-up of price on total AC 
and consequently low profits when n is fixed. When n is allowed to vary, this leads to 
exit and a more concentrated industry.
In the context of this model, spillovers also affect the relative importance of basic 
versus development research expenditures. From (2.18) and (2.19) we have:
(2.24) x*/y* = (a/y)(1IK) where K  = [ l+ 5 0 (/i* -1)]
In the absence of spillovers, the ratio of basic to development research depends 
exclusively on the relative elasticities of cost reduction so that for 0=0, K= 1 and 
x*/y* = (oc/y). If the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to development research is 
higher than that for basic research (given the nature of the knowledge generated by the 
latter), a firm would tend to spend more on development research than on basic 
research. The ratio would also be independent of the number of firms in the industry.
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It is not surprising that the introduction of a non-appropriable part of basic 
research makes the ratio x*/y* also a function of the spillover rate. From (2.24) we can 
see that, ceteris paribus, the ratio is lower in industries where part of R&D is inappro- 
priable. Furthermore, industries with higher spillover rates will be spending less on 
basic research as a proportion of total R&D expenditures than industries where 
spillovers are low. Spillovers therefore induce a shift away from pure or generic 
research whose outcome is not fully appropriable towards more product-specific and 
proprietary development research. This result may go some way in explaining why 
industries with the same opportunities for cost reduction may have differential ratios of 
basic to development research expenditures. We can therefore state:
Corollary 3.2: Inappropriability in basic research is associated with a shift from
partially appropriable basic research to fully appropriable 
development research.
In the case where there are barriers to entry into an industry, we established that 
the proportion of total R&D that is accounted for by basic research is also a function of 
the number of firms in the industry. Given the elasticities and the spillover rate, as n 
increases, the ratio of basic to development research expenditures and the fraction of 
total R&D expenditures accounted for by basic research decline. In the case where 
free-entry results in firms earning zero profits in equilibrium however, the optimal share 
of basic research in total R&D is uniquely determined by the elasticities of cost 
reduction and by the degree of appropriability of basic research.
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III. The socially-managed Industry
We now turn to the case of the socially-managed industry. The purpose here is to 
derive the equilibrium levels of output and of resources devoted to R&D in an industry 
organised by a social planner but where part of basic research is not appropriated by the 
originating firm. These levels would be optima from the social point of view and would 
enable us to establish a "benchmark" against which the efficiency of the market could 
be compared.
We assume that the social planner solves her maximisation problem in two steps. 
In the first stage the socially optimal number of firms is chosen, and in the second stage 
the planner chooses the levels of R&D and output that will maximise welfare **. The 
problem is solved recursively, with industrial structure taken as given for the solution of 
the second stage. Given n firms for the moment therefore, at the second stage the social 
planner is assumed to organize production so as to maximize net consumer surplus, 
which is given by:
(2.25) W = U ( Q ) - i c , < i , - i x l - i y i1-1 l-l l -1
where U(Q) is the total benefit from the consumption of output Q (the area under 
the demand curve). The first-order conditions then are:
(2.26) dU(Q)/dq, = y]
n  This two-step procedure serves two purposes. First, it allows a  comparison of the marginal 
benefits due to basic research in the case of an n-firm oligopoly with that of a  socially-optimal 
industry composed of n firms in the presence of external effects. Secondly, it allows for the 
examination of the possibility that the socially optimal number of firms exceeds one. While 
under the functional forms assum ed in this chapter it will be established that 1, this 
procedure allows direct comparison of the results here with those in chapter three, where we 
define circumstances that give /v>1.
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(2.27) -[0C/9*,.) + (Z  & A )]? ,. = 1
(2.28) -ldc,/dy,]qi = 1
With symmetry, these conditions become:
(2.26*) U'(Q) = c { [ x , ( n - l ) x l y }
(2.27’) -[(dc/dx) + ( n - l )  @c/&t)] (Q/n) = 1
(2.280 -[dc/dy](Q/n) = 1
Expression (2.26’) indicates that price equals the marginal cost of production in 
equilibrium, thus giving us a quasi-competitive solution. In this particular case, 
marginal and average (variable) production costs are the same. The price therefore does 
not cover the firm’s R&D expenditures and they would need to be fully subsidized.
In the socially-managed industry, the expression for the marginal social benefit 
from basic research expenditures takes into account the externality generated through 
spillovers. Comparing therefore (2.27’) with the corresponding expression (2.8’) in the 
oligopolistic case we can see that the Nash equilibrium is missing the term 
-[(n -  l)/n]Q (dc/dx) ie the external effect of the increase in one firm’s basic research 
on the n-l other firms. Since dc/dx < 0, the term is positive and the private marginal 
benefit of basic research expenditures understates the social one. Ceteris paribus 
therefore, each firm in an oligopolistic market tends to underinvest in basic research 
relative to the social optimum.
We can now assume explicit forms for the utility and cost functions so as to obtain 
a sharper characterization of equilibrium. The utility function will be assumed to be of 
the form:
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(2.29’) U(Q) = (1/(1 - e)]oQ 1_* so that U'(Q) = <sQ'€
For the cost function, in this and the next chapter we will examine the two specifi­
cations that are used in the case of oligopoly. In both cases we will assume that cost 
and demand elasticities are independent of the market structure 29. Assume therefore 
that the cost function is given by (2.14). Under symmetry, in the socially optimal case 
unit production costs are given by (with the subscript s denoting the solution in the 
socially-managed industry):
(2.30’) c = p ([1 + 50(n -  l ) K r  ( y , r
and the first-order conditions are then:
(2.31) o (Q ,r  = V K ~ ( x ,r ( y , r
(2.32) opK ^(x,T '-*(y ,r(Q Jn)  = 1
(2.33) m r ( y , ( Q J n )  = 1 
where K  = 1 + 80(« -1 ).
For the second-order conditions to hold, we need to assume strict concavity of the 
welfare function in R&D expenditures. This is satisfied for e -  p(l -  e) > 0. The 
equilibrium values of basic research expenditures, development research expenditures 
and output when the social planner takes n as given then are:
29 The assumption that cost and demand elasticities do not differ in the two market structures 
facilitates the assessm ent of the performance of the market vis-a-vis the socially optimal case 
(where we have to restrict e< 1 for w* > 0. It can of course be argued that competitive pressure 
makes the market more efficient and that this should be reflected in a  higher elasticity of cost 
reduction with respect to R&D. If this is indeed the case, the derived performance of the market 
may understate its true potential.
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(2.35) x, = [oPE- ‘ a '- 1" ' 0 f ' - °  K *'-*
(2.36) y,=  [ a p '- 'a “('- e)f - a<'- c)A:<,<|-E,n-E]''[e"p<1' ' )1
From (2.34)-(2.36) it follows immediately that output, as well as basic and 
development research expenditures are all larger in industries that face larger markets 
(dqjdo > 0, dxjdc > 0 and dyjdv  > 0). Furthermore, output is smaller in industries 
characterized by a lower scientific base (more costly technology or higher p ) so that 
dqjdp < 0, while R&D expenditures are less in such circumstances only if demand is 
elastic ( fo/dp < 0 and 9y,/3p > 0 if e < 1).
The impact of spillovers on the socially optimal levels of R&D expenditures is the 
following. If n is taken as predetermined for the moment dxJdQ > 0 and dyJdQ > 0 for 
e < 1. Higher spillovers increase the basic and development research expenditures 
undertaken at firm level in equilibrium if demand is elastic (£ < 1). Furthermore 
dQ 759 > 0 so that higher spillovers increase output. Finally, with optimum welfare 
given by W* = nxs[z -  p(l -  £)]/[a(l -  e)], dW*/d9 > 0 so that, if the social planner 
takes the industry structure as given, higher spillovers improve welfare. We can 
summarise these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4: When demand and cost functions are given by (2.12) and (2.14),
in the solution («q# xs, ys) for a socially-managed industry 
composed of n firms, spillovers in basic research:
(i) increase basic and development research expenditures
(ii) increase output;
(iii) improve welfare.
With the equilibrium values for R&D and output given in (2.34)-(2.36), the social 
planner can now determine the number of firms in equilibrium that would maximise net
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consumer surplus. From yy* = nx [£ — p(l — e)]/[cc(l — £)]we can see ^ at o^r 
functional form of the cost function given in (2.14) and for the admissible values of the 
spillover rate and of absorptive capacity (ie for 0 £ 0 £ 1 and 0 ^  5 <i 1), we have 
dW*/dn < 0. This implies that in the socially-managed industry welfare is maximised 
with at most one firm operating.
This result is not surprising. With own and rival basic research being perfect 
substitutes, the operation of any number of firms exceeding one is wasteful from the 
social point of view. The externality associated with spillovers can then be internalised 
by allowing the operation of one firm only30. In that case firm and industry variables 
coincide and the expressions in (2.34)-(2.36) give the socially optimal levels for (Qs, X„ 
T,) for 0 = 0, K -\  and n/= 1. These values are in effect those that would have arisen if 
the social planner had from the start maximised a welfare function of the form 
W=U(Q)-cQ-X-Y, where P = cQ ^  and c = pJT T * We therefore have:
(2.34’) Q, = [o1+pP '1a “ / ] ' /tE' pa' ' )1
(2.35’) X,=  [a pc- ' a e-,<,- eY 1' c>],/te‘ P<," !)1
(2.36’) Y =  [Op'-1
30 Hartwick (1984), following a  different procedure, derives a  socially optimal outcome with 
external effects where more than one firm is operating. He maximizes net consumer surplus 
given n firms and attempts to capture the externality in R&D by allowing for differential cost 
elasticities with respect to "own" and to "borrowed" R&D in his unit production cost function 
c(x,X) = pan*-0 where X=(n-1 )x. His specification therefore assum es a  degree of complemen­
tarity between a  firm’s own R&D and that of its rivals. Furthermore, depending on the choice of 
values for the parameters, the externality generated in R&D can benefit other firms more than 
the originating firm (in effect, the values chosen for his simulations exhibit increasing returns to 
scale to R&D expenditures; in addition, the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to rivals’ 
R&D is greater than that with respect to own R&D). In the socially optimal case, where the 
external effect is accounted for in the maximand, this will result in the optimal number of firms 
being greater than one. Hartwick’s result is reconciled with ours when the cost function is 
assum ed to be of the nested CES form (see the next chapter).
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IV. Market performance and government policy
Sections II and El addressed the question of how the equilibrium characteristics 
of a free-entry oligopoly and of a socially-managed industry are affected by the 
existence of a non-appropriable part in basic research. We derived results that showed 
that the impact of spillovers depends to a large extent on the assumptions about how 
R&D inputs combine to produce cost-saving innovations. In this section, we examine 
the implications of these results for the incentives of the market to conduct basic 
research as well as its performance relative to the socially optimal case 31. We also 
examine the desirability and implications of a government policy that subsidises basic 
research.
a. Relative market Incentives and performance
The specification of the cost function adopted in this chapter assumed that a firm’s 
own basic research is a perfect substitute for the basic research of its rivals while total 
basic research and development research are substitutable with an elasticity of one. We 
want to compare basic research expenditures and total R&D performed in the free-entry 
oligopolistic market with the socially optimal case under these assumptions. From
(2.19) and (2.35’) we see that x ’/X, = [faT 'C l-£ /« ’)]“  (1ART). For0 = O, 
n* = e(l + p)/p and x*/Xs = 1 + p) (since n=  1, x=Xa). It follows that x* < Xs so
31 We noted in the beginning of the chapter that the reader could interpret the research 
spillovers in this model as being international, rather than national, with knowledge generated 
by one firm benefiting its rivals in other countries. This would make the model one of interna­
tional oligopolistic rivalry, with firms located in different countries but selling their product at a  
world price. Under this interpretation, the welfare maximisation problem in section III above that 
delivers the socially optimal levels of R&D and production has to be understood as  referring to 
global welfare, In the sense that it covers all consumers and producers of the product, wherever 
they are located. Similarly by "the government" subsidising R&D now one has to understand 
some supra-national agency that attempts to stimulate industry R&D without discriminating 
between firms. This type of subsidy is of course very different from the profit-shifting subsidies 
in strategic trade, where governments attempt to assist national firms to capture a  greater slice 
of world profits. A model along those lines is developed in chapter five below.
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that with full appropriability, each firm in the free-entry oligopoly spends less on basic 
research than is socially optimal. The result is reinforced when part of basic research is 
non-appropriable since with the cost function under consideration, higher spillovers act 
as a disincentive to basic research expenditures at firm level. With 0 > 0 therefore, n is 
given by expression (2.23) andx  < X, as [w*-6]1 A < [1 +y+ (oe/X)]1/AX. Similarly, x +y* 
< Xs+Ys so that individual firms in the market case underinvest in total R&D as well.
In the market economy however, total basic research expenditures are XA=nx* and 
we are primarily interested inX*PCs. When basic research is fully appropriable,
X*/Xs = (rt*)p(e-l)/(l + p). It is therefore possible, if £ is large (ie if demand is highly 
inelastic) for n x  > xs. This is the basis for the conclusion arrived at by Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1980a) that the market economy may be characterized by excessive 
expenditure on R&D {n x ), while simultaneously having too low a rate of technical 
progress {x). The result that the market may encourage excessive duplication is 
derived in their model with R&D treated as homogeneous and fully appropriable.
When we allow for the existence of spillovers in basic research, we have that 
X*IX3 = [(«*)P(E_ 1)_ 1 {n* -  s)]1/A (1 IK). It is still the case that we can have X*>XS or X*<XS 
but the ratio declines as the degree of appropriability falls (ie as 0 rises). Furthermore, 
X*+Y* > Xs+F, or X*+Y* < Xs+Fs so that the market in the presence of spillovers may be 
spending too much on total R&D as well. Excessive duplication of basic research effort 
and of total R&D in a market economy is therefore still possible in the presence of 
spillovers, but duplication will be less if the degree of appropriability is low. Put 
another way, the range of the elasticity of demand for which the market wastes 
resources on R&D is more restricted if spillovers are widespread. In summary:
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Proposition 5: When demand and cost functions are given by (2.12) and (2.14),
in a free-entry oligopoly with spillovers in basic research each 
firm underinvests in basic research and in total R&D compared 
with social optimality. The market as a whole however may be 
spending too much on R&D, although this is less likely if the 
degree of appropriability of basic research is low.
A related question concerns the performance of the market relative to the socially 
optimal case in the presence of spillovers. This can be represented by the ratio TS/W*. 
TS is the total surplus achieved in the market, and is obtained as the addition of the 
consumer surplus B(Q) - Q B’(Q) (where B(Q) is the total benefit obtained by the 
consumption of output Q) and the producer surplus n il  so that TS*= B(Q*)-c*Q*- 
n x - n y *. Maximum welfare is given by W*=U{Qs)-csQs-X-Ys with one firm operating. 
We assess first the relative performance of the market when there are barriers to entry 
so that the number of firms n is exogenously given. From the equilibrium values 
(q , x ,  y*) and {Qs, Xs, Ys) derived in the market and in the socially optimal case 
respectively, and for the form of the cost function assumed in (2.14):
(2.37) TS\n)/W ’ = (1M) ((1 -  e/n)np<e‘ 1>]<‘'',) • [e(n +1 -  e)/(n -  e) -  (1 -  e) (Y+(ot/Ar))]
If the industrial structure is taken as a datum for the moment, so that n is 
exogenously determined, a comparison of the case where basic research is fully 
appropriable to the case with spillovers shows that TSq>0/W* > TSq.JW*. Spillovers 
reduce basic research expenditures and lead to higher profits. When the number of 
firms is given, this implies a higher producer surplus. Given that the socially optimal 
outcome in this case involves one firm only, Wq_0 = We>0 and therefore the ratio TS*/W* 
increases. Furthermore, d(TS*/W*)/dQ> 0 so that a higher spillover rate improves the 
performance of the market.
81
When there are no barriers to entry and the number of firms in equilibrium is 
large enough for the zero profit condition to hold, the entire surplus generated in the 
market is consumer surplus. The ratio TS*/W* is therefore given by:
(2.38) T S\n  ’)IW’ = (£M )[(1- ei n f  (n ’)P,E‘ Y " "
and it is possible to have d(TS*/W*)/dQ > 0 or d(TS*/W*)/dQ < 0. More specifically, the
sign of d(TS*fW*)/dQ is determined by the sign of the expression {e(l + p) -  p(n * — £)}. 
Given that the number of firms is a function of the spillover rate and dn*/dQ> 0, a 
higher spillover rate is associated with a less concentrated industry. As the spillover 
rate increases, total R&D expenditures at firm and industry level decline. Unit 
production costs therefore increase. With entry, industry-wide output may rise or fall.
If total output produced falls, total surplus falls and a higher spillover rate can be 
associated with a lower TS*fW* ratio.
Proposition 6: When demand and cost functions are given by (2.12) and (2.14),
in an oligopoly with barriers to entry, spillovers in basic research 
improve market performance. In a free-entry oligopoly inappro­
priability improves performance only when spillovers result in 
higher industry output.
b. R&D subsidies
The preceding discussion has shown that in the context of the specific model, 
spillovers act as a disincentive for firms’ investments in basic research and in total 
R&D. An obvious question is whether the government should implement a policy to try 
and counter this negative effect and what precise form this policy should take. One 
possible avenue is to attempt to reduce the incidence of spillovers through, for instance, 
more far-reaching legislation on the right to patent basic research principles. Such a
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strategy however ignores the positive externality associated with inappropriability of 
part of R&D: spillovers, by reducing R&D costs for a given level of cost reduction, 
have the potential to improve the market’s performance.
An alternative strategy is for the government to institute a policy which would 
counter the negative externality associated with spillovers, while preserving the 
spillover environment. In its simplest form, such a policy would involve a subsidy on 
basic research. This would have the effect of lowering the cost of basic research for 
individual firms and therefore to encourage investment in this type of R&D.
With a per-unit subsidy on basic research, denoted 5, the firm’s profit-maximising 
problem would now be, instead of (2.3):
(2.3’) II, = {P{Q )-c[R  (*,., 5j, 0), y,.]}?,. -  (1 -  s )*,. -  y •
For the functional forms for demand and cost functions given in (2.12) and (2.14), 
the corresponding first-order conditions for the symmetric solution are the same as for 
the situation where firms bear the full cost of basic research (2.15)-(2.17), except for the 
condition that equalises marginal benefit with marginal cost in basic research, which is 
replaced by:
(2.16’) o p /T "  V f 1' 1 ( / f e e  V )  = l - s
For the situation where there exist barriers to entry so that the number of firms n 
can be taken as given, the new system of first-order conditions (2.15), (2.16’) and (2.17) 
yields the following solutions:
(2.18’) 4 =  [a“ P'1V,'al+,’( l - e /n ) ,+pn‘€(1+p,( l - s n l/Ie''’<1' e)'
(2.19’) x=  [ae~*'~e)p8~ V a (1 - e /n ) n ^ l - s ) ^ * ' ~ £)l .(l/AT)
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(2.20’) y =  [a*' - e |  pe- ' f  *' “ £ )  a  (1 -  e/«) "■*(! -  i)^ ' -£,],'"'p<' ~ e ) 1
A number of observations can now be made. First, for subsidy rates that are 
positive and less than 100%, basic research expenditures and total R&D are higher in 
the presence of subsidies and rise with the subsidy rate ie dx/ds > 0 and d(x + y)/ds > 0. 
Development research expenditures increase with the subsidy rate only if demand is 
inelastic (dy/ds > 0 if e < 1). Marginal production costs fall (dc/ds < 0), and 
consequently firm and industry output is higher and prices are lower ( dQlds > 0, 
dP/ds < 0). Profit for individual firms rises for elastic demand ( dTl/ds > 0 for e < 1).
Secondly, as should be expected, subsidies reduce the disincentive effects of 
spillovers on basic research. For given n and a subsidy rate $, the marginal disincentive 
effect of spillovers is given by the negative sign of dJc/dQ. Accordingly, subsidies 
negatively affect this ie <?Jc/(dQds) < 0. Their presence therefore improves incentives to 
invest in basic research in an environment characterised by spillovers.
Finally, subsidies to basic research improve welfare. If we define maximal 
welfare in the presence of subsidies as W* = U(Qs) — csQs -  (1 -  s)Xs — Ys, we can 
establish that dW*/ds > 0. Because of their output-expanding effect, higher subsidy 
rates to basic research are associated with higher welfare.
In setting a subsidy rate, the government is attempting to maximise the total 
surplus generated by the market. This surplus is the addition of the producer and 
consumer surpluses generated by the production of output Q, net of the cost of the 
subsidy, ie TS=PS+CS-sX-Y. For ( f ,y ,Q/n), TS is the maximum surplus generated by 
the market under the presence of spillovers and subsidies. The optimal subsidy rate can 
then be calculated as the rate that will maximise this total surplus. Setting dTS/ds = 0 
yields the optimum subsidy rate s*:
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Inspection of (2.40) reveals that the optimal subsidy rate is positive and less than 
one. It depends on the number of firms in the industry, the spillover rate, the elasticity 
of demand and the elasticity of cost reduction through development research. With full 
appropriability, s* is still positive, reflecting the fact that even in the absence of 
spillovers, firms in the market underinvest in R&D. As the number of firms increases 
however, the optimal subsidy declines and as n —» —» 0. With positive spillovers 
0s700 > 0, so that the optimal subsidy increases with the spillover rate. The effect of 
concentration on the optimal subsidy rate is however ambiguous in this case. The 
reason is that in a spillover environment with many firms, subsidies can significantly 
reduce industry marginal costs. Finally, ceteris paribus, the optimal subsidy to basic 
research increases with the elasticity of cost reduction through development research.
The table below provides a simple example that helps illustrate these results. It is 
constructed for an elastic demand (1/e = 1.5) and for y= 0.3. Reading across rows, at 
any level of concentration (except for a monopolistic industry), optimal subsidies 
increase with the spillover rate. For four firms, optimal rates vary from 25% with full 
appropriability to 81% when basic research is a pure public good. Reading down 
columns, with full appropriability optimal subsidy rates decline sharply as the market 
becomes less concentrated. With low spillovers, they decline initially; as the number of 
firms increases however, the effect of a spillover environment on cost reduction 
overwhelms the cost of subsidies. With moderate or high spillovers, this effect is 
reinforced, and optimal subsidy rates increase with n. These effects do not change 
when we vary the elasticity of demand or the elasticity of cost reduction through 
development research.
Table 1
Optimal subsidy rates to basic research (using (2.14))
Firms Spillover rate
n 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 77.92 77.92 77.92 77.92 77.92
2 46.85 57.50 64.58 69.64 73.43
3 33.51 55.67 66.75 73.40 77.83
4 26.08 57.76 70.43 77.25 81.52
5 21.35 60.67 73.78 80.33 84.27
We can now compare the performance of the market on the basis of the derived 
optimal subsidy to basic research to that in the absence of any R&D subsidy. This 
entails the comparison of TS\s*) = B(Q*) -  c*Q* -  (1 -  s*)nx* -  ny * with 
TS'(s=0)=B(Q')-c’Q' -rvc-ny*. It is easy to establish that for elastic demand (1/e > 1 — 
necessary for both TS*(j=0)>0 and TS*(s*) > 0), we have that TS*(s*) > TS*(s = 0) 32. 
When basic research is subject to spillovers, the market with optimal subsidies in basic 
research outperforms the market with no R&D subsidies.
We summarise these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 7: When demand and cost functions are given by (2.12) and (2.14),
subsidies in basic research:
(i) reduce the disincentive effect of spillovers;
(ii) improve welfare;
(iii) increase the performance of the market.
Corollary 7.1: Optimal subsidies to basic research are positive and increase
with the spillover rate.
The discussion has so far assumed that in setting subsidy rates, the government 
can identify the part of R&D that represents basic research and which is subject to
32 T S \s* )/T S \s  = 0) = T/A where T = (1 -  s Y >A {etf(n +1 -  e) (1 -  s ' ) -  [ a + yK(l -  j*)] (n -  e) (1 -  e)},
A = {eAT(n +1 - e)-  (a+^yK)(n - e)(1 - e)} and where B = e - t (1 -  e) and A = e - p ( l  -  e). We can 
then establish that TS\s*) > TS\s -  0).
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spillovers. It can therefore subsidise basic research while letting producers bear the 
total cost of fully appropriable development research. In reality however, there exists a 
"revelation problem": basic and development research often cannot be easily distin­
guished from each other, and governments usually tend as a result to subsidise the 
whole of R&D 33. The question that arises in this context is whether this practical 
policy is a second-best. In an environment where basic research only is subject to 
spillovers, and where it is difficult to identify separately basic and development research 
expenditures, is there still a case for government subsidising the whole of R&D?
In order to address this question, we derive the firms’ equilibrium levels of R&D 
and output when the total of R&D expenditures is subsidised at a rate £, but when it is 
still the case that basic research only is subject to spillovers. Rather than maximising 
profit as in (2.3’) therefore, each firm chooses R&D and output levels so as to 
maximise:
(2.3”) n ( = {P (Q )-c  [/?(*,,*,, 6,, 0), y,-]}<?,• -  (1 -  *) (*,. + y()
The resulting solutions when there are barriers to entry so that the number of firms 
n can be taken as given are:
(2.18” ) 4=  [aap^, f o ,*p( l - e /n ) l*pn^*l*'’X l- s ) - e]w ~fil~'),
(2.19”) i =  [a“ 1<l“ , pe' 1f <l" )w (l-E /” ) « 'e( l - ' ' ) ' e]I/*!’P(l’ e)l <VK)
(2.20” ) y=  [a*l’E)pE- 1f ‘ *I' c)o ( l - £ / r t ) n ^ ( l - . r r ] ,'I‘' p<I' e)1
33 This is not the sam e a s  saying that often both basic and development research expenditures 
are subject to spillovers. We continue to maintain the assumption made in this chapter, that is 
that when "revealed", basic and development research have fundamentally different appropri­
ability characteristics: the former is subject to spillovers, while the latter is not.
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It is straightforward to establish that with a subsidy f  that is positive and less than
100%, basic research, development research and output all increase with the subsidy 
rate 0 i /9 f  > 0, 9y/9f > 0 and dq!d§ > 0). Profit for individual firms rises for elastic 
demand ( dfUds > 0 for e < 1). Welfare also increases due to the output-expanding 
effect. If we define maximal welfare in the presence of subsidies to total R&D as 
= U((),) — €s@s ~ (1 ”  f)  + ^ )» we can establish that d\fr* / > 0.
The optimal subsidy £* can now be derived by assuming that the government
attempts to maximise total surplus, given in this case by TS=PS+CS-s(X+Y). The 
optimal subsidy per unit of (total) R&D is then given by:
(2.39’) / =  l ~ (n ^ e)[ai+yA? (1''g)
Comparison of the optimal subsidy rate to basic research (2.39) with the optimal 
subsidy rate to total R&D (2.39’) reveals that for elastic demand (1/e > 0 — a necessary 
condition for W>0), it is the case that irrespective of spillovers, s* > £*. Optimal 
subsidies are lower when it is the total R&D, rather than the part subject to spillovers, 
that is being subsidised.
With optimal subsidies to total R&D in place, the total surplus achieved is given
by TS*(f*) - B(Q) - 6Q -  {I -§*) (n£ +ny). The question of whether it is better for the 
government to abstain from any R&D subsidies if there exists a "revelation problem" 
with basic research can then be addressed by comparing TS*(£*) to the total surplus that 
the market can achieve in the absence of R&D subsidies, given by 
TS’(s=0)=B(Q’)-c‘Q' -nx-ny*. It can be established that as in the case of optimal
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subsidies to basic research only, for a given number of firms and spillover rate,
TS*(£*) > TS*(s = 0) 34. Total surplus in this case exceeds the maximal total surplus in 
the absence of subsidies.
Of greater interest however is the comparison between TS*(s*) and TS*(£*)35. We
cannot establish a priori whether the performance of the market under optimal basic 
research subsidies exceeds or falls short of the market performance with optimal 
subsidies to total R&D. The ratio depends on the elasticities of demand and of cost 
reduction with respect to the pool of basic research and to own development research 
expenditures, and more importantly, on the number of firms in the industry and the 
degree of appropriability of basic research.
Table 2 below provides an example that illustrates this comparison for different 
levels of concentration in the industry and spillover rates. For its construction, we have 
assumed an elastic demand (1/e = 2) and cost elasticities with respect to the pool of 
basic research a  and to own development research y of 0.1 and 0.3 respectively. With 
full appropriability, we see that the performance of the market under optimal basic 
research subsidies falls short of that under optimal subsidies to total R&D. The same is 
true for low spillover environments and/or concentrated industries. In high spillover 
environments and/or less concentrated industries, the reverse is true. Here the
34 TS\£*)/TS\s = 0) = E/A where E = (1 -  f y * A {eK(n +1 -  e) (1 -  £') -  ( a + yK) (n -  e) (1 -  e)},
A = {e£(n +1 -  e)-  (a+yST)(n -  e)(1 -  e)} and where B = e -y ( l  -  e) and A = e -p ( l  -  e). We can 
then establish that TS\§') > TS\s = 0).
35 This is given by TS\s*)ITS*(£*) = I7E where
r = ( l  -  j  V M {eK(n +1 -  e) (1 -  j*) -  [ a + y^(1 -  j*)] (n -  e) (1 -  e)},
E = (l -  £'y A {eK(n + 1 -  e) (1 - £'') -  ( a +yK)  (n -  e) (1 -  e)} and where B = e - y ( l - e )  and 
A = e - p ( l - e ) .
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revelation problem implies that a policy of subsidising the whole of R&D, rather than 
just the part subject to spillovers, has a cost, and that cost increases both with the 
spillover rate and with the number of firms in the industry.
Table 2
Relative market performance under s* and (using (2.14))
Firms Spillover rate
n 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 0.774 0.774 0.774 0.774 0.774
2 0.931 0.943 0.940 0.948 0.956
3 0.967 0.976 0.993 1.010 1.028
4 0.980 0.998 1.023 1.051 1.075
5 0.987 1.013 1.049 1.083 1.112
The explanation runs along the following lines. With low spillovers/high concen­
tration, the potential cost-reducing benefit of subsidising the total R&D exceeds that of 
subsidising one part of R&D only. This is especially true since the elasticity of cost 
reduction with respect to development research is assumed to exceed that of basic 
research. With high spillovers/low concentration, the potential cost-reducing benefit of 
subsidising basic research only is very high; it can therefore outweigh the cost of not 
inducing any increase in the other part of R&D, development research.
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V. Conclusions
This chapter set out to investigate the economic characteristics of an environment 
where a set of interacting firms compete by setting output and R&D levels simulta­
neously in a one-stage game and where one part of R&D, basic research, is not entirely 
appropriable by the firm or firms that originate it. In a framework where market 
structure is in turn taken as a datum or considered as endogenous, we examined the 
impact of such R&D spillovers on R&D expenditures, costs and output, on industrial 
concentration and monopoly power, and on the incentives and performance generated 
by the market relative to a socially optimal case.
The main conclusions are presented below. They rely heavily on the underlying 
assumptions about the nature of technological advance in an industry as it is revealed in 
the cost function of the individual firm. This first set of conclusions should be 
compared with a similar set in the next chapter emanating from an analysis embodying 
different assumptions about firms’ technology. Empirically, the conclusions here seem 
to be most relevant to industries where technical advance can be thought to have a 
"discrete" nature, in the sense of innovations in basic research representing isolated 
advances in knowledge. The basic research of a firm’s rivals that leaks out and is 
absorbed can then be plausibly considered to be a perfect substitute to a firm’s own 
basic research. Furthermore, total basic research and development research are assumed 
to be substitutable with an elasticity of one, so that the cost function is represented by
(2.14). The impact of spillovers is in this case seen to be quite drastic and is 
summarized below.
(1) If there exist barriers to entry into an industry so that the number of firms can 
be taken to be exogenously given, inappropriability in basic research will reduce the
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incentives at firm level to conduct basic research and improve profitability at the firm 
level36. A higher spillover rate will be associated with a lower rate of basic research 
expenditures and of total R&D at industry level, with lower fixed costs and 
consequently with more profitable industries.
(2) In a cross-section of industries facing the same elasticity of demand and with 
the same opportunities of cost reduction through R&D, but differing in terms of the 
degree of appropriability of basic research, one would expect to observe that the 
industries exhibiting the least appropriability of basic research would be the ones least 
concentrated and with the weakest monopoly power. Spillovers therefore reduce 
price-cost margins and improve allocative efficiency.
(3) When the number of firms in an industry is large enough for each firm to earn 
zero profits in the free-entry equilibrium, inappropriability is associated with less 
R&D-intensive industries.
(4) Despite the fact that higher spillovers sustain a larger number of firms in the 
free-entry equilibrium, so that the number of firms undertaking basic research increases, 
industry-wide basic research expenditures suffer. In a free-entry oligopoly therefore 
inappropriability of basic research acts as a disincentive for basic research expenditures 
at both the firm and industry-wide level. It may increase industry-wide development 
research expenditures, but R&D expenditures in total fall.
30 All the conclusions are based on the assumption that absorptive capacity is exogenously 
given. Section ll.c demonstrated how with absorptive capacity a  function of a  firm’s basic 
research expenditures, spillovers need not necessarily act a s  a  disincentive to conduct basic 
research, and will instead encourage It in the case  where the positive absorptive incentive is 
strong enough to outweigh the negative incentive due to diminishing returns. We postpone 
drawing a  full set of conclusions on the basis of this possibility until next chapter, where such a  
complementarity of own and competitors’ basic research is examined more carefully through 
particular assumptions about the cost function.
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(5) Industries with a lower degree of appropriability of basic research will be 
spending less on basic research as a proportion of total R&D expenditures than 
industries where spillovers are low. Spillovers therefore induce a shift away from pure 
or generic research whose outcome is not fully appropriable towards more 
product-specific and proprietary development research.
(6) Each firm in a free-entry oligopolistic market underinvests in basic research 
and in total R&D relative to the social optimum. The extent of underinvestment 
increases with the degree of inappropriability of basic research.
(7) Basic research expenditures in the market, as well as total R&D, will in 
general be less than socially optimal, whether basic research is appropriable or not; if 
however demand for the product is highly inelastic total basic research expenditures in 
an industry with free-entry can exceed the socially optimal level if spillovers are not 
pervasive. Excessive duplication of basic research and of total R&D in a market 
economy are therefore possible, even though cost reduction is lower, but duplication 
will be less if the degree of appropriability of basic research is low.
(8) When there are barriers to entry into an industry, inappropriability of basic 
research increases the profitability of firms and improves the performance of the market 
relative to the social optimum. In the free-entry equilibrium however, a higher spillover 
rate may dampen market performance if the disincentive effect on basic research 
expenditures increases unit production costs substantially and reduces total 
industry-wide output.
(9) A government policy of subsidising basic research will stimulate expenditures 
in the non-appropriable part of R&D and improve welfare. The optimal subsidy rate 
will be positive, less than one and increase as the degree of appropriability of basic 
research falls.
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VI. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER TWO
We want to locate conditions for which a free-entry symmetric equilibrium 
(n,q*y,y*) exists as a solution to the model described by the first-order conditions 
(2.7’)-(2.10’). Assume for the moment that there are barriers to entry so that n is given. 
The problem reduces to locating conditions for which the choice (Q*/njc*,y*) yields 
non-negative profits for the individual firm in equilibrium ie for which:
(A.1) Il(Q*/n,x*,y*) = {P(Q*)-c[x*,(n -l)x*,y*]}Q*/n - x * -y * Z  0
We furthermore need the profit function of the individual firm 
{P [(n - 1)<2‘ + q{] -  c [xi9 (n -  l)x*, y,]}#, - xx -  y, to be concave in the neighbourhood 
where q,=Q*/n, x{=x*7 y{=y*. Before specifying demand and cost functions therefore, for 
the second-order conditions to hold we need the corresponding Hessian to be negative 
definite. This implies decreasing returns to scale to R&D expenditures ie <?c/dx2 > 0 
and cfc/dy2 > 0. It also implies that own effects (of output and of R&D) on marginal 
profit must exceed cross effects so that II9?n ^  > I l^ n ^  > Tlly and n ^ I I ^  > n j r
If the functional forms of the demand and cost functions are given by (2.12) and
(2.14), for non-negative profits we need n > e (so that {Q*/njc ,y*) is real-valued) and:
(A.2) e/(« -  e) -  [y+ (oc/AT)] £ 0
Condition (A.2) is satisfied when e <> n ^  e(l + y)/y so that:
(A.3) I I ( ( 2 y*) >0 iff e <n <e(l +y)/y 
For zero profits, the condition becomes:
(A.3’) II(<27«,jt*,/) = 0 iff £(1 + p)/p ^ ^  e(l + y)/y
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For the profit function to be concave in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium 
when the inverse demand and cost functions are given by (2.12) and (2.14) the 
second-order conditions (SOC) are satisfied when:
(A.4) e(l +p)T(” ^ 1 > P or e(l + P)M- > P
It can be shown however that |X < 1. [Proof: (n -  e) + (n - 1 )  < n (n -  £) =>
(n -1 )  < (n -  e) (n -1 )  => n > £ which is given by the FOC. QED]. Condition A.4 can 
therefore be replaced by £(1 + p) > p or £ -  p(l -  £) > 0. This is in fact the condition 
used for the derivation of the comparative statics in the text.
We have therefore proved the following theorem:
Theorem 1: If P{Q) and c, satisfy (2.12) and (2.14) and if n is a positive integer, 
then a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the presence of 
spillovers amongst n firms exists if:
(i) e(l + p)/p <« ^£(1 + y)/y and
(ii) E(1 + P )[<"-„‘!f-V !] > P or e(! +P)lx > P-
It can be immediately seen that (ii) is satisfied if £ > 1 ie if demand is inelastic. It
can also be satisfied for £ < 1 as long as demand is not too elastic. We have therefore 
shown that if e(1 + p)/p ^ n <, £(1 + y)/y a Nash equilibrium with spillovers exists even if 
demand is throughout inelastic. Furthermore, the presence of spillovers allows for a 
much wider range of £ to satisfy the existence conditions. With 0 > 0, the SOC can be 
satisfied with a more elastic demand than would be necessary in the case where 
spillovers are absent.
We now want to locate conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium when 
there is free-entry. Suppose there are barriers of entry so that (Q*/ny,y*) is the optimal 
choice for the firm in a symmetric equilibrium with n firms. Following the
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methodology in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), define by jc’+y the solution of P(Q*)= 
c[*,(/j-l)jc,y]. x+ y  is like an entry cost. If there exists an m>0 such that 
TL(Q*/n,x*, y*) < m(x + y ), no additional firm will find it profitable to enter the industry 
and condition (2.6) would then be satisfied.
For the functional forms given in (2.12) and (2.14) using nq* from (2.20) into 
P(Q*)= c[x* y*] we have:
(A.5) x ’+ y ’ = [p'~la (l - eJn f ' -£)’ • [(y/a) + (1/AT)]
Since
(A.6) n* = [a(l-e /n )P e~1a <*,“e)y l“e,n'*]l/l8"p<I”e)1 • [e/(n-e)-(Y +a/tf)]
from (A.5) and (A.6) it follows that:
(A.7) H(Q*/n,x*,y*) £ m ( x + y ) iff [eJ(n -  e) -  (y+cx/AT)] ^ m( l  -e /n )vp(y+aJK)
For the free-entry Nash equilibrium we will choose n to be the largest positive 
integer not exceeding [1 + y + (ot/AT)]/[y+ (cc/AT)]. We have therefore shown:
Theorem 2: If P(Q) and c{ satisfy (2.12) and (2.14) respectively and in view of 
Theorem 1, a free-entry Nash equilibrium exists if:
(i) e(l + p)[ — > p or e(l+ p)p > p
(ii) n ’ = [1 +y+(a/X')]/tY+(ot/X')]
(iii) [e/(n- e)- (y+ a IK)]S m ( l - eJn),,p(y+ a IK).
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CHAPTER THREE
COMPLEMENTARITIES IN BASIC RESEARCH
I. Introduction
The results obtained in the previous chapter point to a potentially serious problem 
associated with the inappropriability of part (or all) of R&D. While spillovers are 
beneficial from the point of view of ex post (production) cost reduction, they may be 
associated with serious ex ante disincentives to invest in the part of R&D that is subject 
to imitation by rivals. This suggests that industries where spillovers are widespread 
should be expected to be those characterised by a low rate of technological progress.
A number of empirical studies however seem to contradict this result. They point 
to evidence suggesting that while spillovers exist there do not seem to be serious 
disincentive effects associated with them. In a recent paper for example, Levin (1988) 
reports on the results of an empirical study to ascertain the effects of inappropriability 
on industrial performance and R&D intensity. He finds that while "involuntary" 
spillovers do exist, they do not seem to be associated with low R&D intensity. The 
disincentive effect of spillovers which is predicted in models such as the one by Spence 
(1984) for the homogeneous R&D case and in the model developed in chapter two 
above (under the parameterization of the cost function given by (2.14)), is not 
discernible in the data. Levin’s and others’ results lend weight to widespread beliefs, 
based on casual observation, that there exist many high R&D-intensity industries, such 
as electronics, which exhibit a low degree of appropriability of R&D-related 
expenditures, but also often have a high degree of dynamic efficiency.
In an attempt to reconcile theory with the stylized facts revealed in empirical work 
a number of explanations have been offered. The first is institutional. It asserts that 
while spillovers hurt firms’ incentives to invest in the part of R&D that is not full 
appropriable by the originating firm, the fact that we do not observe a diminished rate of 
effort in R&D can be largely explained by government support of R&D which in the
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form of subsidies restores incentives. In the model in the previous chapter we showed 
that the introduction of a subsidy rate to basic research reduces the marginal cost to the 
firm of investing in that form of R&D expenditures and acts as a counterbalance to the 
diminished appropriability associated with it. Optimal subsidies are positive for the 
case where appropriability is imperfect and increase with the spillover rate.
A second explanation runs along behavioural lines. In his 1984 paper, Spence 
conjectures that firms might imperfectly anticipate (or even totally ignore) the effects of 
their own R&D on the costs of other firms and on industry prices. He interprets this as 
implying that when making their decisions on the levels of R&D, firms do not take 
account of the fact that their R&D increases their competitors’ knowledge and thereby 
reduces their costs. This indirect effect reduces a firm’s own profits; when it is not 
therefore taken into account R&D investments are more aggressive (because the 
perceived benefit is higher) and the disincentive effect due to spillovers is reduced \  In 
the model of the previous chapter however, we showed that even in the absence of this 
indirect effect, ie in a situation where the marginal benefit of basic research to the firm 
is defined solely by the reduction in its marginal cost due to its own basic research 
expenditures, the incentives to invest in basic research in equilibrium decline with the 
spillover rate. While therefore ignoring spillovers does increase the apparent marginal
1 1mperfect anticipation of the effects of a  firm’s own R&D investments on the costs of other 
firms and on industry prices is reflected in Spence (1984) in the first-order conditions. The 
marginal return to a  firm’s R&D expenditures takes account in such a  case  only of the (positive) 
direct effect of R&D on own profits ie n^, and not of the indirect effects of R&D on competitors’
knowledge level Rj =Xj+QbjX_j and through that on price and own profit ie of 9 X 5 J 4 .. Givenj*i j
that this second term is negative, its omission increases the marginal benefit of spending on 
R&D. Put another way, not taking into account this indirect effect is equivalent to reducing a  
two-stage game (with R&D decisions preceding production decisions) to a  one-stage game.
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benefit to the firm of investing in the partially appropriable part of R&D and thereby 
makes its investment decisions more aggressive, it does not totally eliminate or reverse 
the disincentive effect due to spillovers 2.
Such a reversal in the role of spillovers, ie a situation where spillovers become an 
incentive to invest in R&D, is possible in the context of a third explanation that focuses 
on the technology itself, and to inter-industry differences in the nature of technical 
advance. Take for example the case where own and rival basic research are perfect 
substitutes, as in (2.14). This would seem to best characterize industries where 
technical advance has a "discrete", as opposed to a "cumulative" nature, so that 
innovation represents isolated advances in knowledge. In such a situation, spillovers 
from rivals lower the marginal productivity of a firm’s basic research by making further 
such outlays duplicative, and, in the context of this model, also shift some of the firm’s 
resources to another type of R&D, development research.
Technical advance may however instead be "cumulative". Rather than 
representing radical departures in previously unexplored directions, many of today’s 
innovations are often closely related to existing knowledge; the technology embodied in 
new processes is then founded on the technology it replaces. If findings in a field build 
on past findings, the capacity to assimilate new products and processes depends to a 
large extent on the firm’s own past R&D expenditures 3. In addition therefore to 
generating innovations, R&D in this case also develops the ability of firms to utilise 
technological knowledge from its competitors in the same industry or to assimilate
2 The effect of behavioural assumptions on the impact of spillovers on R&D incentives and firm 
profitability are explored in detail in chapter four below.
3 Levin (1988) offers this idea of industries dominated by "isolated increases in knowledge” as 
opposed to industries dominated by "cumulative advance” as a  plausible explanation for the 
contradiction between previous theoretical predictions on the effects of spillovers and the results 
of empirical work.
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innovations developed in other industrial sectors. In such a situation, the marginal 
productivity of a rival’s basic research can enhance the productivity of the firm’s own 
basic research. Consequently, a high spillover rate may also stimulate expenditures in 
basic research and thereby raise R&D intensity.
Another aspect of outside knowledge that may make a firm’s own R&D 
expenditures critical to its capacity to assimilate externally generated knowledge is the 
complexity of knowledge and the degree to which outside knowledge is targeted to the 
needs of the firm 4. When extra-firm knowledge is particularly complex, or when it is 
of a generic nature and less directly targeted to the capabilities already developed by a 
firm, own R&D expenditures become particularly important in allowing the firm to 
track the evolution of this knowledge and assimilate it. This suggests that the effect of 
spillovers on incentives and performance can be most sharply visualised if, as has been 
the case in the models developed here, it is assumed that spillovers exist in basic 
research, whereas development research is taken to be fully appropriable.
There are at least two ways of attempting to model and examine the implications 
of the main elements of this third "technological" explanation to the apparent paradox. 
The first has been followed by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and was also illustrated as a 
digression (section n.c) in the previous chapter. It consists of assuming that a firm’s 
capacity to absorb external knowledge depends on its own R&D expenditures. Higher 
expenditures mean that firms are in a better position to take advantage of the research of 
their rivals that spills over: for given spillovers, their absorptive capacity improves. 
Cohen and Levinthal show that with absorptive capacity an endogenous variable in the 
model, spillovers will in certain circumstances spur, rather than discourage,
4 Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Pavitt (1987) discuss som e of the characteristics of 
knowledge and technology mentioned here.
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expenditures in R&D. In the previous chapter, we illustrated this result for the case 
where spillovers are in basic research only, and where basic and development research 
enter the firm’s cost function with a unitary elasticity.
An alternative way of capturing the idea that firms invest in basic research (or in 
R&D in general) in order to be better able to utilise information available externally is 
to focus directly on the idea that competitors’ basic research (or R&D in general) may 
be complementary to a firm’s own expenditures, rather than simply substituting for it. 
This implies allowing in the formulation of the model for the possibility that spillovers 
from rivals can increase, as well as decrease, the marginal productivity of a firm’s own 
basic research. In the context of a model where cost reduction depends on expenditures 
in (partially appropriable) basic research and in (fully appropriable) development 
research, this boils down to a particular specification of the cost function that is more 
flexible with respect to the possibilities of substitutability and complementarity between 
three research inputs: own basic research, rivals’ basic research, and own development 
research5. This chapter develops such a model, analyses its implications for incentives 
at the firm level and industry performance, and compares the results with those of the 
previous chapter with the use of a simple example.
9 The specification adopted in this chapter is a  more general one than that of Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989). They focus on the idea of learning, and on the implications of an endogenous 
absorption parameter on the incentives that firms have for R&D expenditures. We focus on the 
technological interaction between firms. Thus with our approach it would in principle be 
possible to distinguish between two industries which, while having similar absorptive capacities, 
also have different technological characteristics and thus respond differently to spillovers. This 
is reflected in the specification chosen. We assum e that for each firm, the marginal cost 
function is given in general form by c, = $(£>,.,/?,,/?;), where D, is the firm’s development research 
knowledge, R, its basic research knowledge and /?ythe basic research knowledge of its 
competitors. For heterogeneous R&D, the Cohen and Levinthal specification would be of a  
weakly separable form c, = <j>(D„8(/?,)i?,) = <!>[/>,•, /?,)], where 6 is the firm’s absorptive capacity.
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II. Oligopoly with n firms
The results of the last chapter were derived on the basis of the functional form of 
the cost function in (2.14). This formulation embodies certain assumptions about the 
manner in which a firm’s own and its borrowed basic research combine with 
development research to reduce production costs. Own basic research is assumed to be 
a perfect substitute for that part of the basic research of rivals that spills over and that 
can be absorbed. Total basic research on the other hand, both own and borrowed, is 
taken to be substitutable with development research with an elasticity of one. These 
assumptions are fairly stringent and it may be that they exert an unduly strong influence 
on the effects of spillovers.
a. Complementarities in basic research
In order to explore whether it is true that the disincentive effect of spillovers rests 
critically on the underlying assumptions about the firm’s technology, we examine a 
different parameterization of the cost function. Rather than using a cost function whose 
underlying knowledge production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type, we now 
assume a cost function based on a two-level (nested) constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) knowledge production function. For a particular firm i, the (basic) knowledge 
production function is given by the form:
[
-■-i/p,
with a corresponding cost function:
where - l < p 1<oo, - l < p 2<oo, p lfp2 * 0 ,  a ,y > 0 , a + y = l
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The firm’s own basic research expenditures together with that part of the basic 
research expenditures of its rivals that spills over and that can be absorbed are nested in 
a subaggregate R; that represents the total basic research pool. Own and borrowed basic 
research however are no longer perfect substitutes, and their direct elasticity of 
substitution is given by sxx = 1/(1 + p,). The subaggregate input Rs on the other hand 
enters into the cost function together with development research expenditures and with 
a direct elasticity of substitution between the two of sRy = 1/(1 + p2) *. This is in 
contrast to the previous specification of the cost function where the elasticity of 
substitution between basic research and development research was equal to one.
A nested CES cost function allows for two different types of elasticity of 
substitution: (i) that between the inputs within the nest ie between "own" and 
"borrowed" basic research; and (ii) that between the nest as a whole and the input 
outside it ie between the total pool of basic research and (own) development research.
In our case however, we are primarily interested in comparing the ease of substitution 
between "own" and "borrowed" basic research on the one hand with that between 
"borrowed" basic research and own development research on the other, rather than with 
that between the "nest" as a whole and development research. Put another way, we 
want to explore the implications of a situation where the public part of rivals’ basic 
research is more complementary with a firm’s own basic research than with its 
development research. To this end it is more appropriate to use the concept of
* In effect, the subaggregate input Rh together with development research expenditures yh enter
( I  *a R ^ + y y y *]  . This
knowledge, generated through own basic research, borrowed basic research, and development 
research expenditures, is in turn transformed into cost reduction through a  function c, = 
where X is the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to knowledge generated by R&D.
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"elasticity of complementarity" 7. Let be the elasticity of complementarity between 
"own" and "borrowed" basic research and that between "borrowed" basic research 
and own development research *. For > cxy we require that 9logfx/dxj > dlogfy/dxj ie 
that borrowed basic research raises the marginal productivity of own basic research by 
more that it raises the marginal productivity of development research. It can be easily 
verified that c„ > cv  (c„ < c,y) when p, > p2 (p, < p2) *.
The new specification of the cost function therefore allows us to account for the 
following possibility: that the firm may be faced with a situation where the basic 
research of its rivals that "spills over" is more easily substitutable with the firm’s own
7 Hicks (1970) introduces the concept of "elasticity of complementarity" c a s  a  dual concept to 
the (Allen partial) elasticity of substitution o. For two inputs / and j  it is defined as Cq**f tyf, fj, 
i * j  , with q=f(av ...ta j  the firm’s production function where q is output and a, the ith input.
Similarly the partial elasticity of substitution is defined as  where Cij=g(pl p„,q)
is the cost function dual to the production function. The two definitions are equivalent under a  
two-factor constant returns to scale technology. Using duality theory, Sato and Koizumi (1973) 
show that the partial elasticity of complementarity m easures the inverse of the cross elasticity of 
derived demand with marginal cost held constant, while the partial elasticity of substitution 
m easures the sam e with output held constant. Furthermore, in the sam e way that for more than 
two factors the Allen partial elasticity of substitution is used in order to characterise inputs as 
substitutes and complements (with respect to changes in prices), the partial elasticity of comple­
mentarity can be used for the sam e purpose (with respect to changes in quantities). For c$>0 
therefore, the two inputs are defined to be quantity-comp/emenfs, while for Cf.0 they are 
quantity-subsf/ftvfes.
* = C„ = (1+pj)+ (P, -  P ^f7 '{oR 7')and c,„, = = c,y = 1 !>*, =  1+Pr Following textbook
notation, we use cfor the elasticity of complementarity, s  for the direct elasticity of substitution 
and o for the Allen elasticity of substitution. These symbols are used in this section only and 
should not be confused with, respectively, the marginal cost function c, the subsidy rate s and 
the extent of the market o, used throughout the dissertation.
• A brief proof is as follows. Define a nested CES knowledge production function
= a R ^ + y y ^ 1 where Ft, is as defined in (3.1). Then = atfi/Ri)i+t>2(Ri/'L$Qx_i) '+Pt and
d togL f ix i  =  ( !  +  p2>d logf/dXi + (Pi -  p2>a logR fix t. S im ilarly , f yt=y ifJyS+p2 a n d
9 tog fyfixi = (1+ p2>a tog fi/dxi- Therefore or d log > 9 log fy/dxi when p, > p2. It is also
the case that pairs of factors that are more complementary than others in terms of the elasticity 
of complementarity cwill tend to be more complementary in terms of the Allen elasticity of 
substitution o  as well, so  that p, > p2 (p, < pa) implies cw > cv  (c„ < cv) and axx < axy (axx > oxy).
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development research than it is with its own basic research10. In such a case, a higher 
spillover rate may not automatically induce the firm to cut back on its own basic 
research. In the light of the (relative) complementarity between "own" and "borrowed" 
basic research, a firm may instead increase its own basic research expenditures.
As in the previous chapter, firms are assumed to aim to maximize profits net of 
R&D expenditures. In this respect, they choose basic research expenditures xh 
development research expenditures y{ and output q{ simultaneously in a one-stage 
Cournot game. The firm’s objective function is then to maximize:
(3.3) n, = n,(<?;, 2 _ , 0, 8j, y,) = {P(Q) -c  [Rix^x^, 0), ?,]}<?, -  jc, -  >,
where the cost function is now given by the (nested) CES form of (3.2) and where 
demand takes again an iso-elastic form ie:
(3.4) P(Q) = o Q a ,e > 0  
where a  indicates the size of the market.
b. Equilibrium with barriers to entry
Under the cost and demand functions assumed in (3.2) and (3.4), the first-order 
conditions for the symmetric solution in the case where there exist barriers to entry are:
(3.5) o(Q’f  [1 - e ( g > ]  = p [ a * ^ '  (jc-)“Pl+ Y(>,*)_Pl]Vp2
10 As was noted also in the previous chapter, nothing in the model distinguishes development 
research expenditures y, from any other cost-reducing inputs that are not R&D-related. in the 
situation where y, is interpreted as any of a  number of other such expenditures, x, should be 
understood as representing R&D expenditures in general, with spillovers operating on the total 
of R&D. The concepts of "substitutability" and "complementarity" between x and /  should then 
be interpreted as  referring to R&D in general in relation to non R&D-related inputs.
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(3.6) Xo#[ej C^ ^ + y (y ^ f ^ hX,Pi"h% t*)"1'%  = 1
(3-7) = 1
where K  = 1 + (n -1 )  [50]^
For the second-order conditions to hold, it is necessary that e -  -  e) > 0. We
assume that this is indeed the case. The explicit solutions for {Q*In, x , y*) when the 
industrial structure is taken as a datum are then given by:
(3.8) q = [o* • (i _ e/„)i p-> £  of*'* k h' (i + yK*-')*' ♦»]'* '*  ' e>1
(3.9) , * = [G(i _e/„) r '  V a**;”*4 (1
(3.10) y‘ =jc‘ \|/«r*
where y  = ( y / a )m+p,) and <j> = (p, -  p2)/[pi(l + P2)]
We can now examine the impact of spillovers under the CES specification of the 
cost function, starting with the case where there exist barriers to entry so that rt can be 
taken as given11. In the specification of the unit cost function used in chapter two 
above, "own" and "borrowed" basic research were perfectly substitutable. This meant 
that when the number of firms was given, an increase in the spillover rate induced a 
corresponding decrease in the basic research expenditures of the representative firm
11 In the comparative statics based on the CES cost function we concentrate on the cases 
where the specification of the cost function gives qualitatively, as  opposed to quantitatively 
different results to the case  where the cost function is as in (2.14) of chapter two. We therefore 
ignore in the comparative statics the impact of changes in the scientific base p and of the 
market size o  on the equilibrium values of {q, x, y), given that the sign of the effects is 
independent of the specification of the cost function.
106
equal to the increase in its effective borrowed basic research, while leaving 
development research and direct production costs unchanged. Total costs inclusive of 
R&D costs fell of course, since basic research outlays had fallen. Profits therefore rose 
leading to entry in the absence of barriers.
In contrast, with the nested CES cost function, the comparative statics results of 
the impact of spillovers on R&D, costs, output and profits, are no longer as straight­
forward. They are discussed each in turn and summarised in Table 1 below.
Starting with the impact of spillovers on basic research expenditures in 
equilibrium, the sign of dx*/dO is ambiguous; a firm’s basic research expenditures may 
rise or fall as a result of a higher degree of inappropriabilityu . The effect will depend 
on three factors: first, on the relative strength o f complementarity between own and 
borrowed basic research as opposed to that between own basic research and 
development research (ie the magnitude of as opposed to that of c^); second, on the 
ease of substitutability between "own" basic research, "borrowed" basic research and 
development research (ie the absolute values of s„ and sRy); and lastly, on the elasticities 
of demand and of cost reduction with respect to R&D-related knowledge.
Take for example the case where p, > p2 > 0, so that borrowed basic research is
more complementary with "own" basic research than it is with development research 
(cxx > cxy), while both own with borrowed basic research and total basic with
12 Differentiation of (3.9) yields that the sign of 9*790 is determined by the sign of the
expression { [p je+ X O -eX K l+ p^+ C p i-pz ty^ '^e -ty l-e)] where <(> = (p, — p2)/[p,(l+ pa)] and
y = (y/a)w+Pl\  Note also that it is not just the sign of 9*790 that is ambiguous; unlike in the 
Cobb-Douglas case, in the CES case we cannot even say that, compared with industries where 
basic research is fully appropriable, firms in industries where spillovers exist will be spending
less in basic research. In effect ** |0>o=** |e=0 ^ £_lypl“e( l + lypl * so that for 0 > p, > p2, 
e<  1 and X > ep ,/(e -1), we have** |#><^ ** |e=0-
107
Table 1: Comparative statics results using (3.2)
d jc /3 0 d y /d O dc/dO d q / d 9 a n / a e
Pi > P2 > 0 e >  1 X < p 2s / ( e - l ) + + - + -
e >  1 PjE/(e - 1 )  < X < p,e/(E - 1 ) + - - + + / -
e >  1 e / ( l - E ) > X > p ,e / ( e - l ) + / - - - + + / -
e <  1 X  <  e /(1  — e ) + + - + + / -
Pi =  p j> 0 e >  1 X < p ,e/(e - 1 ) + + - + -
e >  1 E/(l -  E) > X > P,E/(E -  1) - - - + + / -
e <  1 X  <  £ / ( l  — £) + + - + + / -
p » > p i> 0 e >  1 X < p ,e / ( e - l ) + / - + - + -
e >  1 X > p 2e/(E -1 ) - - - + + / -
e >  1 p2E/(E - 1 )  > X > p,E/(E - 1 ) - + - + + / -
e <  1 X <  £ / ( l  — £ ) + / - + - + + / -
0 > p , > p 2 e >  1 + / - - - + -
e <  1 e/(1 -  e) > X > p 2e/(e - 1 ) + + - + + / -
£ <  1 pte/(e - 1 )  < X < pj£/(e - 1 ) + - - + + / -
e <  1 X < p ,e / ( e - l ) + / - - - + +
0 > p , * p 2 e >  1 - - - + + / -
e <  1 e/(1 -  e) > X > p ,e/(e - 1 ) + + - + + / -
e <  1 X < p ,E /(E -l) - - - + +
0 > p 2> p , e >  1 - - - + + / -
£  <  1 E/(l -  E) > X > p2E/(E -  1) + / - + - + + / -
£  <  1 X < p ,E /(e - l) - - - + +
£  <  1 p2E/(E -  1) > X > p,E/(E -  1) + / - - - + + / -
p ,> 0 > p 2 E >  1 X < p ,e/(e - 1 ) + - - + + / -
£  >  1 X > p ,e/(e - 1 ) + / - - - + + / -
£  <  1 e/(1 -  £) > X > p2E/(E - 1 ) + + - + + / -
£  <  1 X < p 2e/(e — 1) + - - + + / -
p2> 0 > p , £  >  1 X < p 2e/(e - 1 ) - + - + + / -
£  >  1 X > p2e/(e — 1) - - - + + / -
£  <  1 e/(1 -  e) > X > p1e/(e - 1 ) + / - + - + + / -
£  <  1 X < PjE/(e — 1) - + - + + / -
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development research are not easily substitutable with each other (sxx < l,sRy < l)- If in 
addition demand is elastic (1/e > 1), then 3*730 > 0 13. In such a case spillovers, rather 
than acting as a disincentive on a firm’s basic research, will instead act as a stimulus. In 
fact even if pt = p2 (ie = c^), higher spillovers increase basic research, as long as 
Pi£ + A l^ - e )  > 0. This last requirement is satisfied either for inelastic demand, or for 
elastic demand provided epi/(e -1 )  > X  >  e/(l -  e).
For a wide range of parameter values therefore, spillovers act as an incentive to 
expenditures in basic research14. Under the assumed functional forms, we can still have 
3*730 < 0 if p2 > pi and p{ < 0 (with demand inelastic or elastic provided that 
£p7(£ -1 )  > X  > e/(l -  e) holds), or if p2» pj by a significant amount, with Pi>0, but 
then only with inelastic demand and assuming in addition that X  >  £pj/(£ — 1). To obtain 
therefore the disincentive effect of spillovers on basic research effort in this case, one 
needs to assume c^cc^ and ^>1 or and in addition impose certain restrictions
on the parameters. Individual basic research effort is therefore certain to fall only if 
borrowed research is more complementary with development research than it is with 
"own" basic research and if in addition substitutability between "own" and "borrowed" 
basic research is high.
13 If instead demand Is inelastic (e> 1), we can still have 9*790 >0, as  long a s  p ,e+ A (l-e )> 0  
(which necessitates that ep ,/(e -1) > A, > e/(l — e)) or as long as
^ ♦ " '( p ,  -  p j  [e -  M l -  e)] >| (1 + p^ [p,e+A<l -  e)] |.
14 It should be noted that this reversal of the traditional result that spillovers act as  a  disincentive 
to basic research, which we obtained in the CES case, does not hinge on the breakdown of 
R&D into (partially appropriable) basic research and (non-appropriable) development research 
and on the resulting possibilities for relative complementarity and substitutability between the 
three pairs of factors. Suppose instead that R&D were homogeneous, so  that a  firm’s cost 
reduction depended on xonly, where x is subject to spillovers. Rather than (3.2), suppose a
firm was faced with a  cost function such as c, = p j owp*+ Vp. The sign of 9*790 
would still be ambiguous and 9*790 > 0 for ep+ A(l -  e) > 0.
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Turning now to development research, differentiation of (3.9) with respect to the 
spillover rate reveals that for ep2 +A(1 - e )  > 0, dy*/dQ > 0. The effect on development 
research expenditures therefore depends on the elasticity of demand and on the 
elasticity of substitution between basic and development research sRy = 1/(1 + p2). For 
spillovers to affect positively development research expenditures, it is sufficient for 
p2 > X - X l z .  For an elastic demand, this condition is satisfied if development research is 
not easily substitutable with basic research (p2 > 0 or sRy< l ) .  If demand is inelastic, it is 
also necessaiy that in addition the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to knowledge 
generated by R&D (A,) be low. If on the other hand basic and development research are 
good substitutes for each other (p2 < 0), the positive incentive effect of spillovers can 
only survive if demand is elastic and if in addition X  > ep2/(e -1 ). In any other case 
spillovers have a disincentive effect.
Irrespective of their (incentive or disincentive) impact on basic and development 
research expenditures, spillovers have a beneficial effect on marginal production costs 
in equilibrium. Substitution of the equilibrium values of x  and y* into (3.1) and differ­
entiation with respect to the spillover rate yields that dc*/d0 < 0. Put another way, 
whether expenditures in R&D decline or not, the production of knowledge generated by 
R&D in equilibrium increases with the spillover rate. Accordingly, as the marginal cost 
function shifts down due to a higher spillover rate, with a downward demand schedule 
output expands: dq 790 >0. Given n therefore, higher spillover rates reduce unit 
production costs and increase output.
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Lastly, when n is fixed, higher spillovers may increase or decrease individual firm 
profits ie 0IT/90 > 0 or <0 15. The overall effect on profits is the combination of the 
separate effects on R&D expenditures, production costs and revenues. Given that 
spillovers reduce equilibrium production costs and thereby increase output, if demand is 
inelastic (e > 1) profits gross of R&D expenditures (ie Pq-cq) will fall. Whether net 
profits fall as well will depend on the strength of the effect of spillovers on basic and 
development research expenditures. If for example pi > p2 > 0, and if in addition 
e/(l -  e) < X < pi£/(l -  e), so that spillovers stimulate expenditures in both basic and 
development expenditures, net profits fall. They also fall however for p2 > Pi > 0, and 
e/(l -  e) < X < Pi£/(1 -  e). In that situation, higher spillovers increase output and 
development research while reducing production costs. With an inelastic demand total 
revenue falls and so do net profits, even in the case where weak complementarity 
between "own" and "borrowed" basic research induces the firm to spend less on its own 
basic research when appropriability declines (thereby reducing one element of fixed 
costs).
In the situation where instead we assume that demand is elastic and where 
0 > Pi > p2 and e/(l -  e) < X  < pte/(l -  e), then 0lT/d0 > 0. Here the elastic demand 
leads to a fall in profits gross of R&D expenditures, while the high substitutability of 
(borrowed) basic research with development research causes the latter to decrease.
Even if basic research rises, net profits fall so that equilibrium profits are higher as the 
appropriability of basic research declines.
18 Differentiation of IT=n*(;c*,(/i -1)80x*,y*,q*) with respect to the spillover rate shows that the 
sign of dlT/d9 is determined by the sign of the expression
{[€/(« -  £)]*( l + vis:*-1) ( l + P,) ( l + Pa) (l -  e)+A vis:*- '(P, -  Pa) (is: - 1) -  ( l + v * 7  ( i + P ^ } where 
A = [e -X (l-e )]  and B = [pte+A<l-e)]-
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Summarising the main results of this subsection we develop proposition 1 (to be 
compared with proposition 1 in chapter two above):
Proposition 1: When cost and demand functions are given by (3.2) and (3.4), in
the Nash-Cournot equilibrium (q*, x*9 y*) with barriers to entry 
spillovers in basic research:
(i) will increase basic research expenditures when the basic 
research of rivals is at least as complementary with a firm’s 
own basic research as with its own development research 
cxx 'k. cxy and when in addition epj + X(1 -  e) > 0;
(ii) will increase development research expenditures when 
ep2 + A<1 -  e) > 0, and decrease them when ep2 + A{1 -  e) < 0;
(iii) will increase the total knowledge generated due to R&D 
expenditures, and thereby reduce marginal production cost 
and expand output;
Corollary 1.1: Spillovers in basic research can increase or decrease (ex ante)
incentives for cost reduction while reducing (ex post) the costs at 
industry level of achieving a given level of cost reduction.
c. Free-entry equilibrium
For the case where there are no barriers to entry, and where n is large enough so 
that firms are earning zero profits in equilibrium, the expression equivalent to (2.23) in 
the last chapter, indicating the number of firms in the free-entry equilibrium is given by:
It can be readily checked that for 0 = 0 (no spillovers), expression (3.11) reduces
elasticity of demand and on the responsiveness of cost reduction to the knowledge
(3.11)
where \j/ = (y/a) i/d+p2) and <> = (Pi — p2)/Pi(l + P2)
to n = e(l + X)/X so that the equilibrium number of firms depends then only on the
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generated by R&D expenditures. With positive spillovers however, n is also a function 
of the spillover rate 0 and the free-entry equilibrium with spillovers sustains a larger 
number of firms than the corresponding equilibrium with full appropriability. Even in 
the case where own and borrowed research are not perfect substitutes therefore, 
inappropriability is associated with less concentrated industries.
By total differentiation of (3.11) with respect to the spillover rate and the number 
of firms we obtain that while n* |9>0> rt* |9. 0, we can have dn*/d& > 0 or <0 w. It is not 
necessarily the case that a higher spillover rate implies a larger number of firms in the 
free-entry equilibrium. As was indicated above for the equilibrium where barriers to 
entry prevent profits going to zero, in the case for example where demand is inelastic, 
and where p2 > Pi > 0 and X < piE/(l -  e), higher spillovers will reduce profits 17. The 
free-entry solution with zero profits and a higher spillover rate will then be associated 
with a more concentrated industry.
The explanation for this apparent contradiction runs along the following lines. In 
the situation when spillovers are zero, the firm’s cost function is of a normal
1* The sign of BnVdQ is determined by the sign of the expression pv(n - 1)/(1 -0p.v), where
\ i = (e/A.) (K - 1)/[(1 + y K * ) \n  - 1) ( l + p j  and v = - p ,( l+ p j  (1+ v * * ) + (K -  -  pj). Since
p > 0, when v < 0 we will have dn*/dQ < 0. This will occur when p, and p2 are both positive, or 
alternatively when sxx - 1/(1+p,) < 1 and sRy = 1/(1+p2)<  1, and irrespective of whether we have 
Pi > Pz (Cxx>cv) or not.
17 This result we can obtain analytically from the expression 3IT/90. In general however, 
because of the functional form it is not possible to derive analytically the complete range of 
parameter values for which we have dn'ldQ  > 0 or <0. The elasticity of substitution parameters 
for which higher spillover rates reduce the number of firms in equilibrium can only be 
established with simple simulations of (3.11). As an example, consider the situation where we 
have p,=10 and p2=2, giving s^O .09  and s ^ O .3 3  respectively. Assume also that demand is 
slightly elastic (l/e=1.25) and that the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to R&D is A^0.4. 
With these parameters, in the situation with no spillovers zero profits would obtain with a  
duopoly (the equilibrium number of firms being derived as the largest integer not exceeding the 
value of r i  that satisfies (3.11)). With 0=0.25, zero profits obtain with four firms. For 0=0.50, 
n*=3 while for complete spillovers (0=1), the free-entry equilibrium number of firms is two.
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(non-nested) CES type with the elasticity of substitution between basic and 
development research given by sxy = 1/(1 + p2). Compared to this situation, even a 
small positive spillover rate will decrease production costs, raise profits and lead to 
higher n in a zero-profit equilibrium. Once some inappropriability has been established 
however, the effect of a higher spillover rate involves taking account of the elasticities 
of substitution between research inputs and of the differential impact of a higher 
effective borrowed research on the marginal productivities of "own" basic research and 
of development research respectively. Once the firm adjusts its R&D spending in 
response to that, its maximal profits under the higher spillover rate may be lower, 
leading to a lower number of firms at the zero-profit equilibrium. We can therefore 
summarise in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: When cost and demand functions are given by (3.2) and (3.4), the
free-entry Nash-Cournot equilibrium (/T, q*, jr\ y*) with 
imperfectly appropriable basic research is characterised by a less 
concentrated industry than the same equilibrium with perfect 
appropriability. However, the degree of industrial concentration 
can vary either directly or indirectly with the degree of appropri­
ability (ie with the spillover rate).
The impact of spillovers on monopoly power in the industry is similarly 
ambiguous under the assumed two-level (nested) CES cost function.
P(Q*)/c* = 1/(1 -  Eln*) and therefore it is possible that the expression 
d(P(Q*)/c*)/dQ = -[£/(«* -  e)2] (9« 790) is positive or negative. Price-cost margins can in 
fact increase if higher spillovers lead to a smaller equilibrium number of firms. When 
comparing however the case with spillovers to the case where spillovers are absent it is 
still true that the existence of spillovers (as opposed to higher rates of spillovers) 
reduces monopoly power in an industry. In this respect therefore the qualitative impact 
of the existence of spillovers does not hinge on the specification of the cost function.
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Taking now into account the values of the elasticities between the various inputs needed 
to determine whether spillovers lead to a more or less concentrated industry, we can 
develop the following:
Corollary 2.1: In a cross-section of industries facing the same elasticity of
demand and with the same opportunities of cost reduction 
through R&D, but differing in terms of the degree of appropri­
ability of basic research, one would expect to observe that the 
industries that exhibit the least appropriability of basic research 
would be the ones most concentrated and with the strongest 
monopoly power when the elasticities of substitution between 
own and "borrowed" basic research and between total (both own 
and "borrowed") effective basic research and development 
research are low (sXJt< l and sRy<l).
Turning next to the effect of inappropriability on the total industry-wide basic 
research when the cost function is of the nested CES type and when zero profits are 
guarantied by free-entry, we see that no clear pattern emerges. Under the parameter­
ization of the cost function in chapter two we obtained that n*x* |0_o> n*x* |e>0 and that 
d(n V)/d0 < 0. The existence of inappropriability and an increase in the spillover rate 
both resulted in lower basic research expenditures for the industry as a whole in the 
free-entry equilibrium. In the present case however, with the cost function of the 
nested CES type, n*x* |0_(£> n*x* |0>o or n*x* |0<.o< n*x* |0>o and d(n*x*)/dQ > 0 or 
d(n*x*)/d9 < 0. In the free-entry case neither the existence of inappropriability nor a 
higher spillover rate necessarily imply lower total industry-wide basic research. 
Industries where part of basic research is non-appropriable may, ceteris paribus, spend 
more on basic research than similar industries where spillovers are absent.
An example of a case where a greater degree of inappropriability is associated 
with higher basic research expenditures at firm level and with a greater number of firms 
in the free-entry equilibrium is the following. Assume that 0 > pt > p2 (ie and
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sxx<sRy< 1) and that in addition (l + p 2) [ept + ^ 1  - e)] + <|>(pi -  p 2)A  >  0 so that the strong 
complementarity between "own" and "borrowed" basic research induces each firm to 
spend more on basic research as a result of a higher spillover rate. With elastic demand 
(e < 1), profits also rise leading to a higher number of firms in the zero-profit 
equilibrium. In this case therefore, spillovers lead to higher basic research expenditures 
at firm and industry level.
Proposition 3: When demand and cost functions are given by (3.2) and (3.4), in 
the free-entry Nash-Cournot equilibrium (iT, q*9 x*9 y*) spillovers 
in basic research increase firm and industry basic and 
development research expenditures if demand is elastic, 
"borrowed” basic research is more complementary with a firm’s 
own research than with its development research ( c ^ c ^ )  and 
when the elasticities of substitution between own and "borrowed" 
basic research and between total (both own and "borrowed") 
effective basic research and development research are low ($**<1 
and 5X,<1).
A related question is the effect of spillovers on the R&D intensity in a certain 
industry. R&D intensity is defined as the fraction of an industry’s combined basic and 
development research expenditures in total sales, ie R*+D*=n*(x*+y*)/P(Q*)Q*. When 
basic research can be fully appropriated, R* +D* = dn* = A/(l + X). With a CES 
knowledge production function, expenditures in R&D are a constant fraction of total 
cost. With free entry and zero profits, total costs equal total revenues and R&D 
expenditures are therefore also a fixed fraction of total revenue. That fraction is solely 
determined by the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to the knowledge generated 
by R&D expenditures. When a part of basic research expenditures cannot be 
appropriated however, R&D intensity also depends on the spillover rate.
R* +D* = eJ n *(0) and d(R* +D*)/d0 = -[e/ n2(0)] (dn*/d0). Given that in the present 
context, spillovers may lead to a more or to a less concentrated industry, the effect on
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R&D intensity is similarly ambiguous. It will increase with the spillover rate when a 
lower degree of appropriability is associated with more concentrated industries. We can 
therefore conclude that for the free-entry solution:
Corollary 3.1: Inappropriability in basic research is associated with less R&D
intensive industries, but the level of R&D intensity varies 
positively with the spillover rate when the elasticities of 
substitution between own and "borrowed” basic research and 
between total (both own and "borrowed") effective basic 
research and development research are low (ie when 
= 1/(1 + p,) < 1 and sRy = 1/(1 + p2) < 1).
Turning finally to the relative importance of basic versus development research in 
a firm’s total R&D outlays, under the assumed specification of the cost function, the 
expression equivalent to (2.24) in chapter two is:
(3.12) x l y ‘ = (ot/Y)1'0+Pl>
When basic research is fully appropriable, 0 = 0, K= 1 and the ratio of basic to
development research depends only on the relative distribution of their shares in 
production costs and on the elasticity of substitution between basic and development 
research. With the cost function of the Cobb-Douglas type, the latter was equal to one 
so that the ratio depended only on the relative shares.
When spillovers are positive, taking initially the case where the numbers of firms 
is exogenously given (reverting, in other words, to the model with barriers to entry), we 
can see that 9(x7y*)/90 > 0 (<0) as pi > p2 (pi < p2). If pi < p2 so that an increase in 
effective borrowed research (due to a higher spillover rate) raises the marginal produc­
tivity of own basic research less than that of development research, the ratio of basic to 
development research at the firm level declines. If Pi = p2, so that c^-c^, the spillover 
rate does not affect the ratio. It raises the proportion of basic research in total R&D
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only in the case where the marginal productivity of development research is more 
sensitive than the marginal productivity of "own" basic research to increases in 
"borrowed" basic research.
In the case where the optimal number of firms is determined by free-entry, the 
sign of d(x*/y*)/dQ is given by the sign of [(p, -  p2)/(l + p2)] Kn - 1) + 00/T/00)]. The 
proportion of basic research in total R&D is then raised if borrowed basic research is 
more complementary with a firm’s own basic research than with its development 
research and if in addition spillovers lead to positive profits and consequently to entry 
of firms.
Corollary 3.2: Inappropriability in basic research will be associated with a shift
from fully appropriable development research to partially 
appropriable basic research when borrowed basic research is 
more complementary with a firm’s own basic research than with 
its development research and if in addition research inputs are 
easily substitutable with each other.
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III. Socially-managed Industry
We now turn to the case of the socially-managed industry. As in the previous 
chapter, the purpose here is to derive the equilibrium levels of output and of resources 
devoted to R&D in an industry organised by a social planner but where part of basic
from the social point of view and enable us to establish a "benchmark" against which 
the efficiency of the market can be judged.
The social planner’s maximisation problem is solved in two steps. In the first 
stage the socially optimal number of firms is chosen, and in the second stage the levels 
of R&D and output that will maximise welfare are chosen. This two-step procedure 
allows for the examination of the possibility that the socially optimal number of firms 
exceeds one. The problem is solved recursively, with industrial structure taken as given 
for the solution of the second stage. Given n firms for the moment therefore, at the 
second stage the social planner is assumed to organize production so as to maximize net 
consumer surplus, which is given by (an expression equivalent to (2.25) in chapter two 
and repeated here for the sake of convenience):
where U(Q) is the total benefit from the consumption of output Q (the area under the 
demand curve). The first-order conditions then are:
research is not appropriated by the originating firm. These levels are taken to be optima
n n n
(3.13) W = U (Q )- 'L c lq - ' L x i - ' L y i
l - l  l - l  i - l
(3.14)
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With symmetry, these conditions become:
(3.14’) U'(Q) = c { [ x \ ( n - V ) x \ y }
(3.15’) -[(3c 7 3 /)  + ( n - 1) 0 c  7 3 /)]  (Q*/n) = 1
(3.16’) -[3c73y*] (Q*lrt) = 1
In order to solve (3.14’)-(3.16’) explicitly and obtain a sharper characterization of 
equilibrium, the utility function will be assumed to be of the form:
(3.17) U(Q) = [1/(1 -e f la f i^ 'so  that U \Q )  =
In this social planner’s problem, the cost function is assumed to be given by (3.2). 
Under symmetry, unit production costs therefore are:
(3.18) c = p{ o ^ j+[5e(„ _ Jc_Pl+ ry _Pl}
If the social planner takes the number of firms in the industry as given, the 
first-order conditions to the maximisation problem are:
(3.19) 0 (2 ,r  = p
(3.20) XaP ' P^ ^ ‘C*.)',‘ \  = 1
(3.21) xyp [ a K ^ X x f 1+ ’f  =1
where K  = 1 + [800 - 1)]-1*1 and the subscript, denotes the socially-optimal solution.
The equilibrium values for (Qs, xs, ys) when the second-order conditions hold are 
then given by:
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(3.22) q, = [<,•+* p-> a -^> t
(3.23) x ,= [a  p‘-> a W' eyP2 \ e (i + v / r ^ f ^ - 0 * . ] “*
(3.24) y, = \zK "'x,
where \|/ = (y/a)1/(1+p2>, (J>t = —p2/pj(l + p2) and A = e-A(1 - e )
With n given, the effect of spillovers on the socially optimal levels of basic and of 
development research expenditures (the sign of dxJdQ and dyJdQ) depends on the 
elasticity of substitution between basic and development research. For p2 < 0 (so that 
sRy = 1/(1 + p2) > 1), basic research in the socially-managed industry increases as a result 
of a higher spillover rate w. Taking account of the positive externality generated by 
basic research in the socially optimal case implies that each firm spends more on basic 
research as a result of a higher spillover rate, as long as the substitutability between 
basic and development research is high. The proportion of total R&D accounted for by 
basic research then rises.
The effect on development research depends on the sign of the expression 
ep2+ ^(l -  e). Spillovers increase the socially optimal level of the fully appropriable 
part of R&D for p2 > Me -  l)/e, ie for all but very high levels of substitutability between 
basic and development research. Even however in the case where high substitutability 
between appropriable and non-appropriable research inputs leads to a decline of
1# The sign of 9.x,780 is determined by the sign of the expression X(1 -  e) (1+ pj) -  p2yK*'A . Given
that the functional form of the utility function is assum ed to be given by U(Q) = [1/(1 -e)]oQ ,_e, 
demand is taken to be elastic for positive levels of utility. We therefore have 9x*/90 > 0 for p2 < 0.
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development research as spillovers increase, total R&D expenditures increase. 
Furthermore, dq 709 > 0 and dW*/dQ > 0. Higher spillovers increase output and social 
welfare. We can summarise these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4: When demand and cost functions are given by (3.2) and (3.4), in
the solution (q*9x*,y*) for the socially-managed industry, 
spillovers in basic research:
(i) increase basic research expenditures when the substitut­
ability of basic with development research is high (jj^> 1);
(ii) increase development research expenditures, except 
where the substitutability of basic with development 
research is very high (ie except when p 2 > A^e- l)/e);
(iii) increase total R&D expenditures;
(iv) increase output;
(v) improve welfare.
a. Optimal number of firms In the Industry
In order to determine the socially optimal number of firms in this case, the planner 
solves W*(qs, x,, ys) for ns. The equilibrium number of firms is then given by the 
expression:
, .  [se(«; -  i)]^'
(3.25) n,= l  + ---------- t- j j -
1+yAT1
From expression (3.25) we can observe that, for the range of values of 0 and S
postulated in the model (ie 0 < 9 S 1,0 S 8 S 1), it is possible to have np>l. hi the 
situation where the technology is described by a nested CES cost function as in (3.2), 
the socially optimal outcome may involve more than one firm operating. This is in 
contrast to the case in chapter two where "own" and "borrowed" basic research were 
perfect substitutes and where the socially optimal outcome involved at most one firm 
operating.
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Consider as an example the situation where research inputs are not easily substi­
tutable with each other and where in addition the non-appropriable basic research of 
rivals enhances the marginal productivity of a firm’s own basic research by more than it 
does the marginal productivity of development research (so that "own" and "borrowed" 
basic research are highly complementary). Assuming sxx -  1/(1 + pj) = 0.09 and 
sRy = 1/(1 + p2) = 0.2, for a spillover rate of 0.10, the socially optimal outcome will 
involve three firms operating. For a spillover rate of 0.50, it will involve two firms 
while for complete spillovers (0=1), welfare will be maximised with only one firm 
operating, just as it would be in the situation with no spillovers19.
The reasoning for this result runs along the following lines. In the case where 
research is subject to spillovers, the social planner takes into account the externality 
generated by basic research when maximizing net consumer surplus. In the structure of 
the previous chapter, with own and borrowed R&D perfect substitutes, the research 
paths of different firms were perfect substitutes. Additional R&D investment of rivals 
that becomes public generates a cost reduction for a firm equivalent to investing the 
same amount on R&D. This implies that in the socially managed case, allowing more 
than one firms to operate generates needless duplication. The social planner therefore 
would only ever have one firm undertaking R&D 20.
19 The example Is calculated for p^K), p2=4, giving elasticities of substitution between own and
borrowed basic research and between the pool of basic research and own development 
research of sxx = 1/(1+pj)=0.09 and sRy = 1/(1+px)=0.2 respectively. We also assum e a =0.3 
and y=0.7. The socially optimal number of firms is then calculated as the largest integer not 
exceeding the value of n that satisfies expression (3.25).
20 Production would then be undertaken by the firm investing in R&D, with regulation enforcing a 
price equal to marginal cost; alternatively, the planner could costlessly disseminate the 
technology to a  large number of firms and allow competition to determine prices. The point is 
m ade in Katsoulakos and Ulph (1990).
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In the case where research inputs are subject to spillovers and poorly substitutable, 
welfare is increased by allowing more than one firm to operate. With research paths no 
longer perfect substitutes, spillovers lead to lower production costs and higher output, 
thus generating higher welfare. In effect, in this case the planner has to reconcile two 
separate effects: introducing more than one firm will allow different research paths to 
emerge and society will benefit from the positive externalities associated with 
spillovers; with a segmented market however each firm will be producing less, and the 
incentive to invest in R&D will be reduced.
For given values of the elasticities of substitution, the relative strength of the two 
effects is determined by the spillover rate. As the example above illustrates, with high 
or moderate appropriability (low or moderate spillovers), the positive external effect 
dominates and welfare is maximised with more than one firm operating. With high or 
complete spillovers, on the other hand, costs are reduced significantly; together with the 
segmentation of the market, this reduces incentives to invest in R&D. The socially 
optimal outcome then once more involves at most one firm operating 21.
In the situation therefore where the social planner takes the industrial structure as 
given, spillovers increase output and improve welfare, irrespective of the specification 
of the cost function and the relationship between "own" and "borrowed" basic research
21 In a  recent paper, Katsoulakos and Ulph (1990) obtain certain results that parallel our results 
in this chapter. They extend the Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) model to examine the case  of 
product differentiation. In their model, products are imperfect substitutes and R&D is 
product-specific. The social planner then faces a  conflict between (i) proliferating products to 
satisfy consumers’ taste for variety, but with each firm producing little output and therefore 
undertaking little cost-reducing R&D; and (ii) having a  small number of products, each with a  
large output and consequently a  lot of cost-reducing R&D. They obtain that when the degree of 
substitutability between products is low relative to the productivity of R&D, the socially optimal 
outcome may involve more firms operating than the equilibrium number of firms in the market. 
Thus the assumption of product differentiation has an analogous impact to the assumption of 
externalities in R&D with poor substitutability between a  firm’s own and its rivals’ research 
inputs.
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with development research. The existence of inappropriability or higher spillover rates 
increase total resources devoted to R&D in the socially-managed industry, while the 
separate effect on basic and development research depends on the ease of substitut­
ability between the two inputs. Furthermore, if the social planner can adjust the number 
of firms to achieve the maximum net consumer surplus, the socially optimal outcome 
may involve more than one firm operating in the case where "own" and "borrowed" 
basic research are not perfect substitutes and where the technology is described by a 
nested CES cost function. This last result can be formulated into a proposition:
Proposition 5: When demand and cost functions are given by (3.2) and (3.4), the
solution (n,\ q*9 x*9y*) for the socially-managed industry may 
involve more than one firm operating if research inputs are not 
easily substitutable with each other (s**<l, $^<1).
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IV. Market performance and government policy
Sections II and HI of this and the previous chapter addressed the question of how 
the equilibrium characteristics of an n-firm oligopoly and of a socially-managed 
industry are affected by the existence of a non-appropriable part in basic research. We 
derived results that showed that the impact of spillovers depends to a large extent on the 
assumptions about how R&D inputs combine to produce cost-saving innovations, as 
this is reflected in the cost function with which firms operate. In this section, we first 
examine the implications of the results of this chapter (ie under the assumption of a 
nested CES cost function) for the incentives of the market to conduct basic research as 
well as its performance relative to the socially optimal case. Secondly, we briefly 
examine a government policy that provides a subsidy to expenditures in the non-appro- 
priable part of R&D, basic research, and show how the nature and effectiveness of such 
a policy is heavily dependant on the characteristics of the underlying knowledge 
production function that firms in a particular industry are faced with.
a. Relative market Incentives and performance
Under the assumption that a firm’s technology is described by a two-level (nested) 
CES cost function, as in (3.2), we examine the situation where in the market we have 
free-entry so that the (optimal) number of firms n is determined by the zero-profit 
condition while in the socially-managed industry the planner can choose the number of 
operating firms ns so as to maximise social welfare. We start with the comparison of 
basic research expenditures by a firm in an oligopolistic market structure with that in 
the socially-managed industry. If basic research is fully appropriable, n = £(1 + X)/X for 
the oligopoly while ns- 1. It follows that x < xs as (n*)^ < (1 + X). For 9 > 0 on the 
other hand, the ratio x*/xs is given by:
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X < t xX<e-iyp2-e"j1/A(3.26) (1  - £ / » * )  TT
where Ks = 1 + [60(rts - 1)]-*5'.
In order to determine whether the ratio x*/xs is less than one or not, we need to 
determine whether the market equilibrium with free entry sustains a greater number of 
firms than the number of firms maximises social welfare, where n is given by (3.11) 
and ns by (3.25). We assume that n* > ns 22. Inspection of expression (3.26) then shows 
that x* < x*: in the presence of inappropriability each firm in the market underinvests in 
basic research compared to the socially optimum level. For different spillover rates 
however we have that 9(x7jc,)/90>O or <0, with the sign depending on the assumptions 
about substitutability amongst inputs, the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to the 
knowledge generated from R&D expenditures and the elasticity of demand for the 
product. The possibility that higher spillover rates improve the basic research 
expenditures of firms in the market relative to the optimal level is a reflection of the fact 
that under the current specificaton of the cost function, spillovers can act as a spur to 
basic research expenditures of oligopolistic firms.
22 This is not a s  arbitrary an assumption as it seem s. In the case of the oligopoly, from (3.11) 
we have n |0>0= n |0=o +{e/X) [56(«*- 1)]^’/(1 + \y ^ )  while in the case of the socially-managed
industry from (3.25) we have n, |0>0= ns |0=o +[80(n*-  l)]"P|^ i + Given that n |0_o= e(l+X)/k
while nt |0=0= 1 we can guarantee that n |0>o> ns |0>o as long as  e ( l+X)/k>  1. If e ( l+ X)/X does not 
greatly exceed one, it is possible for n |0>o< ns |0>o marginally; given however that the optimal
number of firms is defined to be the largest integer not exceeding n in (3.11) and n, in (3.25) 
respectively, we take it that in the least n |0>0=n, |0>o will hold.
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Industry-wide total basic research expenditures in the market for the case where 
the zero profit condition holds are n x  whereas total basic research expenditures in the 
socially-managed industry are npcs. For 0 = 0, the ratio of the two is: 
n*x*/xs = [(1 -  tin*) (n*f^~l)f llA). It follows that nx* > xs (= n,xs) as (n*)^e_1> > (1 + A,) 
(or equivalently n*x* <xs (= as (rt*)^E_1) < (1 + A) ). Where spillovers are absent 
therefore, the market as a whole may be spending too much on basic research, while 
each firm is underinvesting compared to the social optimum. This result was derived in 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz for the case where R&D is homogeneous, in addition to being 
fully appropriable 23.
With positive spillovers, both nx* and nsxs can be higher, depending on the cost 
and demand elasticities, so that the market as a whole may in this case also be wasting 
resources on basic research. Furthermore, the sign of d(n*x*/n^J/dti is ambiguous: a 
higher spillover rate may increase or decrease the ratio. Under the assumed cost 
function, the reasoning for this ambiguous result is no longer that spillovers necessarily 
tend to discourage basic research in the market while leaving the socially optimal level 
unchanged. Inappropriability may instead stimulate basic research in the market case, 
as discussed above. In the situation where it does however, the external effect 
generated increases also the socially optimal level of basic research, and may result in 
more than one firm operating in the socially-managed industry. The ratio n*x*/n3xJ with 
positive spillovers will therefore depend on the strength of the two effects. In summary:
23 It should be noted however that the result that the market may be encouraging too much 
duplication rests on demand being inelastic (e> l). A positive social benefit out of the 
consumption of Q however (and an associated positive social welfare), Is only defined in the 
functional form adopted by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) -a n d  used also here a s  expression 
(3.16)- if demand is elastic
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Proposition 6: When cost and demand functions are given by (3.2) and (3.4), in
a free-entry oligopoly with spillovers in basic research the 
industry as a whole may be spending too much on basic research 
compared to the socially optimal levels.
The performance of the market relative to the maximum surplus generated in the 
socially managed industry can be represented by the ratio TS*/W*. TS is the total surplus 
achievable in the market, and is obtained as the addition of the consumer surplus 
B(Q) - Q B’(Q) (where B(Q) is the total benefit obtained by the consumption of output 
Q) and the producer surplus n il  so that TS*= B(Q*)-c*Q*-n x  -n y*. Maximum welfare is 
given by W*, so that W* =U(Q*)-c*Q*-X*-Y*. In the situation where the firm’s 
technology is described by (3.2) the ratio TS*/W* is:
(3.28) TS*/W* = (£/A) (1 - t in  )
(  „* Yfc -1) /  ^  \ * £~ 1);pi ( i  +  1 V*e“ ,)(1+pjVp2' ' ,/An
\ n*j
K
yK’J i +v k ;
Expression (3.28) is derived for the case where the zero-profit condition holds in 
the market, so that n is the endogenously determined number of firms. The surplus 
generated is therefore entirely consumer surplus. In the socially-managed industry, the 
number of firms ns is chosen to maximize net consumer surplus.
In chapter two, under the assumption that "own" and "borrowed" basic research 
are perfect substitutes we obtained the result that, while a higher spillover rate does not 
necessarily improve the performance of the market, the existence of inappropriability 
implies that the total surplus generated in the market as a percentage of the optimal 
surplus will always exceed the surplus in the case where spillovers are absent. In the 
case where the firm’s technology is described by a nested CES cost function, this is no 
longer the case. When spillovers stimulate, rather than inhibit, basic research 
expenditures, market performance in the presence of inappropriability may fall short of
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the performance in the case where spillovers are absent. In addition therefore to the 
indeterminacy of the effect of a higher spillover rate on performance (ie of the sign of 
d(TS*/W*)), in this case we can also have either TS*fW* le .^  TS*/W* |e>0 or 
TS*/W* le«0< TS*IW* |e>o*
Proposition 6: When cost and demand functions are given by (3.2) and (3.4), in
a free-entry oligopoly, neither the existence of inappropriability 
nor higher spillover rates in basic research necessarily improve 
the relative performance of the market.
b. Subsidies to basic research
We now turn briefly to examine the equilibrium characteristics of a market 
environment where the government subsidises a part of basic research expenditures of 
each firm. This is an exercise already developed in the last chapter where we assumed 
that a firm’s technology is given by a Cobb-Douglas knowledge production function, 
and a firm’s basic research is a perfect substitute with the part of the basic research of 
its rivals that leaks out and that can be absorbed. In such a situation, a government 
policy that subsidises basic research will restore incentives to spend in the partially 
appropriable part of R&D and thereby improve welfare. It followed that optimal 
subsidy rates were positive and increasing with the degree of inappropriability.
The aim in this section is to examine whether these results hold when the firm’s 
technology is described by a nested CES knowledge production function and an 
associated cost function as in (3.2). Such a cost function gives greater flexibility in 
substitutability between inputs and allows for the possibility that the basic research 
expenditures of rivals that leak out and that can be absorbed increase the marginal 
productivity of a firm’s basic research by more than that of its development research.
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We showed that in such circumstances spillovers can act as an incentive, rather than as 
a disincentive, for investment in basic research, thus questioning the desirability of a 
policy that subsidises non-appropriable R&D.
In order to examine the implications of the assumptions made in this chapter about 
technology on government policy, we assume that firms can take advantage of a 
per-unit subsidy on basic research, denoted s. The firm’s profit-maximising problem 
would now be, instead of (3.3):
For the functional forms for cost and demand functions given in (3.2) and (3.4), 
the corresponding first-order conditions for the symmetric solution are the same as for 
the situation where firms bear the full cost of basic research (3.5)-(3.7), except for the 
condition that equalises marginal benefit with marginal cost in basic research, which is 
replaced by:
For the situation where there exist barriers to entry so that the number of firms n 
can be taken as given, the new system of first-order conditions (3.5), (3.6’) and (3.7) 
yields the following solutions:
(3.3’) n , ={P(Q) -c  6„ 9), >>,]}?, -  (1 -  s)x, -  y.
W i ' l i
(3.6’) X«p[0tS: * V P + Y (/ f 2Jr p2VV ’- ' l)V Y ,"P’,(*') ? = 1 - j
(3.8’) q =[(o(l -tin))'"■ P'1 A.1 a * ”' ( l + y X * - ' ( l
1/(1+ p 2)
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where A = [e -  ^ (1 -  £)], \\f = (y/a)1/(l+p2> and <|> = (Pi -  p2)/[pi(l + p2)]
The per unit subsidy of basic research effectively reduces the cost to each firm of 
such expenditures. Accordingly, basic research expenditures rise with the subsidy rate, 
as long as that rate is positive and less than 100%, so that dx/ds > 0. The impact of 
subsidies on development research expenditures on the other hand depends on the sign 
of the expression ep2+ X(1 -  £). For elastic demand, they rise if p2 > 0 or if p2 < 0 and 
X  >  £p2/(£ - 1). For inelastic demand, they will only rise if p2 > 0 and in addition 
X  < £p2/(£ - 1). Furthermore, dc/ds < 0 and dq/ds > 0 : subsidies reduce marginal 
production costs and thereby increase output. For elastic demand profits gross of R&D 
expenditures increase and so do net profits, as long as the increase in fixed costs is not 
too great.
The interesting question in this setting however is how basic research subsidies 
affect the impact of spillovers on the incentives to conduct basic research. Since the 
latter effect is given by the sign of dJc/dQ, the impact of subsidies is given by (flc/dQds. 
In chapter two we saw that dx/dd < 0 and dfJc/dQds < 0. Spillovers acted as a 
disincentive to basic research and a subsidy to basic research reduced that disincentive.
In this chapter, with technology described by a cost function of the form given in 
expression (3.2), it was shown that spillovers could instead act as an incentive to invest 
in that part of R&D that is only partially appropriable. Take for example the case where 
demand is elastic, and where Pi > 0 > p2 and X  < £p2/(£ -1 ) . This is a situation where 
borrowed basic research is more complementary with a firm’s own basic research than 
with its development research, and where basic and development research are easily 
substitutable with each other while own and borrowed basic research inputs are not. 
Spillovers here act as a spur to further basic research expenditures ie dx/dQ > 0.
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Simultaneously however, for the assumed range of parameter values, subsidies that are 
positive and less than 100% (0 <s < 1)  encourage further that (positive) incentive ie 
<?x/dQds >0. In the context of the model in this chapter therefore, the effect of 
subsidies on the incentives to invest in basic research are no longer straightforward.
In setting a subsidy rate, the government is attempting to maximise the total 
surplus generated by the market. This surplus is the sum of the producer and consumer 
surpluses generated by the production of output Q, minus the cost of the subsidy, ie 
TS=PS+CS-sX. For (f , y, Q/n), the maximum surplus generated by the market under 
the presence of spillovers and subsidies is TS. The optimal subsidy rate can then be 
calculated as the rate that will maximise this total surplus. Setting dTS/ds = 0 yields the 
optimum subsidy rate s*:
* (n -  e) (A + [ep2 + A<1 -  e)]co)
(3.29)  j  =  1 - - -------- - ------— —  --------- —v '  e(/i + l - e ) ( l + p 2)iST
4 * '{l+P2)
where co =
*  ,  .-Pz(,+P2)
1+Yjr* ' ( I - / )
Despite the fact that in (3.29) s* is not expressed in reduced form, a number of 
observations can be made. The optimal subsidy rate depends on a host of variables: the 
number of firms in the industry, the spillover rate, the elasticity/substitutability 
conditions amongst research inputs, and on the elasticities of demand and of cost 
reduction with respect to the knowledge generated through R&D expenditures. As a 
result, higher spillover rates in this case do not necessarily imply higher optimal subsidy 
rates. They do so only when spillovers act as a disincentive to basic research. If instead
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spillovers spur expenditures in the part of R&D that is only partially appropriable, then 
the optimal subsidy rate falls as the spillover rate rises. We therefore have 3s730 > 0 as 
3x730 < 0 and 3s730 < 0 as 3x730 > 0 24.
The importance of technology assumptions on the sign and size of basic research 
subsidy rates can be demonstrated by a simple example. Tables 2 and 3 below show 
how optimal subsidy rates vary with respect to the number of firms in the industry and 
the spillover rate under two different assumptions about elasticities of substitution 
between research inputs. In table 2, we assume that research inputs are easily substi­
tutable with each other (0 > px > p2 or 1, sRp> 1), while a firm’s basic research is more 
complementary with the basic research of its rivals than with its own development 
research (c^>c^)25. With the exception of the case of the monopolist, for any given 
number of firms optimal subsidy rates increase with the spillover rate. For fully 
appropriable basic research or for a given spillover rate, they fall with the number of 
firms.
This last result is in contrast to the case in chapter two, where with own and 
borrowed basic research perfect substitutes, for a given positive spillover rate subsidy 
rates initially fall and then rose as the market became more fragmented. The rise was 
due to the effect of the spillover environment on cost reduction overwhelming the cost
24 The sign of dx/dd (and therefore of ds*/dQ) is determined by the sign of the expression
£ { ( l+ p 2)[e p i+ M l-e )]+ ^ (P i-p 2)£} where A,Dan6 E are all positive. Thus for pt £ p2 and 
ep,+ X(1 - e) > 0 we have dx/dQ > 0 and ds*/dB < 0.
25 The optimal subsidy rates in table 2 have been derived for p,B-0.1 and p2*-0.5 ( s ^ l  .1,
2); those of table 3 have been derived for p,=2 and p2=0.5 ( s ^ 0.33, s^*=0.66). In both 
tables, we have assum ed elasticities of demand and of cost reduction with respect to R&D of 
0.8 and 0.2 respectively.
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of subsidies. Here, because research inputs are not perfect substitutes, the cost of 
subsidies as the number of firms increases outweighs the effect of spillovers on cost 
reduction so that optimal subsidy rates decline.
Table 2
Optimal subsidy rates to basic research using (3.2): 0 > pj > p2
Firms Spillover rate
n 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
2 0.62 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.82
3 0.52 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.78
4 0.47 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.76
5 0.44 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.75
Table 3
Optimal subsidy rates to basic research using (3.2): pj > p2 > 0
Firms Spillover rate
n 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
2 0.23 0.95 0.84 0.71 0.61
3 -0.27 0.75 0.37 0.12 0.00
4 -0.62 0.43 -0.11 -0.35 -0.45
5 -0.88 0.00 -0.48 -0.68 -0.76
Table 3 has been derived under the assumption that it is difficult to substitute 
between research inputs (p, > p2 > 0 or s^cl, sRy<l), and where again a firm’s basic 
research is assumed to be more complementary with the basic research of its rivals than 
with its own development research (cxx>c^). The pattern of optimal subsidies is now 
altered. As before, optimal subsidy rates fall with the number of firms. In this case, 
they may also turn negative as the market becomes more fragmented. Higher spillover 
rates however do not necessarily imply higher optimal subsidy rates. Because of the
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low elasticities of substitution between research inputs and of the relative complemen­
tarity between own and borrowed basic research, spillovers act as an incentive to basic 
research expenditures. While therefore compared with a situation of full 
appropriability, spillovers imply higher optimal subsidies, a higher spillover rate leading 
to higher expenditures to basic research will also be associated with a lower optimal 
subsidy rate. In the example in question, with high spillovers and a fragmented market, 
the nature of the technology implies that the optimal policy is to tax basic research26.
We summarise these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 7: When cost and demand functions are given by (3.2) and (3.4),
and for a given market structure and degree of appropriability, 
optimal subsidies in basic research are uniquely determined by 
p!, pp and by the elasticities of demand and of cost reduction 
with respect to R&D expenditures. Optimal subsidy rates rise 
with the spillover rate (for given it) when spillovers act as a 
disincentive to basic research; they fall (and can turn negative) 
when spillovers spur such investments.
28 It should b© noted that what determines whether ds*/dQ is positive or negative is the absolute 
elasticity of substitution between own and borrowed basic research and between total basic 
research and development research ie whether p„p2 > 0 or <0 (sw s% >0 or <0), rather than 
whether own basic research is more complementary with borrowed research than with own 
development research ie whether or c„<cv  (both tables were derived under the 
assumption that c ^ c ^ ).
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V. An extended example
We will now illustrate the main findings of this and of the last chapter by 
developing a simple example aimed at bringing out the implications of spillovers for 
incentives and performance. Using the equilibrium values for (n, q, x, y) derived for the 
market case and for the socially-managed industry under the Cobb-Douglas cost 
function (2.14) of chapter two and the nested CES form of (3.2) given here, we simulate 
the effects of spillovers in different economic environments. The parameters for these 
simulations are chosen in order to obtain a more quantitative picture and explore some 
of the possibilities that arise in environments where part of basic research is inappro- 
priable. The actual values of the parameters or of the variables derived lay no claim to 
reality in the sense of being empirically observed.
Assume for the moment that market structure is exogenous so that the number of 
firms n is given. Letting the spillover rate 0 vary between 0 and 1 in increments of 
0.25, tables 4 and 5 below demonstrate how basic research expenditures at firm level 
vary with the degree of appropriability and with the number of firms in the industry for 
the two alternative specifications of the cost function. Table 4 is derived for the case 
where "own" and "borrowed" basic research are perfect substitutes so that the cost 
function is given by (2.14). We have assumed a  = 0.3, y= 0.7 and e = 0.8. Table 5 is 
derived on the basis of the cost function given by (3.2). We have assumed 
a  = 0.3, y = 0.7, e = 0.8 , and pt = -0.1, p2 = -0.2, so that 0 > p, > p2. In this case 
therefore "borrowed" basic research is assumed to be more complementary with "own" 
basic research than with development research while the elasticity of substitution 
between basic research as a whole and development research is 1.25 and that between 
"own" and "borrowed" basic research 1.11. For all tables, and in order to simplify 
matters and concentrate on the main issues at hand, we have chosen (3 = a  = 5=  1.
137
Table 4
Basic research expenditures at firm level (using (2.14))
Firms Spillover rate
n 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
2 0.041 0.033 0.028 0.024 0.021
3 0.034 0.022 0.017 0.013 0.011
4 0.027 0.015 0.011 0.008 0.007
5 0.021 0.011 0.007 0.005 0.004
6 0.014 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.003
Table 5
Basic research expenditures at firm level (using (3.2))
Firms Spillover rate
n 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
2 0.032 0.070 0.072 0.074 0.076
3 0.026 0.060 0.062 0.064 0.065
4 0.021 0.049 0.051 0.052 0.053
5 0.017 0.041 0.043 0.044 0.045
6 0.014 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.038
The impact of different degrees of inappropriability can be seen by reading across 
rows, while for each spillover rate the effect of the fragmentation of the market is seen 
by reading down columns. In table 4, the disincentive effect of inappropriability on 
firm outlays on basic research is apparent for every rt> 1. When n= 6 for example, 
expenditures when 0  = 1 are 16.6% of what they would be with full appropriability. 
Furthermore, while two firms each spend more than a monopolist, the fragmentation of 
the market implies that thereafter basic research outlays by each firm decline. In 
contrast, table 5 illustrates a case where spillovers act as a stimulus to basic research. A 
higher spillover rate here induces each firm to spend more on basic research. With n=6 
for example, expenditures when 0 = 1 are 2.7 times the level with full appropriability. 
Furthermore, the higher the spillover rate, the slower is in this case the reduction in 
expenditures per firm as a result of the fragmentation of the market.
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These results can be best visualised with the help of graphs. Graphs 1 and 2 below 
are constructed on the basis of the cost function given in (2.14) and graphs 3 and 4 on 
the basis of the nested CES cost function given in (3.2). Graph 1 gives the relationship 
between the spillover rate and a firm’s basic research expenditures for different levels of 
concentration in the industry. With the exception of the case of the monopolist, where 
spillovers are by definition irrelevant, lower appropriability is associated with reduced 
effort in basic research whatever the number of firms in the market. In contrast, when 
the cost function allows for a higher complementarity between "borrowed" basic 
research and a firm’s "own" basic research than between "borrowed" research and its 
development research (Graph 3), spillovers encourage basic research expenditures, 
although as the spillover rate approaches one, the incentive effect —although still 
positive— diminishes, especially in the cases where the market is fragmented.
The effect of inappropriability and market fragmentation on industry-wide 
expenditures on basic research is depicted in graphs 2 and 4. Graph 2 represents the 
case where "own" basic research is a perfect substitute for "borrowed" basic research 
and where basic and development research enter the cost function with a unitary 
elasticity of substitution. With full appropriability, the total resources devoted to R&D 
increase with the number of firms up to a point where the fragmentation of the market 
and falling profit margins induce a fall in total expenditures in basic research. When 
spillovers reduce the ability of firms to appropriate rents, the decline in total 
industry-wide basic research effort occurs at a significantly higher degree of concen­
tration for the industry. In most cases in effect, total basic research is at a maximum 
when the industry is represented by a duopoly.
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In the case of the nested CES cost function, the result is reversed. While with full 
appropriability, the fragmentation of the market induces a fall in total effort in basic 
research, the high relative complementarity between a firm’s own basic research and 
that of its rivals reflected in the parameters chosen imply that the maximum level of 
total expenditures on basic research is reached at a level of market fragmentation greater 
than in the situation with full appropriability. Furthermore, industry-wide basic 
research expenditures increase with the spillover rate, although the rate of increase 
diminishes as n increases.
We next assume that market structure is endogenous so that the number of firms in 
the market is determined by the zero-profit condition (2 .10’) given in chapter two. 
Tables 6-11 examine the effect of differential degrees of appropriability on a number of 
variables in the market case and compare the market with the socially-managed 
industry. Table 6 has been derived on the basis of the Cobb-Douglas cost function 
represented in expression (2.13) while tables 7-11 have been derived using the nested 
CES cost function given in (3.2).
In all tables, column 1 gives the spillover rate. Column 2 shows the zero-profit 
equilibrium number of firms n in the market for different spillover rates. Column 3 is 
the industry-wide basic research expenditures in the market rix while column 4 is the 
optimal ratio of basic to development research expenditures x*/y*. Columns 5 and 6 give 
the total output Q* and the price P(Q*) prevailing in the market, while column 7 shows 
the mark-up of price over marginal cost P/c, and is therefore a proxy for monopoly 
power. Column 8 represents R&D expenditures as a fraction of sales (R*+D*) and can 
be interpreted as a measure of the optimal R&D intensity.
Columns 9-11 compare the market with the socially managed industry. Column 9 
shows total basic research in the market as a fraction of optimal basic research nx*/nsx3
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and column 10 is a ratio of unit production costs c jc s. Finally, column 11 shows the 
performance of the market relative to the socially-managed industry (the ratio of the 
maximum surplus achievable in the market to the welfare optimum ie TS*/W*).
The parameters used in the derivation of the tables are chosen in order to illustrate 
some contrasting effects of inappropriability. In all tables, demand is assumed to be 
slightly elastic (£ = 0.8 or 1/e = 1.25), and p = a  = 5= 1. In table 6 , we let 
a  = 0.05, y= 0.1. In tables 7-11, a  = 0.3, y= 0.7 and we assume a cost elasticity with 
respect to total R&D (A,) of 0.2; we then vary the parameters that determine the substi­
tutability and complementarity among R&D inputs. In tables 7-9 we assume that the 
elasticities of "own" with "borrowed" basic research and that of total basic research with 
development research are low (ie p„ p2 > 0  or sxx = 1/(1 + pt) < 1, sRy = 1/(1 + p2) < 1); 
in tables 10 and 11, the reverse assumption is made (pi, p2 < 0  or sxx > 1, sRy > 1.
We also examine the effect of alternative assumptions about the relative 
magnitudes of the elasticity of complementarity between "borrowed" and "own" basic 
research on the one hand and "borrowed" research with development research on the 
other. In table 7 we assume that pt=4 and p2=2 (sxx = 1/(1 + p,) = 0.2, 
sRy = 1/(1 + p2) = 0.33) so that "borrowed" basic research enhances the marginal produc­
tivity of "own" basic research more than that of development research (cjtt>cj;y). In table 
8 we assume pt = p2=4 so that c ^ - c ^  and in table 9 Pt=0.5 and p2=4 so that c^ k c ^ .  In 
tables 10 and 11 we reverse the assumption about ease of substitutability. With 
Pi» P2 < 0 we have sRy,sxx > 1 so that it is relatively easy to substitute one knowledge 
input for another. Table 10 is derived with pj = -0.1 and p2 = -0.5 so that while 
in table 11 pi = ~0.5 and p2 = -0.1 so that c^kc^.
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Table 6: Free entry simulations with (2.14)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
e *n *  *n x x /y Q* P/c R'+D*
*  *
n x
** c jc s TS/W*
0.00 5 0.030 0.500 0.297 2.339 1.162 0.14 0.711 1.340 0.884
0.25 6 0.014 0.222 0.299 2.328 1.132 0.11 0.325 1.371 0.885
0.50 7 0.008 0.125 0.298 2.333 1.111 0 .10 0.186 1.399 0.884
0.75 7 0.006 0.091 0.298 2.333 1.111 0 .10 0.135 1.399 0.884
1.00 7 0.004 0.071 0.298 2.333 1.111 0.10 0.106 1.399 0.884
Table 7: Free entry simulations with (3.2) and p, > p2 > 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
6 *n *  *n x x /y e* P(Q*) P/c R*+D*
*  •n x
n<*. c jc s TSIW*
0.00 4 0.052 0.75 0.268 2.86 1.25 0.20 0.692 1.422 0.912
0.25 5 0.036 0.67 0.243 3.09 1.19 0.16 0.471 1.612 0.903
0.50 4 0.047 0.73 0.261 2.92 1.25 0 .20 0.623 1.451 0.919
Q.75 4 0.051 0.74 0.266 2.87 1.25 0.20 0.676 1.426 0.92
1.00 4 0.052 0.75 0.267 2.86 1.25 0 .20 0.686 1.421 0.921
Table 8: Free entry simulations with (3.2) and Pl = P2> 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0 *n * *n x */ *x /y Q' m *) P/c R'+D*
* *n x
ns*s CnJCs TS/W*
0.00 4 0.056 0.84 0.267 2.871 1.25 0 .20 0.696 1.419 0.911
0.25 5 0.039 0.84 0.24 3.124 1.19 0.16 0.487 1.622 0.902
0.50 4 0.051 0.84 0.26 2.937 1.25 0 .20 0.632 1.452 0.918
0.75 4 0.055 0.84 0.266 2.884 1.25 0 .20 0.681 1.426 0.92
1.00 4 0.056 0.84 0.267 2.875 1.25 0 .20 0.691 1.421 0.921
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Table 9: Free entry simulations with (3.2) and p2 > p, > 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
e *n *  *n x x'/y* Q ' P ( Q ') P/c R'+D*
*  *
n x
n**i
c jc s TS/W*
0.00 4 0.056 0.84 0.267 2.871 1.25 0.20 0.696 1.419 0.912
0.25 6 0.055 2.06 0.2 3.615 1.15 0.13 0.688 1.936 0.865
0.50 5 0.057 1.75 0.213 3.446 1.19 0.16 0.703 1.788 0.879
0.75 5 0.059 1.6 0.222 3.326 1.19 0.16 0.728 1.726 0.886
1.00 5 0.06 1.49 0.228 3.256 1.19 0.16 0.734 1.69 0.889
Table 10: Free entry simulations with (3.2) and 0 > p, > p2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
e *n * *n x x'/y* Q* P(Q*) P/c R'+D*
•  »
n x
V, c jc s TS/W*
0.00 4 0.02 0.184 0.277 2.793 1.25 0.20 0.74 1.42 0.912
0.25 12 0.06 71.20 0.876 1.112 1.07 0.06 0.28 1.44 0.944
0.50 12 0.06 95.72 0.952 1.04 1.07 0.06 0.27 1.444 0.943
0.75 13 0.065 118.8 0.999 1.00 1.065 0.066 0.29 1.45 0.943
1.00 13 0.065 135.1 1.036 0.972 1.065 0.066 0.29 1.456 0.943
Table 11: Free entry simulations for (3.2) and 0 > p2 > pt
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0
*n *  *n x x'/y Q* P(Q*) P/c R'+D*
*  *
n x
ns* c jc s TS/W*
0.00 4 0.036 0.39 0.273 2.828 1.25 0.20 0.72 1.419 0.912
0.25 4 0.024 0.22 0.305 2.583 1.25 0.20 0.48 1.297 0.932
0.50 4 0.024 0.19 0.315 2.518 1.25 0.20 0.48 1.264 0.939
0.75 4 0.024 0.17 0.322 2.475 1.25 0.20 0.48 2.242 0.942
1.00 4 0.02 0.16 0.328 2.442 1.25 0.20 0.40 2.226 0.946
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In Table 6 , with "own" and "borrowed" basic research perfect substitutes, 
industry-wide R&D expenditures fall as the degree of inappropriability rises despite the 
fact that at higher spillover rates the number of firms spending on basic research has 
increased. The ratio of basic to development research in each firm’s R&D budget falls 
from 50% to 7%. Price-cost margins and R&D intensity decline, to the extent that the 
number of firms in the industry has risen. Prices with imperfect appropriability are 
lower than with full appropriability of basic research, but rise with the spillover rate to 
reflect the higher unit production costs and lower output. The market underperforms 
the socially-managed industry, but the degree of inappropriability does not affect the 
ratio substantially. The lower fixed costs, due to the disincentive to spend on R&D as a 
result of the higher spillover rate, and the higher unit production costs, together with the 
higher prices at high spillover rates counterbalance each other so that the total effect of 
spillovers on performance is minimal.
Tables 7-11 illustrate how the impact of spillovers rests crucially on the 
assumptions about the technology. In contrast to Table 6 , tables 7-9 show that a higher 
spillover rate can stimulate basic research and total R&D in the industry, even though 
the level of basic research expenditures in industries with no spillovers will tend to 
exceed the levels in industries where part of R&D leaks out. A higher spillover rate acts 
as a disincentive to basic research only in the case where "borrowed" basic research is 
highly complementary with development research and in addition it is relatively easy to 
substitute one input for another (table 11). Compared to a situation of full appropri­
ability however, spillovers increase total basic research expenditures only in the case 
where "borrowed" basic research is highly complementary with a firm’s own basic 
research and in addition it is relatively easy to substitute (Table 10). In that situation, 
the fact that the effective basic research available to the firm increases when some of the
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basic research of its rivals leaks out induces the firm to intensify its efforts in basic 
research and can even reverse the shares of basic and development research in total 
R&D.
Industrial concentration, R&D intensity and monopoly power all respond in a 
variety of ways to inappropriability, reflecting the assumptions underlying the cost 
function. In table 7 for example, where "borrowed" basic research enhances more the 
marginal productivity of "own" basic research than that of development research, but 
where it is relatively difficult to substitute among inputs, the number of firms that a 
free-entry equilibrium can sustain in the presence of spillovers exceeds that with M l 
appropriability of basic research, but a higher spillover rate leads to a decline in the 
number of firms in equilibrium. Price mark-ups and R&D intensity initially fall but 
soon recover with a higher spillover rate. The initial impact of the inappropriability in 
basic research is to reduce total R&D expenditures at firm and industry level. If there 
were barriers to entry into the industry, this would have led to higher profits. In the 
free-entry equilibrium, it leads to a higher number of firms. As the spillover rate 
increases however, the complementarity that exists among R&D inputs causes each firm 
to spend more on both basic and development research. Unit production costs fall, but 
fixed costs and total costs rise for each firm in the industry, so that at the higher 
spillover rate, the equilibrium number of firms falls.
In the comparison of total resources devoted to basic research expenditures in the 
market with those in the socially-optimal case (ie n x  vs. n ^ ) ,  tables 7-11 reveal that 
the impact of spillovers rests on the ease of substitutability among R&D inputs. 
Compared with a situation where basic research is fully appropriable, the extent of 
market underinvestment in basic research tends to be greater when this type of R&D is 
subject to spillovers. The ratio of market basic research expenditures to the socially
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optimal levels may however increase or decrease with the spillover rate. The ratio rises 
with the spillover rate in the cases where higher spillovers cause higher total basic 
research expenditures in the market due to entry and/or due to spillovers acting as a spur 
to basic research investment. This is the case for example in tables 7, 8 and 9 where 
research inputs are not easily substitutable with each other.
In contrast, tables 10 and 11, where elasticities of substitution exceed one, 
illustrate the possibility of higher spillover rates being associated with an increase in the 
underinvestment of the market in total basic research expenditures. In table 11 this is a 
reflection of spillovers acting as a disincentive for basic research outlays by existing 
forms in the market (there is no entry or exit as we vary the spillover rate). In table 10, 
where research inputs are easily substitutable with each other and where in addition 
,,borrowed,, basic research is more complementary with a firm’s own basic research 
than with its development research, the ratio falls and then rises with the spillover rate. 
The fall is due to the socially-managed industry increasing its spending on basic 
research and on total R&D at higher spillover rates, so that the ratio of R&D 
expenditures in the two market structures declines. The rise in the ratio as the spillover 
rate approaches one is due to a higher equilibrium number of firms and of total market 
expenditures on basic research.
Finally, compared with the situation where basic research is fully appropriable, 
inappropriability increases the performance of the market relative to the welfare 
optimum when the substitutability amongst research inputs exceeds unity (Tables 10 
and 11). Given that in a free-entry equilibrium the entire surplus generated in the 
market is consumer surplus, the higher total output and lower product price when 
appropriability is imperfect imply an increase in the relative performance of the market. 
A higher spillover rate may however reduce the ratio of the total market surplus to
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maximum welfare (table 10). This is despite the further increase in consumer surplus 
and is due to the fact that with the socially optimal number of firms exceeding one, 
maximum welfare increases with the spillover rate, so that the ratio TS/W* may fall. In 
contrast, when it is difficult to substitute between R&D inputs, the relative performance 
of the market with spillovers can exceed or fall short to the case with full appropri­
ability, while a higher spillover rate will increase the ratio TS*/W* (Tables 7-9). Output 
with spillovers is lower and price higher than with full appropriability, so that consumer 
surplus and market performance suffer, but a higher spillover rate may reduce marginal 
cost, increase output and thereby improve performance.
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VI. Conclusions
If there is one central conclusion to be drawn from the analysis, it is that the 
impact of spillovers is not as straightforward as previously thought. Accordingly, most 
theoretical papers that have attempted to capture the inappropriability of some of R&D 
in models of strategic interaction amongst firms are in a sense misleading. By treating 
R&D as homogeneous and by ignoring possibilities of complementarity between the 
R&D performed by a particular firm and that of its rivals, as well as between different 
types of R&D (basic and applied), they have on the main arrived at the conclusion that 
spillovers act as a disincentive to R&D while enhancing profitability and market 
performance. The analysis of this chapter has shown that these results apply only for 
particular assumptions about the firm’s technology, as revealed in its cost function, and 
may in fact be reversed under alternative assumptions about the manner in which R&D 
inputs combine to reduce costs.
The group of results presented here is consistent with technical advance in an 
industry being "cumulative" rather than "discrete" in the sense of innovations building 
on and enhancing existing knowledge, rather than replacing it. Since the model is 
entirely formulated in terms of expenditures per period, the essence of "cumulative" 
technical advance is captured by the supposition that the basic research of rivals that 
spills over and is absorbed can increase the marginal productivity of a firm’s own basic 
research and of its development research at different rates. Furthermore, the elasticity 
of substitution between basic research and development research is allowed to vary in 
the manner of a two-level (nested) CES cost function as in (3.2). Under these 
assumptions, the effects of inappropriability depend critically on two factors: first, on 
the relative complementarity between "borrowed" and "own" basic research on the one
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hand and that between "borrowed" basic research and development research on the 
other; and secondly, the impact of spillovers depends on the (absolute) ease o f substitut­
ability between research inputs.
The main conclusions of this chapter are presented below. They are presented in 
a form that makes them directly comparable with the set of conclusions derived in 
chapter two of the thesis so as to bring out the effect of the alternative assumptions 
about the cost function on the impact of spillovers on incentives, market structure and 
performance.
(1’) If the number of firms in an industry is taken to be exogenously determined, 
higher spillover rates will be associated with higher levels of basic and development 
research expenditures at firm level if R&D inputs are not easily substitutable with each 
other, if demand is elastic (or not too inelastic), and (for basic research only) if in 
addition "borrowed" basic research is at least as complementary with a firm’s 
development research as it is with its own basic research. Higher spillover rates will 
always be associated with lower marginal production costs and higher output.
(2’) In a cross-section of industries facing the same elasticity of demand and with 
the same opportunities of cost reduction through R&D, but differing in terms of the 
degree of appropriability of basic research, one would expect to observe that the 
industries that exhibit the least appropriability of basic research would be the ones most 
concentrated and with the strongest monopoly power when the elasticities of 
substitution between own and "borrowed" basic research and between total (both own 
and "borrowed") effective basic research and development research are low.
(3’) In the free-entry equilibrium, R&D intensity in oligopolistic industries where 
basic research is fully appropriable will be at least as great as in industries where part 
of basic research is inappropriable. Industries facing a low degree of appropriability (a
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high spillover rate) will however be more R&D-intensive than industries where the 
degree of appropriability is high when the elasticities of substitution between own and 
"borrowed" basic research and between total (both own and "borrowed") effective basic 
research and development research are low.
(4’) In the comparison of two free-entry oligopolistic industries where basic 
research is partially appropriable, the industry with the lowest degree of appropriability 
in basic research (the highest spillover rate) will be spending more on basic and 
development research expenditures if demand is elastic, if "borrowed" basic research is 
more complementary with a firm’s own research than with its development research and 
if the elasticities of substitution between own and "borrowed" basic research and 
between total (both own and "borrowed") effective basic research and development 
research are low.
(5’) As long as "borrowed" basic research is more (less) complementary with a 
firm’s own basic research than with its development research and if in addition research 
inputs are easily substitutable with each other, a higher spillover rate will increase 
(decrease) the share of basic research expenditures in total R&D. Compared to the case 
with full appropriability however, industries with spillovers can be associated with a 
higher ratio of basic to development research expenditures even when "borrowed" basic 
research is more complementary with a firm’s own basic research than with its 
development research, as long as it is difficult to substitute between R&D inputs.
(6 ’) Each firm in a free-entry oligopolistic market where basic research is 
partially appropriable underinvests in basic research relative to the social optimum.
The ratio of market to socially optimal levels of basic research may however increase or 
decrease with the extent of spillovers in basic research.
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(7’) Total basic research expenditures in the free-entry oligopolistic market, as 
well as total R&D, can be greater than is socially optimal, when basic research is only 
partially appropriable. Furthermore, while with full appropriability excessive 
duplication of basic research and of total R&D in a market economy are possible only 
when demand is highly inelastic, with spillovers they are possible even if demand is 
throughout elastic.
(8 ’) When spillovers stimulate, rather than inhibit, basic research expenditures, 
market performance relative to the social optimum in the presence of inappropriability 
may fall short of the performance in the case where spillovers are absent. Furthermore, 
a higher spillover rate can reduce the relative performance of the market. Higher 
spillovers reduce unit production costs and expand output in the market, thus generating 
a higher producer surplus; relative performance can still suffer however if the cost 
reduction and output expansion in the socially-managed industry due to the less 
appropriable basic research is greater than that in the case of the market.
(9’) A government policy of subsidising basic research will stimulate 
expenditures in the non-appropriable part of R&D. For a given market structure and 
degree of appropriability, optimal subsidy rates are determined by the ease of substitut­
ability and the relative complementarity between research inputs, and by the elasticities 
of demand and of cost reduction with respect to R&D expenditures. Optimal rates 
increase with the degree of inappropriability only when spillovers act as a disincentive 
to investments in basic research; they decrease (and can turn negative) when instead 
spillovers spur such investments.
The comparison of the set of conclusions presented here with the one previously 
derived in chapter two indicate that even within the context of a simple model, it is not 
easy to generalise on the impact of spillovers in an oligopolistic industry. In a static
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model, devoid of risk and uncertainty, where product and R&D decisions on the part of 
firms are represented in a one-stage game, the importance of the nature of the 
technology facing individual firms was shown to be crucial in determining both firm 
behaviour and industry characteristics when part of R&D is not fully appropriable by 
the firm that originates it.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH SPILLOVERS AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR
I. In troduction
In the preceding two chapters we developed a model of cost reduction through 
R&D. The model was aimed at examining the incentives of oligopolistic firms to invest 
in research and development and the resulting static and dynamic performance of 
industries where part of R&D is not entirely appropriable by the originating firm(s) and 
is instead subject to spillovers. We showed that the impact of spillovers depends 
crucially on the specific assumptions made about the firm’s knowledge and technology 
and how these relate to the knowledge produced by its competitors. These assumptions 
and relationships were taken to be codified in the cost functions facing each firm.
One particular characteristic of the model developed in the second and third 
chapter of the thesis concerns the assumptions made about the behaviour of firms. We 
assumed that firms competed by deciding on R&D and output levels simultaneously in a 
one-stage game, taking the decisions of other firms as given. This produced a Nash 
equilibrium as a result of a Cournot game in quantities (quantities being represented in 
our case by the level of output and that of basic and development research 
expenditures). With the exception of some brief references in the footnotes, we did not 
examine the case where the firm’s decision making is a multi-stage process, with 
decisions on R&D being determined before decisions on production.
Alternatively, firm decision-making can be modelled as a multi-stage process, 
where decisions on the amount to produce take place after decisions on R&D 
investment. This procedure gives rise to incentives on the part of firms to shift 
resources to the "sunk category" of costs in early stages so as to gain a strategic 
advantage in later stages. By perceiving such strategic considerations, firms depart 
from simple cost-minimisation. This chapter develops such a model where firms act
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strategically by competing in an oligopolistic environment and where basic research, 
development research and output levels are chosen successively in three stages. The 
framework therefore allows us to look closely at issues related to the interaction of 
strategic behaviour and inappropriability of research \
The model developed below follows closely the work of Brander and Spencer 
(1983a). They develop a two-stage model of competition in (fully appropriable) R&D 
and output for the case of a duopoly. The resulting strategic equilibrium is compared to 
the non-strategic equilibrium that arises from a Cournot game in R&D and output (ie a 
situation where firms decide on R&D levels and output simultaneously in a one-period 
game). They reach a number of conclusions. First, strategic behaviour induces each 
firm to spend more on R&D than is necessary for cost-minimisation so that the 
equilibrium with strategic behaviour involves some inefficiency. Secondly, the 
strategic equilibrium involves higher total R&D expenditures than the corresponding 
Cournot equilibrium. With perfect symmetry 2, this implies that each firm spends more 
on R&D in the strategic case than in the Cournot model. Third, at the equilibrium 
resulting from the two-stage (strategic) game output is higher, prices are lower, and 
each firm earns less profit than at the corresponding equilibrium of the Cournot (one 
stage) game.
We want to extend this model to the case where R&D is subject to externalities 
and where as a result part of R&D expenditures are not appropriable by the originating
1 An alternative approach to capturing interaction effects among firms and linking these to the 
degree of appropriability of research has been to develop "conjectural variations" models (see 
for example Levin and Reiss (1984)). In such models firms are assum ed to anticipate and take 
into account their rivals' instantaneous responses to their own unobservable actions. This 
approach has been widely criticized in the literature for attempting to capture the notion of 
"reaction” (a concept of a  dynamic nature) in an inappropriate one period static framework.
2 Perfect symmetry in this context implies that in equilibrium, demand and cost functions, as well 
as expenditures on R&D, are identical for all firms in the market.
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firm(s). Our interest is in making comparisons along two lines: (i) between the 
multi-stage equilibrium with spillovers and the multi-stage equilibrium with full 
appropriability; and (ii) between the strategic (multi-stage) equilibrium and the Cournot 
(one stage) equilibrium when in both cases R&D is subject to spillovers. The objective 
is to try and answer a number of questions that suggest themselves in the two 
comparisons. In the examination of the strategic case with and without spillovers, the 
question is whether or how spillovers affect the incentives of firms to invest in R&D 
and the performance of the industry when firms use R&D for strategies that are more 
complex than simple cost minimisation. In the comparison between the strategic and 
the Cournot equilibrium on the other hand, we want to address the question of whether 
the presence of spillovers alters the effect of strategic behaviour on R&D expenditures, 
output and profitability of industries. We want for example to examine whether, 
compared to the Cournot case, the strategic use of R&D increases the total amount of 
R&D undertaken, increases total output, lowers prices and reduces industry profit.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section we develop a three 
stage model of R&D with spillovers in general form. We examine the effects of differ­
ential assumptions about basic and development research inappropriability on its 
comparative statics properties and compare the resulting equilibrium with that of the 
non-strategic model. In section three the three-stage model is collapsed to two stages by 
assuming that research is homogeneous and that spillovers operate on the whole of 
R&D, rather than just on basic research. By specifying two different functional forms 
for the knowledge production function, we can then solve explicitly for the case of n 
symmetric firms and compare the strategic and Cournot equilibria, with and without 
spillovers. Section four has the concluding remarks.
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II. A three-stage model of R&D with spillovers
In order to model the strategic use of R&D it is necessary to formulate a multi­
period oligopoly model of R&D and production 3. We choose to develop a three-period 
model in general form, although for the illustration of particular points and for the 
derivation of explicit solutions it will be collapsed into a two-stage model, by 
abandoning the distinction between basic and development research expenditures. The 
structure of the general model is as follows. In the first period/stage, each firm chooses 
its level of expenditures in basic research, which is assumed to be only partially 
appropriable. In the second period it decides on the level of expenditures on 
development research, with the basic research levels of all firms already determined and 
known to each other. Development research is taken to be fully appropriable by the 
firm that originates it. Finally, in the third period the representative firm chooses an 
output level, given the choices on basic and on development research that itself and its 
competitors have made in the previous two steps 4.
The model therefore involves a three-step equilibrium, where the equilibria in the 
first and second stages of the game are assumed to be the outcome of noncooperative 
Nash games in R&D levels and the final third step is resolved as a Cournot game 5. In 
deciding on basic research levels in the first step firms form expectations regarding the 
Nash game in development research in the second step and the quantity game in output 
in the third step. Similarly, in deciding on their investment on development research in
9 The model is an example of a  multi-period model without time dependence (Friedman, 1986).
4 The choice of competition in quantities rather than in price in the last stage of the model can 
be explained on a  number of levels. A practical argument is that this allows a  direct comparison
with the results obtained in the one-stage models in chapters two and three. A conceptual
argument is that it would be hard to see  the advantages of introducing Bertrand competition
when products are homogeneous. Finally, a  technical argument is that "quantity precom­
mitment and Bertrand competition yield Coumot outcomes" (Kreps and Sceinkman, 1983).
8 For a  discussion of the concept of the Nash noncooperative equilibrium, see  Johansen (1982).
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the second stage of the game, in addition to the knowledge of the basic research levels 
chosen by all firms in the first stage, firms form expectations on the quantity game in 
output to follow. We assume that in equilibrium their expectations are confirmed so 
that the outcome is an example of a "subgame perfect equilibrium" *.
a. The basic model
Let the market be represented by rivalry between two firms, denoted 1 and 2. (In 
some cases we use i and j  instead; it is then understood that when i refers to firm l , j  
refers to firm 2). Each firm i produces output q\ has revenue E‘ and costs C. R&D 
consists of basic research x, and development research y,. Basic research is subject to 
spillovers at the rate 0 while development research is taken to be fully appropriable.
For 0 = 0, appropriability of R&D is perfect. For 0= 1 , basic research is a  pure public 
good and each firm can make full use of the basic research expenditures of its rival. For 
0  < 0 < 1, appropriability is imperfect, with each firm i benefiting from a proportion 0jcy- 
of the basic research expenditures of its rival7. Profit for firm i can then be written as:
(4.1) TX(q \  q2;y;,xv x2) = E'(q \  q2) -  C \ q \ y ^ x ^  -  y.
The firms produce a homogeneous good and we assume that increasing the output 
of good j  decreases the total and marginal revenue of firm i 8. We therefore have that
dE‘ldqj = E ‘j< 0  and tfE'ldq^q* = Ejj < 0.
• For a  definition of a  "subgame perfect equilibrium", see  Friedman (1983).
7 The emphasis of this chapter is on the difference that an alternative behavioural assumption 
- strategic behaviour- has on the impact of inappropraiability. We will therefore assum e that a  
firm can fully absorb the basic research knowledge of its rival that spills out. In the context of 
the models in chapters two and three, this is equivalent to assuming that the param eter of 
absorptive capacity, 5, is set equal to one. Nominal and effective spillovers are therefore here 
one and the sam e and are represented by the parameter 0.
• The output of the two firms are in other words assum ed to be strategic substitutes, in the 
sense  used by Bulow, Qenakopoulos and Klemperer (1985). This condition satisfies the 
requirements for stability in a  simple Cournot game.
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The marginal cost function is taken to be independent of output so that C  = c'q' 
with dC'/dq' = c‘ and dc'/dq1 = 0. It includes all costs except for R&D, which is a fixed 
cost. Variable total and marginal costs decline with a firm’s expenditures on own basic 
research and on development research ie dC'/dx, = C" < 0 and dC'/dy; = Cy <0 
(dc'ldxi = clXj < 0 and 3c73y,- = c'yi < 0), but at a declining rate ie cPC'/dx? = CX)X{ > 0 and 
dfC'/dyf = C‘yiyi > 0 (ifc'/dx? = cx,Xj > 0 and d?c‘/dy? = cyfy{ > 0). Because of the 
existence of spillovers in basic research however, they also decline with competitors’ 
basic research ie dC'/dxj = Cx. < 0 and cfC/dxf = C'XjXj > 0 (dc'/dxj = cXj<0 and 
dPc'/dx? =s c* > 0). The issue of whether cost reduction due to own basic researchJ  X jX j /
exceeds that due to the rivals’ basic research is left open at this stage and is taken up 
below in the context of particular functional forms.
Finally we assume that the effect of own development research on a firm’s 
marginal cost reduction due to own basic research expenditures is positive, so that 
diminishing returns apply, ie that 32CV3x)3y, = CJ > 0  (or = cX/>/ > 0 ).
Similarly for the effect of rivals’ basic research on a firm’s marginal cost reduction due 
to own development research expenditures ie yC79y,-Jcy- = Cy/Xj>0 (or 
d2c'/dy;Xj = cy{Xj > 0. We leave however open the possibility that the effect of borrowed 
basic research on a firm’s marginal cost reduction due to own basic research 
expenditures be positive or negative so that the sign of <?C'Idxfix j = CX/Xj (and similarly 
of ifc'/dxidxj = cXjX)  is not predetermined. This issue will be explored further below in 
the context of particular cost functions.
Following the usual procedure in these type of models, we solve recursively. At 
the last stage, and with basic and development research expenditures already sunk, the 
firm maximises its profit function with respect to its output. The first-order conditions 
for a maximum are then given by:
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(4.2) n; = dW dq! a  E '(q \q 1) - c X y ^ . x J  = 0
where E\ = dE'/dq'. The second-order conditions are satisfied for:
(4.3) n J ,a0 W /3 ? 'a£ /,< O  
and for
(4.4) a  s  n } ^  -  n 12rg 1= e \xe 21 -  e 1X2e 2X > o
Expression (4.4) holds if own output effects on profits exceed cross effects. In our 
case, with marginal cost constant, it will hold if own revenue effects exceed cross 
revenue effects. Together with expression (4.3), they guarantee that the profit function 
is strictly concave and relate to the stability of the reaction functions. At a symmetric 
equilibrium, it is also the case that Ilj7-(= Ejj) < HJ,(= Ej{).
The slope of the output reaction function can be derived by totally differentiating
(4.2) to obtain H'adq' + TYijdqj = 0, from which we have:
(4.5) dq tdq1 = -IjJ/TlJ, = - E j / 4  < 0
In its reduced form, the solution of the first-order conditions for the two firms 
depends on each firm’s own basic and development research expenditures, as well as on 
the basic research expenditures of its rival through the respective marginal cost 
functions ie:
(4.6) q x = q \ c l{y{jcv xd ,c2(y»xvxJ\\ q2 = q ^ i y ^ x ^ i y ^ x ^
The impact of inappropriability of basic research in the strategic model can be 
illustrated simply by the comparison of the effect of an increase in (fully appropriable)
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development research as opposed to that of an increase in (partially appropriable) basic 
research on a firm’s output. By totally differentiating (4.2) with respect to ql, q2 and xu 
yi we obtain the system:
Endq +Eudq = cxdxl +cydyl
(4.7)
^21 dq +E‘ndq — cX{dx{
Holding the basic research of both firms and the development research of firm 2 
constant, the effect on the output of firm 1 due to an increase in its development 
research is given by Cramer’s rule as qyi = dq1/dyi = c\E%JA where A>0 and given by
(4.3). Since E222<0 and < 0, then qyi > 0. Similarly, qyi = —c^E^/A<0. Because of
symmetry, we can then conclude that in general terms:
(4.8) q‘yi > 0; * ' < 0
An increase in development research by a particular firm will lower its marginal 
cost, shift out its reaction function and increase its output, for constant levels of 
development research by the other firm and for given levels of basic research. In the 
process it will decrease the output of its rival. The overall change is given by 
q'yj+ qJyi = Cyt(Ejj - Ej;)/A. Since E\- <Ej;< 0 and given that cy/ < 0, it is the case that 
q‘y + qJyj > 0 , so that total output increases as a result of higher development research 
expenditures. These results are illustrated in Figure 1 below. Starting with an initial 
equilibrium at point A, the increase in firm 7’s development research expenditures shifts 
out its reaction function. The new equilibrium at B involves higher output for firm i ,  
lower for firm 2 , and higher total output in the symmetric case.
162
Figure 1: Output effects of an increase in development research
firm 1 output reaction functions
firm 2 output reaction function
q i
Contrast now this result with the comparative statics of an increase in a firm’s 
basic research expenditures. From the system (4.7), keeping the basic research of firm 
j ,  as well as development research by either firm constant, the effect of an increase in 
the basic research of firm i on its output is given by:
(4.9) <  = 99i/axi = « 4 - < £ i ) A
The net marginal impact on output now consists of two separate effects going in 
opposite directions: the first is a positive effect due to the reduction in the firm’s 
marginal cost which shifts its reaction function outwards; and the second is a negative 
effect due to the reduction in the marginal cost of firm j  as a result of the higher basic 
research of firm i. This second effect is due to spillovers, it is due in other words to the 
fact that the basic research of firm i enters as an argument in the marginal cost function 
of its rival. It shifts the output reaction function of firm j  outwards, so that the new 
equilibrium point lies at the intersection of the two new output reaction functions.
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If, instead of being subject to spillovers, basic research was perfectly appropriable, 
the marginal effect on output would be positive, its sign being determined by cxEjj. 
Inappropriability of basic research however makes the sign of qx ambiguous in 
principle. In effect, in general terms, since A>0, we will have qx > 0 as long as 
cxEjj > c'Elj. Since we have however established that in symmetry Ejj < EJjh then it 
follows that it is sufficient for cX{ < c*x for q' to be positive. This latter requirement 
implies that a particular firm’s basic research reduces its marginal cost by more than it 
reduces the marginal cost of its rival9.
In order to explore the conditions for which a firm’s basic research expenditures
reduce the cost of its rival more than its own ie for which we have cI > c l , we will*i v
examine briefly the two parameterizations of the cost function used in the previous two 
chapters. In chapter two, the firm’s marginal cost function involved a linear basic 
knowledge production function where own and rival basic research where substitutable 
at the rate 1/0. We reproduce it here for firm i in the duopoly case10:
(4.10) c ' = (3 RJ* y ’p  = p (x, + where a ,p ,y>0
The marginal cost reduction of each firm due to the basic research expenditures of 
firm i is given by differentiation of (4.10) with respect to x{ and by differentiation of d  
with respect to Jt,; they are cX( and respectively. A comparison of the two shows that 
cX{ < clt for 0 < 1 : own basic research reduces a firm’s marginal production cost by more
• Note that this condition is sufficient, though not necessary, it is also possible to have q'X{ > 0, 
even if c[, > c ' , as long as it is still the case  that c[E]} > dE^.
10 Apart from setting n=2, the only other difference between (4.10) and (2.13) of chapter two is 
that here we have also set 8 = 1. As mentioned above, for the purposes of this chapter, we 
assum e that firms can absorb all of the basic research of rivals that leaks out. There is 
therefore no distinction between nominal and effective spillovers.
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than it does that of its rival as long as the spillover rate is smaller than its limit value of
one11. The condition is therefore automatically satisfied in the case of this and any 
other cost function where basic research knowledge is of the form R ‘ =/(*, + 0jt;).
The situation is different in the case where the cost function has a nested CES 
form, as explained in chapter three above. That particular specification becomes in the 
duopoly case for firm i:
Differentiation of (4.11) and of the marginal cost function of firm j  with respect to 
X; yields respectively cx and c{r In this situation however, for c'x < cjjj, the condition is 
0-i»! < i 12 This js satisfied for 0 < 1, but only as long as pi < 0. Since sxx = 1/(1 + pj) 
represents the direct elasticity of substitution parameter between own and "borrowed" 
basic research within the "nest" of the CES, and given that —1 < p, < <», it is implied that 
the condition is fulfilled only when sxx > 1, ie only when the two are easily substitutable 
with each other. If instead pj > 0, that is if the basic research of a firm’s rival is not 
easily substitutable with its own, then sxx < 1 and the condition is violated resulting in 
cx > cl. If in addition c'xE\- < c'£/y-, then q* can be negative.
In the presence of spillovers therefore, the marginal effect of basic research on 
output in the strategic model is not necessarily positive. The different possibilities that 
are open are illustrated in Figure 2. Starting from an initial equilibrium at A , an increase 
in basic research by firm i reduces its marginal cost and shifts out its reaction function.
11 For complete spillovers, Ie for 0 = 1, c[ = c'.. Since however E j} <  E j if we still have qx > 0.
12 Let c‘ -  p/j* where =[a/?,^2+yy,^2] 1 Pl and R( =  + (0bc;)"Pl] ' P'- We then have
(4.11)
l0"Pl so that c[ < c{ for 0^' < l.
* i  * i
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In the absence of spillovers in basic research, the new reaction function would give an 
equilibrium at B with higher output for firm i. If however basic research is subject to 
spillovers, an increase in basic research expenditures reduces the marginal cost of firm j  
and results in an outward shift of its output reaction function. The resulting output 
equilibrium will lie at the intersection of the two new reaction functions, both exhibiting 
lower production costs, with the new levels of output for the two firms depending on the 
relative shifts of the two curves. In the situation where the effect of the reduction in 
own costs is stronger, the new equilibrium point B ’ will lie between A and B and the 
output of firm i will expand. If instead c'x. > c*x and in addition c'xEj} < c 'E y ,  the effect 
of the reduction in the marginal cost of its rival brought about by the firm’s spillovers 
(the negative term in (4.8)) will be stronger. This will result in a new equilibrium point 
such as C  and a fall in output for firm i.
Figure 2: Output effects of an increase in basic research
firm 1 output reaction functions
firm 2 output reaction functions
q i
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We can similarly examine the impact on a firm’s output of an increase in the basic 
research expenditures of its rival (or equivalently the impact on a rival’s output of an 
increase in a firm’s basic research expenditures). Application of Cramer’s rule yields
clE'u < c'xEj;. Since by symmetry we have Eh < Ejh this implies that a necessary 
condition is c* > c'x . It is not however a sufficient condition as it is possible for cj{ > cxX{ 
and still for c}xE\- > c'xEjh giving qj, > 0. An increase in basic research expenditures by 
firm i therefore can in principle increase the output of firm j  even in the situation where 
cost reduction through basic research benefits the originating firm more than it does its 
rival. This would be the case with point B’ in Figure 2. They will certainly lead to a 
higher level of output for firm j  if cJX( > cX/ ie in the situation where, because of 
spillovers, basic research expenditures reduce the marginal costs of a firm’s rival by 
more than they reduce the costs of the firm originating the expenditures.
The total effect of the two changes is given by:
From the second-order conditions above we established that in a symmetric 
equilibrium IXJy(= Ejj) < nj,(= Ejj) (and similarly that nj/(= Eh) < II\j{E\-f). It therefore 
follows that Ejj -  Ej; < 0 and Eh -  E';j < 0. Expression (4.9) is therefore positive ie 
industry-wide output increases as a result of higher basic research expenditures by firm i 
irrespective of spillovers (ie whether the disincentive effect dominates or not).
In the second stage of the game, and given the dependence of output on basic and 
on development research expenditures as in (4.6), profit can be written directly as a 
function of R&D. If we let this function be represented b y /, it is given by:
qXi = dq2/dxt = [elfin ~ Ci,^2i)/A . In general terms therefore, qji < 0 as long as
(4.12)
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(4.13) / —n [ c  CVi»^ i»-^ 2)»^
c ,(^'[c,(3'i^i^2) ^ 2(>'2^i^2)];>,,^i^2);y,^/}
= £ '(?  \c  \ y l^ v x2), C2(y2vci9x j\ , q2[c \ y 1'fxv x2), (c2(y2yclfx j]
Xj)- ? ,  X;
Each firm maximises this function with respect to its development research 
expenditures, taking the development research expenditures of its rival as given. From 
(4.1), (4.2) and (4.13), the first-order conditions of the resulting Nash equilibrium are:
(4.14) / t = d f /d y .= n ; ? ; + i r > '+ n ; c ; + n ; = o =*
= £ M - < * ' - lss0
since n j = 0 and FI' = £j. The second-order conditions are satisfied for:
(4.15) f u s  dfi/dy; s  EjqsWt + qjy){dE)ldy^ -  c'^q  -  c ' ^  < 0 
and for A, s  f .jj. -  f.jfj. > 0. In symmetry, this implies 13:
(4.16) \fH\ > | / y| 
whereby a  q^dEjldyj) - c‘yiq‘yj.
13 Condition (4.16) states that own effects of development research on profit exceed cross 
effects. It implies reaction function stability in the second stage of the game and, together with 
(4.15), are necessary for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. As Brander and Spencer 
(1983) note however, these second-order conditions will not necessarily hold. Particularly, at 
least one term in (4.15), qffiEj/dyj) = qJy[ E 'j,(lyl+Ejj(lQ, may be positive if Ejj > 0. Existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium may therefore be a  problem in multi-stage models. The conditions 
will however hold in both the second and first stages of the game if the marginal cost reducing 
of development and of basic research expenditures is strongly diminishing so that c ^ ( and cjft(
respectively are large and positive.
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The solution to the first-order condition (4.13) depends on the levels of basic 
research expenditures of each firm. We can therefore write:
(4.17) y l = y \x „ x ji  y 1 = y \ x v x2)
The comparative statics of an increase in the basic research expenditures of one 
firm on its own development research expenditures and on that of its rival can be found 
by totally differentiating (4.14) with respect to qu andxv This yields the system:
f u d y '+ f a y ^ i d f t d x jd x ,
(4.18)
f 2ld y '+ f27d y 1 = (df1ldxl)dxI
From the system (4.18) by a simple application of Cramer’s rule we have that 
yXi = dyjdxi = ~ (dfydxiVnVAi- Since Ax>0, the sign of y,1 depends on the
sign of (dfl/dxi)J^2 -  (dfydx^fh- From the second-order conditions in sym m etry^ <f\2 
holds, and in addition^ < 0. In general terms therefore if dfi/dx; > 0, for y ‘X{ < 0 it is 
sufficient that dfi/dx; > d f j / d x If instead dfi/dx; < 0, then df/dx; > df/dxt is a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for yx, < 0. Alternatively, for yx >0 a sufficient condition 
is dfj/dXi < dfj/dx; if dfi/dx; < 0; it is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition if instead 
df/dxi < 0. Substituting from expression (4.14) however for each firm and manipulation 
of the resulting equations reveals that the satisfaction of these conditions depends 
largely on the sign of c‘m  -  c '^  and cj( -  c ' ,4.
14 From (4.14) we have dfj/dx, = E)q>yfi + (B E j / d x ^  -  c^q* -  cyjqXi and
d/j/dx, =  E\q;A + (dE//dXi)q;. -  dyit#  -  cJy.qJx. In symmetry E) =  Ej, Ejj =  E l  and qfh =  q'yj. Furthermore, 
given that £ ' = P q i, we have that dEj/dxi =P'qii and dEjfdxt = P'q lt. We can then use the derived 
values of qJy>= -c^El/A , < ? ; = [c^El -  c{ e \^ a  and qJXi= [ciE l -  c iEj^A  and further derive 
qyfi= - c JyjXElj/A and qJyiXi= - c ytXEl/A  (ignoring third-order effects on earnings). Substitution then
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Put another way, these conditions imply that an increase in a firm’s basic research 
expenditures will induce it to also increase its development expenditures in the 
following two cases. First, if an increase in its basic research reduces the marginal 
profitability of its development research and does so at a higher rate than the marginal 
profitability of its rival’s development research (which may in fact increase). Second, if 
its additional basic research increases the marginal profitability of its development 
research but at a lower rate than that of its rival. In this second case, in order for the 
inducement for higher (marginal) development research expenditures to be present, the 
negative effect of the rival’s increase in output on its marginal product must be low.
Similarly, the effect of an increase in the basic research expenditures of one firm 
on the equilibrium development research expenditures of its rival are given by 
yjt = dy/dXi = [(dfj/dx;)fa -  (dfi/dxi)fji]/Av In an analogous manner therefore, for y* < 0, 
if dfj/dxi > 0 it is sufficient that df/dx{ < dfj/dx{; if instead dfj/dx; < 0, dfj/dx; < dfj/dx; is 
a necessary (though not sufficient) condition. For yjf > 0 on the other hand, 
dfj/dXi > dfj/dxi is a necessary condition when dfj/dx{ > 0 and a sufficient condition 
when dfj/dxi < 0.
The impact of a marginal increase in a firm’s basic research expenditures on its 
own and on its rival’s equilibrium development research expenditures rests therefore 
with the specification of the cost function. We noted earlier that for a cost function as 
in (4.10) where own and rival basic research are perfect substitutes, the condition
gives d f / d x , + E J ( E j i/ A) ] - c ; iq ^  +P'(Eji/A ) ]  and
dfj/dxi =  - c JyjXi[qj +Ej(Ejj/A)] -  c jq j i l  +P'(E ,iJ/A)]. Assuming that the sign of df/dx;  is determined by 
the sign of qj,  for q j  > 0, we have that df/dx i >  0. A sufficient condition however for q j  > 0 is that 
cl < c{ . It therefore follows that a  sufficient condition for y’x < 0 is that cl < cl  and in addition thatxi *i ' xt xi xt
df/dxj > df/dx^ This latter condition is satisfied when qj  < 0.
170
c> < ci is satisfied for 0 < i. The same limit value of the spillover rate also satisfies thexi *i
condition cy/X/ > cJyjXf. Under these assumptions about the technology therefore, an 
increase in one firm’s basic research will decrease its development research and 
increase that of its rival.
In the situation where the cost function has a nested CES form as in (4.11), for 
both c' < cl and c' > c* the condition is tf*  < 1. This is satisfied for 0 < 1 as long asxi xi ytxt yfi
Pi < 0. If instead Pi > 0 ie if the basic research of a firm’s rival is not easily substi­
tutable with its own, then both conditions are violated and an increase in one firm’s 
basic research can increase its development research and reduce that of its rival.
In the light of (4.9) and of (4.17), profit can be written as a function of basic 
research expenditures only. Letting this function be represented by g{ and using the 
reduced form solutions obtained in the other stages:
In the first stage, the Nash equilibrium of the strategic game occurs where each 
fiim is maximising its profit with respect to its basic research expenditures, given the 
leYel chosen by its rival. From (4.1), (4.2), (4.10) and (4.14), the first-order condition 
for a maximum for firm i is:
V
(4.19) g ‘ s E ;{ q \ c \ y l(xv x,y^x,x1),(c2(y2{xv x ^ , x 2)),
-CXqXc'iyfavXj-jCvXj^fiyAXvXjjvXjyjitXvXj.Xi.xJ)
-y fc v X ^ -X i
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since E\ = 11) = 0 from (4.2) and E-qJyt -  c'yf - 1  = 0 from (4.11). The second-order
conditions are given by:
(4.21) g!, & E]q‘Vi + qi'QEpdx,) -  c'Viq‘ -  < 0
and (in symmetry) by:
(4.22) |* /,|> |* il
where gij = E jq ^ + qlfiEj/dXj) -  c ^ q ‘ -
b. Strategic vs. non-strateglc behaviour
We initially compare basic and development research expenditures at firm and 
industry level in the three-stage model with those of the corresponding one-stage 
Cournot case. In the one-stage Cournot game firms set simultaneously R&D (both 
basic and development) and output in order to maximise profits:
(4.23) IT (q \q 2;y„xi,x2) = E‘(q,,q2) - C ( q l,y i,x l,x2) - y l - x i
Wi’*!
The first-order conditions are given by:
(4.24) n ; a  a n '% ' = E ](q q 1) - c X y ^ x J  = 0
(4.25) n ;(= arr/ay= - c ;  - 1  s  -c[q - 1 = 0
(4.26) n ;  = dtildx1 s  -cl - 1 a  -c l q‘ - 1 s  0
The comparison of the two sets of first-order conditions ie of (4.2), (4.14) and
(4.20) with (4.24)-(4.26) reveals that while (4.2) is identical to (4.24), the marginal 
benefits to conducting R&D are different in each case. In the strategic model the
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marginal benefit to spending on basic or on development research expenditures includes 
an extra term, reflecting the interaction of the two terms in the step-by-step decision­
making. Higher R&D expenditures in the early stages of the game reduce a firm’s 
marginal cost relative to that of its rival in the production stage. In the case of 
development research, this implies an increase in the output of the firm originating the 
development research expenditures, a fall in the output of its rival, and an increase in 
the first firm’s profits 15. This indirect effect is given by the extra term Ejq^; it is 
positive given that E- < 0 and qJyj < 0. We can therefore conclude:
Proposition 1: In the presence of spillovers in basic research, the marginal
benefit of development research in the strategic game exceeds 
that of the Cournot game. Strategic behaviour therefore 
induces each firm and the total industry to spend more on 
development research than is required to minimise costs.
Proof. The total cost of producing output q' is C'+y.+X/. With respect to development 
research expenditures, this cost is minimised for given q' when CJ( +1 = 0, with a 
second-order condition C\ y > 0. In the strategic case however, we have from (4.14) that 
c'yfl' +1 = Ejq^ > 0, since E- < 0 and qy, < 0 by (4.8). Since > 0, this implies that 
development research expenditures exceed the level required to minimise costs. QED.
19 A model with a  similar structure and preoccupations to the one in this chapter is Anderson 
and Fischer (1989). They develop a  two-stage model of a  multi-market oligopoly with 
production taking place before sales and compare the resulting ("strategic") equilibrium with the 
equilibrium in a game where production and sales decisions are taken simultaneously. In the 
comparison between the two equilibria, they identify two conditions that are necessary for the 
two alternative behavioural assumptions to result in different equilibria. First, firms must have 
the incentive to try to alter the strategy (and thereby the production) of rivals (ie there must exist 
profitable opportunities in doing so); second, they must have the ability to do so. Both incentive 
and ability are reflected in the interaction terms, in the context of this model, the incentive 
aspect is reflected in E) <0 of (4.14) and (4.20); the ability is reflected In the term qJy( <0 of (4.14)
for development research, and in the term q* < 0 of (4.20) for basic research. If either Ej = 0 or 
both qJyi and q* are zero, the strategic equilibrium is identical to the Cournot equilibrium.
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Turning to the partially appropriable basic research, in the Cournot case, the 
marginal benefit of investing in basic research is equal to the cost reduction achieved 
due to it. In the strategic case however there is an additional indirect effect and its 
impact is more complicated when there exist spillovers. In the absence of spillovers, 
this indirect effect would consist of the (negative) impact on the output of the firm’s 
rival caused by the firm’s own basic research expenditures due to the strategic 
interaction. This tends to increase the firm’s own profits and thereby increase the 
marginal benefit of basic research expenditures.
In the presence of spillovers, the indirect effect due to the step-by-step decision­
making is mitigated by the fact that own basic research expenditures enter the rival’s 
cost function through the spillover rate and decrease those costs, thereby potentially 
reducing the profits of the firm undertaking the basic research in the first instance. 
These two opposing forces are reflected in the term Ejqi. We have established that 
Ej < 0; in this case however the sign of ql is ambiguous and depends on the exact 
specification of the cost function. More specifically, we saw earlier that q* can be 
positive (ie an increase in own basic research expenditures leading to an expansion of 
production by the rival) in the situation where the marginal cost function is given by 
(4.11) and where in addition own and rival’s basic research are poor substitutes M. In 
that situation, the term Ejqi is negative, so that the marginal benefit of investment in 
basic research in the strategic case can fall short of that in the Cournot case. We can 
therefore conclude:
18 We can also have q? > 0 when the marginal cost function is given by (4.10) (ie with < cJx), as 
long as  ^ > < ^ 4 .
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Proposition 2: In the presence of spillovers in basic research, the marginal
benefit of basic research in the strategic game may exceed or fall 
short of that in the Cournot game. In the situation where a firm’s 
basic research and that of its rival are poor substitutes, strategic 
behaviour can induce each firm and the total industry to spend 
less on basic research than is required to minimise costs.
Proof: The total cost of producing output q‘ is C'+y.+Jt/. With respect to basic research 
expenditures, this cost is minimised for given q' when C" +1 = 0, with a second-order 
condition CXtXf >0. In the strategic case however, we have from (4.20) that 
cx(f +1 = Ejql(. While Ej < 0, the sign of ql is ambiguous. When q* > 0, we have that 
c'x<f +1 = EjqJXi < 0. Since > 0, this implies that development research expenditures 
fall short of the level required to minimise costs. QED.
These results require some elaboration. They are discussed below, by examining 
in turn the incentives to conduct R&D in the absence and in the presence of spillovers 
for both the Cournot and the strategic case. In this discussion, in order to simplify 
matters and to focus attention on the forces in operation, no distinction is made between 
basic and development research expenditures. The whole of R&D (denoted jc) is 
assumed to be either fully appropriable by the originating firm or subject to spillovers.
In the Cournot case each firm attempts to maximise profits by setting simulta­
neously the levels of R&D expenditures and of production. Assume initially that there 
are no spillovers in research. Since R&D expenditures reduce production costs, each 
firm has an incentive to invest in such cost reduction, the incentive increasing with the 
elasticity of cost reduction with respect to R&D. This marginal benefit to the firm due 
to research expenditures is given by -C'x, and is positive.
Assume now that the firm perceives strategic considerations beyond simple cost 
minimisation. These strategic considerations arise from the fact that decisions on the
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level of expenditures in R&D precede decisions on output levels. Given that R&D costs 
are fixed costs, by investing in R&D firms can reduce their marginal costs in the later 
(production) stage of the game and thereby gain an advantage. Compared to the simple 
cost minimisation of the Cournot case therefore, the cost-reducing incentive to spend in 
research is enhanced in this case and in addition to -Cjr the marginal benefit to a firm 
of R&D investment is increased by EjqJXf. Given that both Ej and qi{ are negative (a 
decrease in a rival's output increases a firm’s earnings; an increase in own R&D shifts 
out a firm’s reaction function and reduces the output of the rival), the total marginal 
benefit due to R&D investment is positive and exceeds that in the Cournot case. Each 
firm ends up spending more on R&D than they would if they were cost-minimisers.
It should be noted here that given the assumption of perfect symmetry and 
simultaneous moves, in equilibrium no firm actually enjoys the advantage that 
motivated the strategic behaviour in the first place: we have a classic Prisoner’s 
dilemma17. The strategic equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that leaves each firm worse 
off relative to the simple Cournot rule, though still better off than if it had chosen to 
invest on R&D so as to minimise costs, while its rival was acting in a strategic manner.
Looking now again at the Cournot case, assume that research is not entirely 
appropriable by the firm that generates it. Furthermore, assume initially that the 
research of each firm is a perfect substitute to the research of its rival that comes into 
the public domain. In a symmetric equilibrium, the original benefit of R&D investment 
is now less than in the case where basic research was fully appropriable (ie 
—Cj’9m° > -C j’9>0). This is because the firm knows that by benefiting from its rival’s
17 In recognizing the Prisoner’s dilemma nature of the strategic equilibrium, Brander and 
Spencer also note that the firm’s suboptimal behaviour is reinforced by the "once and for all" 
aspect of rivalry through R&D. In a  repeated game, an incentive to collude and move to the 
joint optimum might develop in time.
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research through the existence of spillovers it can minimise production costs by 
spending less on R&D than before. In equilibrium therefore, each firm ends up 
spending less on R&D than they would have done if that were perfectly appropriable.
If, rather than being perfect substitutes, the research of each firm was a poor 
substitute (or a "complement1') to its rival’s research, the effects of inappropriability can 
be reversed. Here, the knowledge that a rivals’ effort in R&D increases a firm’s 
knowledge pool (and thereby decreases its production costs) can intensify the firm’s 
own efforts in research. The marginal benefit of R&D expenditures in the presence of 
spillovers then exceeds that with full appropriability of R&D (ie -C ‘’6m0 < -C",e>0). 
Rather than acting as a disincentive, the existence of inappropriability in R&D in this 
situation can therefore enhance the incentive to invest in this type of cost reduction.
How do these incentives and disincentives due to spillovers in the Cournot 
environment translate in the strategic case? In the strategic case with no spillovers, 
R&D affected profits in two ways: in a direct way, since R&D reduces marginal 
production costs and therefore increases profits (by Ej); and in an indirect way, since 
R&D reduces a rival’s production in a later stage and therefore increases again the 
firm’s profits (by E-). Now consider spillovers. In the strategic case, they also have 
two ways of affecting profits. The first is direct and is common to both the Cournot and 
strategic setups. Spillovers reduce a firm’s costs because they make available to it part 
of the R&D expenditures of its rival.
There is however also an indirect route as well, present only when strategic 
considerations guide firm behaviour. In the strategic case, a firm perceives (and can act 
upon the fact that) its own R&D expenditures enter as arguments in the marginal cost 
function of its rival. Given the spillovers, higher R&D expenditures on its part increase 
its rival’s knowledge pool, reduce its marginal production cost and expand its output.
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This results in lower profits for the firm originating the R&D. This indirect effect of 
spillovers runs counter to the indirect effect due to the strategic nature of the 
environment. The strategic effect says that higher R&D shifts out a firm’s reaction 
function, reduces the rival’s output and increases the firm’s profits; the spillover effect 
says that higher R&D increases the rival’s output (by reducing its production costs and 
shifting out its reaction function) and reduces the firm’s profit. The question of which 
effect dominates depends in large part on the assumptions about the technology.
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III. An explicit solution to a two-stage model with n symmetric firms
In order to make the comparisons between the strategic and the Cournot cases with 
and without spillovers more concrete, we solve in the strategic case explicitly for the 
levels of R&D and output in a two-stage model. The three-stage framework developed 
above in general form is collapsed here into two stages by assuming that R&D is 
homogeneous, so that there is no distinction between basic and development research 
expenditures. In the first stage each firm chooses its total R&D investment x-t ;in the 
second stage, with R&D levels already determined and known, each firm chooses its 
production level q'. We assume that spillovers operate on the entire R&D outlays. This 
simplifying assumption is at the expense of being able to look at changes in the 
composition of R&D relative to changes in appropriability conditions; it does however 
make the model more tractable and allows explicit solutions to be derived for the case 
where the industry is composed of n firms, rather than looking only at the duopoly case.
Solving recursively, at the second stage each firm chooses its production level q, 
so as to maximise its profit II' = + ^ ) — c‘J^' —x'. We assume that the demand
function is of the iso-elastic form P = oQ~*. In symmetry, the resulting equilibrium 
output is a function of the firm’s and its rivals’ cost functions and is given by:
'Lc' - c ‘(n -E)J
e^S c j +m
a. Perfect substitution In the knowledge production function
In the first stage, in order to get explicit solutions, we need to assume a particular 
functional form for the cost function. As before, we will derive solutions based on two 
■such parameterizations. In the first, we assume that the part of the research of a firm’s
(4.27) q l = [<j(n -  e)]1/£
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rivals that spills out is a perfect substitute for the firm’s own research. The resulting 
knowledge production function Rs that is specific to the firm enters into its production 
cost function with an iso-elastic form, the elasticity given by a. We therefore have:
(4.28) /?,.=*,+ e X x y and c' =
Under this parameterization of the cost and knowledge production functions, we 
can explicitly solve for the equilibrium level of R&D in the strategic case with positive 
spillovers. Let this be represented by x ^ ° .  It is given by:
(4.29) 4 ->0 = [[y g (a /n )e(l -e /n ) ]" ^  + +e)g ] (1/x-)
where A = e -  a (l -  e) and K  = 1 + Q(n -1 ).
We can now compare the equilibrium level of firm R&D expenditures in the 
strategic case under the presence of spillovers with that in the absence of spillovers 
(*sr"0)» ^  well as with the same equilibria in the Cournot model (denoted x 8>0 and jc®“° 
respectively). It is first easy to establish that x 8>0 < x®"°. In the Coumot equilibrium 
each firm spends less on R&D under the presence of spillovers than with full appropri­
ability 18. It is also easy to establish that in the situation where spillovers are absent, 
xsr° > x*-°. The strategic equilibrium will involve higher R&D investment than the
18 The equilibrium characteristics when firms are Cournot oligopolists were examined 
extensively in chapters two and three of the thesis in the context of a  model that distinguished 
between (fully appropriable) development research and (partially appropriable) basic research. 
In the context of the model in this chapter, where R&D is homogeneous, the Coumot model 
consists of firms choosing simultaneously R&D and production levels so as to maximise profits. 
The resulting equilibrium level of firm R&D expenditures when som e of R&D is not appropriable 
is given by *®>0= [pt' 1o(a//i)e(l - e/n)]M {UK). For 0= 0, K *\ and the solution is identical to that 
derived in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) for the case with no spillovers.
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Coumot equilibrium. This is an extension to the n-firm oligopoly of the duopoly result 
by Brander and Spencer (1983a) for the case where the knowledge production function 
and the corresponding cost function are given by (4.28) 19.
We turn next to the impact of spillovers on the equilibrium level of R&D in the 
strategic case. This involves the comparison of x ^ 0 with x%f°. From (4.29) we have:
(4.30)
57 57 L 2 n (n -e )-2 /i + 1 +e J
Since (1/K)<1 and A>0 (by the second-order conditions for a maximum), it is 
sufficient for the term in brackets in (4.30) to be less than one for spillovers to lead to 
lower R&D in equilibrium in the strategic case. It can be checked that this is the case 
for rt > (1 + e)/2. Since n > £, this latter condition is satisfied, so that x^>0 < x%f° 20.
19 Setting 0=0, we can see  from (4.28) and from the footnote above that
Forjcs f0> xcm0 it is necessary and sufficient for the term in brackets
to be less than one. Upon manipulation, this reduces to the requirement th a t« > 1+e. While 
however from first-order conditions n > e is satisfied for any positive level of output, the condition 
n > 1+e is more restrictive. In particular, when n=2, it implies that x ^ ° > X c ‘ ° only when demand
is elastic (l/e> 1 or e< 1). As the number of firms increases, the condition is less restrictive; for 
n=4, for example, the condition is e<  3, ie that the demand elasticity exceed 0.33. The 
comparison therefore of the equilibrium level of R&D expenditures in the strategic model with 
that in the Cournot model, when cost and demand functions have isoelastic forms, is sensitive 
to the assum ed demand elasticity. This is problematic in the sense  that it has no clear intuitive 
explanation; furthermore, it limits the generality of the results claimed by Brander and Spencer 
(1983a and 1983b). This criticism is also made elsewhere in the literature. In a  recent paper 
Collie and de Meza (1986) have demonstrated "some unappealing implications of strategic 
models" in the context of a  discussion of the strategic rationale for export subsidies; namely that 
for reasonable functional forms the results of such models (in their paper the case  for export 
subsidies) rests on the elasticity of demand being greater than one. The purpose of this chapter 
however is to re-examine the implications of strategic models when R&D is not fully 
appropriable. We will therefore confine ourselves to the cases that satisfy the condition 
n > 1+e, so that when research is fully appropriable, we have x$f°>Xc^°-
90 Since (1/K)<1, x&° < x$f° if [ L A,gebraic manipulation however reduces this
to n > (1+e)/2. For n>2 this latter condition is satisfied since for positive levels of output n > e by 
the first-order conditions of the last stage of the game. QED.
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The comparison of the equilibrium levels of R&D in the strategic and the Coumot
x»>0. With R&D fully appropriable, we obtained x$f° > jt®"°. Strategic considerations 
led to higher equilibrium levels in R&D than when firms were simply concerned with 
cost minimisation. In this case, with externalities in R&D:
Once more the result rests on whether the term in brackets is greater or less than 
one. This time however, the answer depends on the extent of inappropriability 
assumed. Simple algebraic manipulation yields that x ^ 0 > x®>0 for 
0 < (n -  e - 1)/(2n -  e -1 )  and x& 0 < x*>0 for 0 > (n -  e - 1)/(2n -  e -1 ). With low 
spillovers, the strategic effect whereby high R&D expenditures in the first stage benefit 
the firm by placing it in a comparative advantage in the second (production) stage of the 
game outweighs the disincentive effect of inappropriability (due to the fact that the 
same level of cost reduction can be achieved with lower R&D than before). At low 
levels of appropriability however (high spillover rates), a given level of cost reduction 
can be achieved with a relatively much lower level of R&D expenditures, while the 
strategic aspect loses its power in that aggressive R&D investments now have a large 
(beneficial) impact on rivals. R&D externalities therefore reverse the result obtained in 
the situation where research is fully appropriable 21.
Finally, in order to be able to rank the R&D levels in the four possible equilibria 
(Coumot and strategic, with and without spillovers), we need to compare x&° with
21 As an example, for slightly elastic demand (e=0.8), x ^ ° > x £>0 as long as  6<  0.10 (for a
duopoly) or 9 < 0.43 for an industry composed of 8 firms. The thresholds vary little as  we 
change the elasticity of demand. For appropriability levels that exceed 50% therefore, basic 
research expenditures in the strategic case fall short of those In the Coumot case.
models when part of R&D is subject to spillovers concerns the comparison of x ^ °  with
(4.31)
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x *~°- From the above it can be established that in general x^ °  < x£m0> except at very
low spillover rates, where the reverse is possible 22. We can therefore conclude that at
very low spillover rates, x&° > x&° > x c~ °  >  x c >0- At low spillover rates,
xsr° > xc~° > xsr° > x *c>0, while at moderate and high spillover rates
x s r °  >  x c “ ° > x c > 0 >  xs r °  will hold. The threshold levels of appropriability that
determine the ranking depend on the concentration in the industry, the price elasticity of
demand and on the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to R&D.
In a similar fashion, we can compare the levels of production at the four equilibria, 
as well as the profitability of the industry. On the basis of (4.29), we can derive from
(4.27) the industry-wide equilibrium level of production in the strategic model when 
R&D is subject to spillovers, ie we can compute Qst° as:
<4.32,
The equilibrium level of production in the strategic case when spillovers are 
absent (Qlf°) can be deduced from the above expression by setting K= 1. Similarly the 
level of production in the Coumot model when spillovers are positive is given by 
Qc>0 = (x®>0)1+a(/i/otp)i^1+a, while for fully appropriable R&D it is given by 
Qc~° = (x°’ T a(nla$) (which is the level of industry production in the Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz 1980a model).
22 x!r>0= jc®={ ^ ("~eH^ * (1+E)*]eM (1 I K ) .  We saw that [ - ]  < 1 where
0 > (rt -  e - 1)/(2n -  e -1). We can therefore have *£->0 > x i=0 only If 0 < (n -  e -  l)/(2n -  e- 1) and if
in addition [ (1/AT) > 1 . As an example, for e =0.8, a = 0. l  and 4, the threshold
of inappropriabilty beyond which we have ^ >0> ^ c“° is a  spillover rate around 0 = 0.10. For 
rates above 10%, in this specific example, x ^ ° < x i=0 holds.
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We can now proceed to obtain a ranking between these four equilibrium 
production levels. Within each model, the impact of spillovers is different. It can be 
immediately established that Q * >0 =  f i c " °  23 . As was explained at length in chapter two, 
in the simple Coumot model, and with a cost function such as the one given by (4.28), 
the reduction in R&D induced by spillovers exactly matches the R&D that becomes 
available to the firm from its competitors. This implies that marginal production costs 
do not change as a result of the inappropriability of R&D (c®>0 = c®"°) and neither do 
production levels. In contrast, in the strategic case we have that Q & °  <  Q s r °  24 • The 
reduction in R&D expenditures due to spillovers leaves firm marginal production costs 
higher than in the case where R&D is fully appropriable (ie c ^ °  > c%f°); with a 
downward sloping demand curve, production suffers as a result.
Comparing across the two models, in the situation where R&D is fully 
appropriable, we have that > Q%m0 25. This is the result of Brander and Spencer. 
Compared with the Coumot case, in the strategic case firms have an additional incentive 
to spend on R&D. As a result their marginal production costs are lower and industry 
output is higher. When spillovers exist, the result mirrors that for R&D expenditures 
obtained above. For low spillovers (ie 0 < (n -  £ —1)/(2 n - £ - 1 ) )  we have that 
Q s r °  >  Q c >0 while for high spillovers (ie 0 > (n — e -  l)/(2n -  e - 1)) we have that
23 Qc>0 =  (x*>0)'+a(n/ap)K1+« =  (.*£=0) 1+> / a P ) =  ( 2 c =0-
8 4  /~ ) 8 > 0  _  / r Q > 0 \ l + a  " I* H (w -E ) l y i + q  , e  = <Kl+«f 2 " ( " - e - * )  + ( l+ e )* ~l A »  r  w(n -e ) 1
\lsr \XST ) apL 2n(n-e-JT) + ( l +E)JC J '■ & ' L 2n(n-e)-2n+ 1+e J apL 2n(n-e-4T) + (l+e)JT J
= C&={ ]**• Since the term in parentheses is less than one, we have Q & °<  Q&°.
25 n # = 0 - / ' r e = ^ ,+ otrM/r¥ft'\r "(” ~ e) 1 / v e= (K l+ «r  2 " (" -e -l)+ ( l+ e )]e(1+«y4 R f  1 _
Qsr v^5T / (# l / a P ) L a .O .- e - l ) + ( l+ f lJ ” W  )  L „(n-e) J (»/0tp)L - e _ l ) + ( t +e)J ”
__ g e , < j  Since the term in parentheses is greater than one, we have > q £~°.
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Qsr° < Qc>0 26' was established earlier that with low spillovers, x *f° > x®>0: the
strategic effect outweighs the disincentive effect of inappropriability. This leads to a 
lower level of production costs in the strategic case ( c ^ 0 < c®>0) and to higher industry 
production. At low levels of appropriability however (high spillover rates), we 
established that x ^ °  < jtc>0. R&D externalities reversed the result obtained in the 
situation where research is fully appropriable. This implies that marginal costs are now 
higher in the strategic case ( c ^ 0 > c®>0) and as a result industry output is lower.
A full ranking of the four industry output equilibria therefore is as follows. For 
low spillover rates (ie for 0 < (n -  e - 1)/(2n -  £ - 1)) we have 
Qsr° > Qst° > Qc>0 = Qc~°- For moderate and high spillover rates (ie for 
0 > (rt -  e -  l)f(2n -  £ - 1)), the ranking becomes instead > Qc>0 = Qc~° > Qsr°•
We now turn to the examination of firm profitability in the two models in the 
situation where R&D is fully appropriable and where it is instead characterised by 
spillovers. In each case, we can express individual firm profit as a function of R&D 
expenditures. In the strategic case with spillovers, profit in equilibrium is given by 27:
(4.33) where
*• A)9>o_/'ye><Ki+«_^ r "("-«) lffri+a- rve>°vH2"("-e-jr>+<i+c>jri * "<"-*> l _
VJ5T V\ST )  e$L 2n(n —e—JT)+(1 +t)K _T^ '  L n(n-e) J  apL 2h(h -e-JT) + (l J
= Qc>([  +e)K ]**. The term in parentheses is greater than one for
6 < (n - e -  iy(2n - e - 1); we therefore have Q ^ °  > Gc>0 for 0 < (« -  e-1)/(2n -  e - 1) and 
< Qc>0 for 0 < (« -  e-l)/(2n -  e - 1).
27 From the preceding discussion we have that S = 2w(n_e" ^ )(1+e)jf > 1 when
0 > (n - e-1)/(2« - e - 1) and 5 < 1 when 0 < (n - e-1)/(2n - e - 1). Similarly, the equilibrium profit 
in the strategic case when spillovers are absent is given by l f f i° = ]  where
c _______W(n -e ) .
° “  2 fi(n -e -l)+ (l+ e ) ^
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In the Cournot case with spillovers, the equilibrium profit for the individual firm is 
given by n j >0 = Xc>0[Ke -  a(n -  e)]/[ot(n -  £)]. Since spillovers cause a reduction in 
R&D expenditures while leaving production costs, prices and output unchanged, profit 
with spillovers will exceed profit with full appropriability M: Il£>0 > n£”°. This result 
was discussed in detail in chapter two for the case where R&D is heterogeneous and 
where spillovers operate only on part of R&D (basic research).
In the strategic model, compared with the situation of full appropriability of R&D, 
spillovers lead to lower R&D expenditures, higher production costs, and thereby lower 
output and higher prices. With an inelastic demand, net revenues gross of R&D 
expenditures (Pq-cq) rise and so do profits relative to the case with full appropriability. 
Profits are also higher even if demand is elastic: the fall in R&D expenditures 
outweighs the fall in net operating revenues and 0 > I l j f019.
In the comparison of profitability across models, when R&D is fully appropriable, 
firms in an industry of Cournot oligopolists earn higher profits than firms that operate in 
industries where strategic considerations guide behaviour (n j“° > f ljf  °)30• When R&D 
is characterised by spillovers however, strategic behaviour can result in higher profits 
per firm than simple cost minimisation if appropriability is sufficiently low ie if
”  n r - n t f  £ 3 3 1  Since K> 1, the term In 
parentheses is greater than one, so that n£>0 > n£=0.
29 n ^ ° =*£?■{ ~ ^ y e)] = n£ r{  ] (& $ fA (lIK) where 8 and 8 are a s  defined above. While
(S/S)6"1 (1 IK) < l, the first term in brackets as well as the entire term multiplying n ^ °  exceeds 
one, so that n ^ >0 > n ^ ° .
30 n ^ ° = ( 1 / 8 ) ^  where 8 is as defined above. We have however 
that [8e- a(/» - e)]/[e- a(/i - e)] < S®''4, so that n ^ ° < n j =0.
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spillovers are pervasive (0 > (n -  e -  l)/(2/i — e — 1))- In that case, we will have 
n ^ °  > Il£>0. If spillovers are limited (0 < (n -  £ -  l)/(2rt -  £ -1 )), profits per firm will 
be higher in the Cournot case ie Il£>0 > 11^° 31.
Finally, and in order to be able to rank the four profit equilibria, we compare the 
profits that each firm earns in equilibrium in the strategic case when there exist 
spillovers (11^°) with the equilibrium level of profits in the Cournot case when R&D is 
fully appropriable (Il£“0). We obtained earlier that for high spillovers, 11^° > n j >0. 
Since also n£>0 > n£”°, this implies that with low appropriability of R&D, 11^° > n®"°. 
In the case where R&D is highly appropriable (low spillovers), we established that 
Il£>0 > U ^°. For n j"°  > °, the threshold of appropriability is higher (ie the
spillover rate much lower) 32. We can therefore rank the four equilibria in the following 
manner: for high or moderate R&D spillovers, we have IlJ?0 > n£>0 > nj“° > njf °; for 
low spillovers Il£>0 > n ^ °  > n£"° > n^"°; and for a very high degree of appropriability 
of R&D (very low spillover rate) we have that n j >0 > n j “° > 11^ 0 > I l jf  °-
We summarise the main results from the comparison of the strategic with the 
Cournot model when R&D is subject to spillovers and when the R&D production 
function and the associated marginal cost function are given by (4.28) — ie where own 
and borrowed R&D are perfect substitutes — in the following proposition:
"  I&>0 = * £ •( te^ V B] = n H  » : * ; : « ] (l/ST1 ■ 8 < lw h e n e < ( n - e - iy ( 2 « - e - l ) .  In that case 
[Sate-a(n - e)]/[*e- a fr -  e)] < S"A, so that n j1>"< n*>0.
“ i£ >0=*£•{*$"%*] - n * " { ( 1/g)(1/8)M- Fori4>0>nJ-°, we need that&r> l.
Since K> 1, it is sufficient for 8 > 1 which is true when 0 > (/* -  e -  l)/(2« -  e - 1). Even however for 
8 < (/t - £  -  l)/(2rt - e  -1 )  (8< 1) it is possible for $K > 1 as long a s  spillovers are not too low or the 
industry too concentrated. Similarly, for n ^ °  < n£=0 we need that 8k  < 1, which requires as a
necessary condition that 8 < l (ie a  very low spillover rate in a  fragmented industry).
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Proposition 3: In a situation where the R&D production function and the
associated marginal cost function are given by (4.28), under perfect 
symmetry, at the strategic equilibrium with spillovers in R&D:
(i) each firm spends less on R&D
(ii) prices are higher
(iii) each firm earns more profit
than at the corresponding Cournot equilibrium with spillovers, 
provided the spillover rate is moderate or high ie for
0>(w -e -1 ) /(2 n -  e - 1).
b. CES knowledge production function
These results rest on a particular specification of the cost function, where the part
research. This assumption is unduly restrictive and may be responsible for the ranking 
obtained above. Instead we could allow the elasticity of substitution between a firm’s 
R&D and that of its rivals to vary, reflecting, among other things, the nature of the 
technology in question, the degree to which a technological field is cumulative or the 
ease of learning. In that situation we could have a knowledge production function of a 
CES form and an associated cost function such as:
Under this new parameterization of the cost and knowledge production functions, 
we can once again explicitly solve for the equilibrium level of R&D in the strategic case 
with positive spillovers x&°. It is given by:
of the research of a firm’s rivals that spills out is a perfect substitute for the firm’s own
(4.29’) x£°  = [Pe"‘a(<x/n)e(l -  e/m)]
f 2n (n - e -  K ,)+(1 + e)AT, T A£ -{ e p + a (l-e )] /p A
n(n -e )
where A = e-cx(l -£ ) and Kx = 1 + [0(w - 1)]-*.
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The same comparisons performed before can now be made with the CES 
knowledge production function. In the Cournot model, equilibrium R&D expenditures 
when R&D is fully appropriable is x£m0; with positive spillovers, it is x*>0 33. Unlike in 
the previous parameterization of the cost function, where jt®“° > x®>0, in this case this is 
true only if -[ep + a (l -  e)]/pA < 0. If the reverse holds, spillovers act as a spur to 
investment in R&D in the Cournot case 34. The relationship x$f° > jt®"° however for 
the case of fully appropriable R&D still holds. When spillovers are absent, the two 
parameterizations of the cost function collapse to the same form35.
Turning next to the impact of spillovers on the equilibrium level of R&D in the 
strategic case, we compare x ^ °  and x$f°. From (4.29’) we have that:
(4.30') 4 .>0= 4 r f  -n-(n-~ - ~-g |)  +-(1+t)K '
v [  2 n ( r t - e ) -2 n  + l + e  _ 1
It was established earlier that the term in brackets in (4.30’) (similar to the same 
term in (4.30)) is less than one. For spillovers to be associated with lower R&D in the 
strategic equilibrium therefore, a sufficient condition is for 2C1_{ep+a<1''e>1/pA < 1. Since 
KX>1 and A>0, this requirement reduces to -[ep + a (l -  £)] < 0. If instead
33 The equilibrium level of firm R&D expenditures in the Cournot model when som e of R&D is 
not appropriable and when the knowledge production function is as  in (4.28’) is given by
jt®>0 = [pe_1o(a//i)E(l -  E/n)]1Mj:1“Iep+*(1~e)1/pA. For 0 = 0, AC,=1 and the solution again reduces to that
derived in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) for the case  with no spillovers.
34 We will not dwell on the conditions for which spillovers can spur R&D investment, as  these 
have been covered exhaustively in chapter three of the thesis for the case  where R&D is 
composed of basic and of development research, with spillovers operating on the former only.
In brief, jc°=0<;t£>0 here in two cases: first, if own and borrowed R&D are not easily substitutable
with each other (p > 0 or sxx = 1/(1+p) < 1), as long as ep+ X(l -  e) < 0. This implies an inelastic
demand (e > 1) and a  > -ep/(l -  e) or equivalently that 0 < p < a (e -  l)/e. Secondly, if own and 
borrowed R&D are easily substitutable with each other (p < 0 or sxx - 1/(1 +p) > 1), as long as 
ep+ X(1 -  e) > 0. This implies an elastic demand (e < 1) and is true for 0 > p > a(e -  l)/e.
38 Once more, this is under the assumption that the condition n > 1+e holds.
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-[ep + cc(l -  e)] > 0 and in addition the spillover rate is high so that ^ep+on-oypA »  it 
is possible for inappropriability in R&D to act as an incentive to equilibrium R&D 
expenditures in the strategic model, just as it could in the Cournot case. The range of 
parameters however for which this is possible is more restricted in the situation where 
firms use R&D for strategic purposes than when it is used for cost-minimisation only.
Under the parameterization given in (4.28*), we can also compare the equilibrium 
levels of R&D in the strategic and the Coumot models when part of R&D is subject to 
spillovers ie x&° and x%>0. With R&D fully appropriable, we obtained under both 
parameterizations of the R&D production function that x ^ 0 > x*"0. Strategic consider­
ations lead to higher equilibrium levels in R&D compared with the case where firms are 
simply concerned with cost minimisation. With externalities in R&D, and an R&D 
production function given by (4.38’):
Once more the result rests on whether the term in brackets is greater or less than 
one. This time however, the answer depends on the combination of two factors: the 
extent of inappropriability and the ease of substitutability between a firm’s R&D and 
that of its rivals. Simple algebraic manipulation yields that for the term in brackets to 
exceed unity (giving x ^ 0 > x®>0), the relationship 
0^  < (n -  l )1+p (n - 1)/(2n -  e — 1) needs to hold36. Conversely, for 
9~p>(n -  l)1+p (n -  £ - 1)/(2n -  e -1 ), we have that x ^ °  < x ®>0.
M For 0-p< ( n -  l),+p(n - e -  l)/(2/i - e -1 ), we distinguish two cases. When p >0, the requirement 
is for the spillover rate to exceed (n - 1)-0+pyp [(« -  e - 1)/(2« -  e -  l ) f 1/p. When p < 0, the 
requirement is that 9 < ( n -  l)~°+p)/p [(n -  e -  l)/(2n -  e -  l)]_1/p. The reverse holds for 
0-p> (n -  l),+p(« - e -  l ) / ( 2 n - e - 1).
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Graphs 1 and 2 below illustrate these relationships. They show the threshold 
spillover rates that determine whether firms spend more on R&D at the strategic or the 
Cournot equilibrium. These thresholds depend on three variables: the elasticity of 
substitution between a firm’s own R&D and that part of its rivals’ R&D that becomes 
public the number of firms in the industry n\ and the elasticity of demand 1/e. In 
the graphs the threshold spillover rates are plotted on the y-axis, and the number of 
firms in the industry on the x-axis. The relationship between n and 0 is then drawn for 
different values of the elasticity of substitution between research inputs, while assuming 
throughout that the demand for the product is slightly elastic (£ = 0.8).
The first graph is drawn under the assumption that own and rivals’ R&D are easily 
substitutable with each other (p < 0 or sxx = 1/(1 + p) > 1). The four lines represent four 
values of p: -0.1, -0.5, -0.7 and -0.9, giving elasticities of substitution of 1.11,2, 3.33 
and 10 respectively. The area to the right and below each line then shows the 
combinations of n and 0 for which x& 0 > Xc>0. For areas to the left and above the lines 
we have x&° <*c>0. For given n, as spillovers increase we tend to pass from a situation 
where x ^ 0 > x*>0 to one where x ^ °  < x®>0. Alternatively, for a given spillover rate, as 
the market becomes more fragmented, we pass from a situation where x ^ °  < jc®>0 to 
one where x ^ °  > Jt®>0. Graph 2 is drawn for the case where own and rivals’ R&D are 
not easily substitutable with each other (p > 0 or sxx -  1/(1 + p) < 1), and in particular for 
p equal to 0.1,0.9, 3 and 10, giving elasticities of substitution of 0.9,0.52,0.25 and 
0.09 respectively. As n increases (for given 0) — and as 0 increases (for given n) — we 
move from a situation where x ^ °  <x*>0 to one where x&° > x£>0 37.
97 For p =-0.9 (ie own and rival R&D almost perfect substitutes), x j>0< jt?>0 for any 6>0.07 in a  
duopoly and G>0.35 in an industry with four firms. For p =0.1, x£r>0<x£>0 for any 9<1 in a  
duopoly; in contrast when n=4, x ^ 0 > *®>0 for any 8>0.17. Finally, at the other end of the 
spectrum, for 8=10, when n=2 x ^ °  < jc®>0 for any 9 < 1, while for n»4, this is only true for 9<0.37.
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The explanation of these patterns runs along the following lines. In the situation 
where it is relatively easy to substitute between one’s own R&D and the part of rivals’ 
R&D that has become public, as spillover rates increase, the strategic effect loses its 
power. The strategic effect implies that high R&D expenditures in the first stage benefit 
the firm by placing it in a comparative advantage in the second (production) stage of the 
game. With high spillovers however, this effect is swamped by the disincentive effect 
of inappropriability, due to the fact that firms now realise that rivals benefit greatly from 
their own R&D expenditures and that they can achieve the same comparative level of 
cost reduction with lower R&D than before. Furthermore, the more concentrated the 
industry is, the stronger is the logic of this argument and the lower the threshold level of 
the spillover rate beyond which the strategic firm will cut back its R&D outlays to 
levels below those dictated by cost-minimising behaviour. This is in fact true 
irrespective of the value of the elasticity of substitution variable.
In the opposite case, the elasticity of substitution of own R&D with that of rivals’ 
is low; put differently, the public part of a firm’s own R&D raises significantly the 
marginal productivity of the research of its rivals. The situation is now more 
complicated. When spillovers are limited, the strategic equilibrium involves firms 
spending less on R&D than in the Cournot equilibrium. As spillovers become more 
widespread, however, a given level of R&D expenditures by one firm induces its rivals 
to also increase their R&D outlays. The strategic aspect then regains its power, in the 
sense that the firm is now obliged to spend more on R&D in order to counter the 
increased spending by rivals. The relative value of "commitment", in the sense of 
committing resources to investment in own R&D, increases with the spillover rate, so 
that it pays again to act strategically by spending more on R&D than would be
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necessary for simple cost-minimisation.
In addition to the comparison of R&D expenditures, when the R&D production 
function is given by (4.28’) we can also compare production and profitability levels at 
the four equilibria. Using (4.29’), we derive from (4.27) a new industry-wide 
equilibrium level of production in the strategic model when R&D is subject to 
spillovers, ie we compute Q&0 as:
—alp
When spillovers are absent, the level of industry production in the strategic 
equilibrium (j2sr"°) can be deduced from the above expression by setting Kf*l. 
Similarly industry production in the Cournot equilibrium with spillovers is given by 
Qc>0 = (x®>0)1+a(n/ap)^r1l“a/p, while for fully appropriable R&D it is given by
Cc’ ° = (*rV+VaP).
Under the present parameterization of the knowledge production function, in the 
Cournot model, equilibrium industry production when part of R&D is not appropriable 
exceeds the equilibrium level under fully appropriable R&D when own and rivals’ 
R&D are easily substitutable with each other (p < 0). When it is not easy to substitute 
(p > 0), we have instead that Q*>0 < fic"° 38-
The explanation of this result can be traced to the effect of spillovers on the 
cost-reducing knowledge generated by R&D expenditures that is available to each firm 
in equilibrium when the knowledge production function is given by (4.28’). In this 
case, the total effective knowledge related to R&D expenditures that the firm has access
38 Qc>0 -  Q^‘ ° K ^ +pVpA. Since A>0 and K > 1, for p < 0 (ie sxx = 1/(1+p) > 1) we have that 
Qc>0 > Qc~°- For p > 0 (ie sxx = 1/(1+p) < l) we have instead that Qc>0 < Q lm0.
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to depends on its own R&D expenditures, and on that part its rivals’ R&D expenditures 
that is in the public domain. When however the R&D of a firm’s rivals cannot be easily 
substituted for its own, in the symmetric equilibrium total research knowledge when 
R&D is subject to spillovers falls short of that same knowledge when spillovers are 
absent ie R*>0 <Rc~° 39• Marginal production cost is in that case higher, resulting (with 
a downward-sloping demand curve) in a lower level of industry output in equilibrium 
than in the situation where R&D is fully appropriable.
In the strategic case, the comparison of equilibrium levels of industry production 
with and without spillovers is less straightforward. In addition to the effect due to the 
conditions of substitutability between own and rivals’ R&D, the difference between the 
two equilibrium production levels will also depend on the interaction effect, due to the 
strategic behaviour of firms. Thus, for a low degree of substitutability of R&D (p > 0), 
the equilibrium production level with spillovers falls short of the same level when 
spillovers are absent. If however own and rivals’ R&D are easily substitutable (p < 0), 
the result is not necessarily reversed as in the Cournot case40. For a given (high) degree 
of substitutability however, the R&D-related knowledge available to a firm in a 
symmetric strategic equilibrium with spillovers is more likely to exceed the level of 
knowledge associated with full R&D appropriability if the industry is fragmented and/or 
if the spillover rate is high. In such a situation, marginal production costs are lower and 
industry production is higher than in the case with no spillovers.
*• Rc>0=R c~°K ^+(>V(>A. For p < 0 (ie sxx =  1/(1+p) > 1) we have that /?">0 > R^°- For p > 0 (ie 
sxx = 1/(1+p) < l) we have instead that J?c>0 < ^ c =°
40 Q lr°= Q lf0K ^ ^ { h l h f A. Since 5 < 5, for p > 0 (ie = 1/(1+p) < 1) we have that Ql?° < Q lf°. 
For p < 0 however (ie sxx = 1/(1+p) > 1) we only have that Qc>0 > Q*~° if isr1"*l+py,v‘(8/8)0,M > 1. For a  
given p < 0, this is more likely for high n and/or high 0.
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Comparing across models, the relationship between industry production in the
R&D expenditures. In order therefore to avoid unnecessary duplication, we simply note 
that Q!r>°>Qc><' for O'* < (n -  l)1+p (n -  e -  l)/(2n -  e -1 )  and Gct° < Qc>0 for 
0“p>(« -  l)'*p(n —£—l)l(2n - e — 1). These conditions are satisfied for particular 
combinations of the spillover rate, the number of firms in the industry, the elasticity of 
demand for the product and the elasticity of substitution between a firm’s own R&D 
and that of its rivals41.
We turn finally to the examination of firm profitability in the two models in the 
situation where the knowledge production function is given by (4.28’). Individual firm 
profit can be expressed as a function of R&D expenditures. In the strategic case with 
spillovers, profit in equilibrium is given by:
In the Cournot case with spillovers, the equilibrium profit for the individual firm is 
given by IlJ>0 = jc®>0[8/sr,E -  a (n -  e)]/[oc(/i -  e)]. In the case where own and rival R&D 
were prefect substitutes, spillovers led to higher profits since they caused a reduction in 
R&D expenditures while leaving production costs, prices and output unchanged. In this 
case however, we have seen that spillovers may lead to higher or lower R&D 
expenditures and production and consequently to higher or lower profits than in the case
41 Cot0 = C r ° d / S r .  We therefore have that (&>0 > Q% >0 for 0 ^ < ( n - 1 ) 1 +p( / i - e - 1)1 {In -  e  - 1) 
and Q$r>0 < Cc>0 f°r O-9 > (n - 1)1 +p( n - e - 1)/(2n -  e - 1). See  footnotes 36 and 37 above.
symmetric strategic equilibrium with spillovers {Qsr°) and that in the symmetric 
Cournot equilibrium with spillovers (Qsr°) is along the same lines as the comparison of
where 8 = 2n(n - e - x , ) + ( l  +e)X|
n(n - e )
196
where R&D was fully appropriable42. Profit with spillovers can be lower than profit 
with full appropriability (ie Il£>0 < n j “°) if for example demand is elastic (e < 1) and it 
is relatively difficult to substitute one’s own R&D with the R&D of rivals (p > 0). In 
that situation, in an environment characterised with spillovers, revenue P(Q)q and R&D 
expenditures are less while production costs c(R)q are more than in the case where 
spillovers are absent. Despite the lower R&D expenditures, spillovers can in this 
situation lead to lower profits compared with a situation of full appropriability. This 
result was discussed in detail in chapter three for the case where R&D is heterogeneous 
and where spillovers operate only on part of R&D (basic research).
Similar conditions apply in the strategic model. Here, the comparison of profit­
ability in the case where R&D is subject to spillovers with the case where it is fully 
appropriable is more complicated because of the existence of the interaction effect due 
to strategic behaviour. We have already seen that compared with the situation of full 
appropriability of R&D, spillovers can in this case lead to lower or higher R&D 
expenditures and production costs, and thereby lower or higher output and prices 43.
42
the term in parentheses is greater than one. For n£>0 > n£ '° therefore, it is sufficient for 
K?*1 "c)(1+pv,vi > 1. This is the case when p > 0 and e > l and when p < 0 and e < 1. For 
r£ >0 < n j ”0, on the other hand, it is necessary that p < 0 and e > l or p > 0 and e < 1 (giving
+Py p 4 <  j )  a n d  jn  a d ( j i t j0 n  t h a t F / ^ ^ W e a w <  L
1 ' L -E) J 1
43 r&>°=*«.>{ c<n e)l = n £ f{  ^  q("~E)] where 5 and 5 are as  defined above.
I  ot(n — c) J  L oe~a(rt -e) J
Of the terms in the right-hand-side, the first term in parentheses is greater than one, while 
(5/5/s:,)^ < l. ~typA > 1 for p > 0 and e > l or for p < 0 and e < 1 and ~typA < 1 for p > 0 and
e < 1 or for p < 0 and e > 1. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition therefore for n ^ °  < n ^ °  is 
that p > 0 and e < 1 or that p < 0 and e > 1.
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The effect on profits then depends not only on the direction, but also on the magnitude 
of the effect of spillovers on revenues and on marginal and fixed costs. These latter 
effects, meanwhile, are made more complex by the strategies that firms are pursuing.
The effect of spillovers in the strategic and in the Cournot models is therefore 
along similar lines. Under certain assumptions about elasticities, spillovers can lead to 
lower profits compared with a situation of full R&D appropriability. The difference of 
the two modes of behaviour comes out in the range of parameters that allow this result, 
and in particular the range of the spillover rate and the assumption about the number of 
firms operating in the industry. In order therefore to focus on the importance of 
behavioural assumptions on the impact of spillovers when the knowledge production 
function for each firm is given by (4.28’), we compare profitability across models when 
R&D is characterised by spillovers.
Comparing profitability across models, we have seen that when R&D is fully 
appropriable, firms in an industry of Cournot oligopolists earn higher profits than firms 
that operate in industries where behaviour is guided by strategic considerations (ie 
n£“° > n j f  °). When R&D is characterised by spillovers however, strategic behaviour 
can result in higher or lower profits per firm compared to simple cost minimisation in an 
environment of partially appropriable R&D 44. The conditions for which profitability is 
higher in the strategic or the Cournot case are analogous to the conditions in the case of
“  n r = tj|^ ° ] = n ^ { ] ( l / 8 f \  When 9 -*< (« - - e - 1)/(2« - e -  X)we
have that 8 < 1 and consequently that [ j  < Se,‘* giving n ^>0 < n j >0. Alternatively when
. _ r  fcr.c-ciCn-e) T •<
(T* > (n - 1)1+p(n - e - 1)/(2n - e - 1) we have that 8> l and consequently that [  J > 8
giving n ^ °  > n£>0. Footnotes 36 and 37 above discuss the ranges of 0 and n that satisfy the 
two conditions.
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R&D expenditures and of production which have been analysed above.
In short, for all three variables (R&D expenditures, production an profitability) the 
comparison of the Cournot and strategic outcomes with spillovers rests on whether O'1* 
exceeds or fall shorts of (rt - 1)1 +p (n -  e - 1)/(2rt -  e -1 ). If instead 
0“p < (n - 1)1+p(n - E -  l)l(2n - e -1 ), then in the symmetric strategic equilibrium with 
spillovers, equilibrium R&D expenditures and production are higher, while profits are 
lower than at the symmetric Cournot equilibrium with spillovers. Conversely, if 
(T* > (rt -  l)1+p (n - E - 1)/(2n — e -  1), the Cournot outcome will exhibit higher 
equilibrium R&D and production, and lower profits than the strategic case.
The main results from the comparison of the strategic with the Cournot model 
when R&D is subject to spillovers and when the R&D production function and the 
associated marginal cost function are given by (4.28’) — ie where the knowledge 
production function is given by a CES form — are summarised in the following 
proposition:
Proposition 4: In a situation where the R&D production function and the 
associated marginal cost function are given by (4.28’), under 
perfect symmetry, at the strategic equilibrium with spillovers in 
R&D:
(i) each firm spends less on R&D
(ii) prices are higher
(iii) each firm earns more profit
than at the corresponding Cournot equilibrium with spillovers, 
provided the spillover rate satisfies the condition
0~p> (« -  l)1+p(n - e  -1)/(2n - e -1 ).
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IV. C o n c lu s io n s
This chapter developed a framework in order to examine the implications of 
inappropriability of R&D in an oligopolistic environment where firms engage in 
strategic behaviour. This issue was approached from different angles, corresponding to 
different sets of questions. The first concerns the issue of how spillovers affect the 
incentives of firms to invest in R&D and the industry characteristics when firms act 
strategically in setting R&D and production levels; it therefore involves the examination 
of the equilibrium characteristics of a strategic model of competition through R&D 
when the degree of appropriability varies. The second set of questions concerns the 
issue of how strategic behaviour affects incentives and performance in an environment 
where R&D is not fully appropriable; this involves the comparison of two different 
equilibria: the Cournot equilibrium with spillovers and the strategic equilibrium with 
spillovers.
The simple schema below illustrates how the models developed in this and the two 
previous chapters of the dissertation fit into a framework that addresses the issues of 
inappropriability of R&D and strategic behaviour. In the first quadrant are situated 
models that examine the equilibrium and welfare characteristics of industries where 
R&D is fully appropriable and where firms are Cournot oligopolists, Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1980) is a prime example of this type of model. In the second quadrant are 
models that while still assuming R&D to be fully appropriable, interpret oligopolistic 
rivalry through R&D as being characterised by strategic considerations; in addition they 
compare the equilibrium characteristics of such strategic models with those of Cournot 
models ie they compare quadrants 1 and 2. Brander and Spencer’s (1983a and 1983b) 
multi-stage models fall into this category.
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Cournot Strategic
0 = 0
0>O
The models developed in chapters two and three of this thesis are situated in the 
third quadrant of the schema. They examine the equilibrium and welfare characteristics 
of industries where R&D is not fully appropriable and where firms are Cournot 
oligopolists. Each of the two chapters makes different assumptions about the way in 
which a firm’s own R&D combines with the public component of its rivals’ R&D: the 
resulting equilibria (sections a and b in quadrant 3 of the schema) have different 
characteristics. These equilibria are then compared to the Cournot equilibrium with no 
spillovers (ie to quadrant 1).
Chapter four develops a multi-stage (strategic) model of oligopolistic rivalry 
through non-appropriable R&D (quadrant four). Once more, the resulting equilibrium 
characteristics differ according to the assumptions made about the technology 
(quadrants 4a and 4b). These equilibria are compared in two dimensions: with the 
equilibrium in the strategic model with no spillovers (quadrant 2); and with the 
corresponding equilibria in the Cournot model with spillovers (ie sections 3a and 3b in 
quadrant 3).
1 2
3a 4a
3b 4b
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The main conclusions of this chapter are summarised below. They can all be 
traced to comparisons between quadrants in this simple schema.
The conclusions relate to the level of research and development investment, levels 
of output and profitability in oligopolistic industries composed of firms acting strate­
gically when the appropriability of R&D expenditures is imperfect. With perfect 
appropriability of R&D, firms perceiving strategic considerations beyond 
cost-minimisation invest more heavily in research than cost-minimising firms. The 
incentive for this deviation from cost-minimising (Cournot) behaviour lies in the nature 
of the game being played: by precommitting to a higher level of R&D in early stages, 
firms aim at reducing their marginal production costs and increasing their market share 
in the later stages.
With spillovers in R&D, these strategic considerations need to take into account 
the fact that a part of a firm’s R&D outlays indirectly benefits its competitors. This 
negative externality may outweigh the advantage that the firm seeks to achieve by 
precommitting to higher levels of R&D than would be necessary in order to minimise 
costs. The marginal benefit of conducting non-appropriable R&D can in that case 
exceed or fall short of the level implied by cost-minimising behaviour. The level of 
R&D investment in such industries composed of strategic firms will then depend on the 
degree of appropriability of R&D and on the assumptions about technology. It will 
depend in other words on the spillover rate and on how a firm’s their own R&D 
combines with that of their rivals to reduce production costs.
The implications of two alternative assumptions about technology were examined. 
Under the first, a firm’s R&D was taken to be a perfect substitute to that part of its 
rivals’ R&D that becomes public through the spillover rate. In that situation, the 
strategic model was found to exhibit some of the same characteristics as the Cournot
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model: under the presence of spillovers, firms invest less in R&D than when research is 
fully appropriable. Unlike the Cournot model however, where marginal costs, output 
and prices with and without spillovers are the same, when firms have strategic consider­
ations, lower R&D implies higher marginal costs, lower output and higher prices in the 
presence of spillovers than when research is fully appropriable. Under both Cournot 
and strategic behaviour however, profits are higher when spillovers are positive than 
when they are absent.
Comparing across models, strategic firms were found to invest more in research 
than Cournot firms only when the degree of appropriability is high (ie when spillovers 
are low). For moderate or high spillovers, the disincentive effect due to the negative 
externality associated with spillovers outweighs the strategic considerations: strategic 
firms are then characterised by lower levels of R&D expenditures than Cournot firms. 
The threshold spillover rate depends on the number of firms in the industry and on the 
elasticity of demand for the product and of cost reduction with respect to R&D.
Furthermore, under the assumption of perfect substitution about own and rival 
R&D, with low spillovers the strategic equilibrium will be characterised by higher 
output, lower prices and lower profitability for each firm than the Cournot equilibrium 
with spillovers. With moderate or high spillovers, the reverse is true: strategic firms 
will be producing less, facing higher prices and earning more profit than Cournot firms.
The other alternative assumption about the technology made was to postulate that 
a firm’s knowledge production function linking its own research expenditures with that 
part of its rivals’ research that becomes public is of a constant elasticity of substitution 
form. The substitutability of "own" and "borrowed" research can therefore in this case 
vary, reflecting, among other things, the nature of the technology in question, the degree 
to which a technological field is cumulative or the ease of learning.
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In the comparison of R&D outlays with and without spillovers within each model, 
it was established that both under Cournot and under strategic behaviour, spillovers 
could act as an incentive, rather than a disincentive, for R&D investments, unlike under 
the assumption of perfect substitutability of research across firms. In a situation for 
example where "own” and "borrowed" research are not easily substitutable with each 
other, both Cournot firms and strategic firms could end up spending more on R&D 
when its appropriability is low than when it is high.
While the reversal of the traditional disincentive result of spillovers is possible 
under both Cournot and strategic behaviour, a direct comparison between R&D outlays 
in the two models when research is not fully appropriable revealed important 
differences. As before, it was established that there is a threshold spillover rate which 
determines the comparison of equilibrium R&D outlays in the strategic model with 
those in the Cournot model. In this case however, in addition to depending on the 
number of firms in the industry, the elasticity of demand for the product and that of cost 
reduction with respect to R&D, the threshold of the spillover rate depended also on the 
ease of substitutability of research inputs among rival firms.
This additional variable produced a more complicated and richer analytical setup, 
with significant possibilities for firms behaving strategically of underinvesting relative 
to firms operating under Coumot rules both when substitutability of research inputs was 
easy and when it was difficult. It was established however that strategic firms had a 
tendency to move from a situation of higher R&D expenditures relative to the Coumot 
equilibrium to one of lower when substitutability of research inputs is easy and vice 
versa when it is difficult. In all cases, ceteris paribus, more concentrated industries 
tended to be characterised with lower R&D expenditures under strategic assumptions 
than under Coumot assumptions.
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The comparison of costs, production, prices and profit across the two models when 
research is subject to spillovers is along the same lines as the comparison of R&D 
outlays. The same values for the elasticity and industry structure variables that 
determine the threshold spillover rate and consequently the comparison between R&D 
outlays in the Coumot and strategic equilibria determine also output and profitability 
comparisons.
In this and the previous two chapters we have attempted to explore some of the 
issues relating to firms’ incentives, industry structure and public policy in oligopolistic 
structures where firms compete in R&D and output and where research cannot be fully 
appropriated by the firm(s) that originate it. The central conclusion that emerges is 
assumptions about the behaviour of firms and about the nature of their technology, as 
these are reflected respectively in the nature of the oligopolistic game being played and 
in the cost functions facing each firm, are crucial elements that determine the effect of 
inappropriability. This general conclusion is in line with a number of empirical investi­
gations of the impact of R&D spillovers that cast doubt on the simple results of many 
theoretical models that attempt to capture the effects of inappropriability.
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CHAPTER FIVE
INTERNATIONAL R&D SPILLOVERS 
AND PUBLIC POLICY
I. In troduction
Some of the most interesting applications of the type of framework presented in 
chapter four above are in the field of international trade and in particular with respect to 
public policy. Strategic behaviour arguments of the type discussed here are in effect 
often invoked for the justification of an actively interventionist approach to international 
trade in the form of R&D subsidies.
The framework of a multi-stage game of cost-reducing R&D and production can 
be readily adapted to look at the issue of public policy in international trade, as Brander 
and Spencer (1983b) have shown. They applied the results of their first model of 
strategic use of R&D (1983a) to the analysis of government intervention in oligopolistic 
international markets through export or R&D subsidies. By modelling government 
behaviour as the first-move in a multi-stage game (thus affecting the subsequent 
strategies of firms), their model examines the optimality and welfare implications of a 
number of different forms of government intervention in support of the R&D performed 
or of the exports of "national champions". R&D is assumed to be homogeneous and 
perfectly appropriable; the game that the domestic and the foreign firm play then 
consists of choosing R&D levels before output levels.
The introduction of public policy in the form of government taxes or subsidies 
alters the structure of the game. The government of each country is now a player who 
can make a move one period before firms choose their R&D levels. Assume first that 
the government of the domestic country, wishing to maximise the net rent accruing to 
the country (ie the profit to the domestic firm minus the cost of the public policy), 
makes a prior commitment to subsidise R&D. Brander and Spencer show that the 
introduction of such a third stage in the game, prior to the other two stages, affects the 
strategies and payoffs of the domestic and the foreign firm. A domestic R&D subsidy
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would in such a case increase domestic R&D while decreasing or increasing the R&D 
of the foreign firm (their Proposition 1). The optimal rate of such a subsidy would be 
positive (Proposition 2). Furthermore the resulting outcome is equivalent to that which 
would have come about in the game with no government intervention if the domestic 
firm was in the position of a leader in a leader-follower equilibrium at the stage where 
R&D levels are chosen.
The natural question that arises in this context is why the domestic firm cannot 
move to the leader-follower equilibrium by itself. Two possible interpretations are 
offered. The first is that in the absence of subsidies, the firm’s choice of R&D level is 
the one that maximises its profit within the context of the two-stage Nash equilibrium. 
Any different strategy entails the risk of lower profits. The subsidy on the other hand 
alters the perceived cost structure and thereby changes the set of actions that are 
consistent with the two-stage Nash equilibrium. Given that the firm cannot credibly 
subsidise itself, "the government does for the firm what the firm cannot do for itself1 \  
The case of European governments’ involvement in aerospace (Concorde, Airbus) is an 
often cited example in this respect. The second (less plausible) interpretation is that 
governments have a better knowledge of firm behaviour (ie that firms are naive) or 
alternatively that they has a different, and possibly incorrect, view of industrial structure 
to firms. Unlike in the previous interpretation, the stress here is on information 
asymmetries.
If, instead of only one government subsidising R&D, both simultaneously set 
R&D subsidies, the resulting noncooperative equilibrium will involve positive 
subsidies. Both countries are worse off since they earn less rent that they would if they 
could coordinate so as not to subsidise R&D, although the third —consuming— country
1 Brander and Spencer (1983b), p. 714.
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gains from the lower prices that result from higher production. The jointly optimal 
policy would therefore be to tax R&D, so as to offset the negative effect of own R&D 
on the other firm’s profit and revert to the Coumot equilibrium. This underlines the 
beggar-thy-neighbour nature of most such policy based on strategic arguments whereby 
each country gains at the expense of the other 2.
The nature of public policy in this setting is fundamentally different to that 
explored in chapters two and three. In those chapters it was implicit in the formulation 
of public policy that competition took place exclusively amongst domestic firms. 
Similarly, R&D spillovers benefited only the domestic rivals of any one domestic firm 
undertaking R&D. R&D subsidies in this context applied to all firms in the industry. 
The rationale was that in the absence of subsidies, firms would be spending less on 
R&D than socially optimal. Subsidies led to higher R&D, lower production costs, and 
thus higher production and consumer surplus. With spillovers, under certain 
assumptions about the cost functions, this effect was accentuated, suggesting that 
optimal subsidies rise as the degree of appropriability of R&D falls.
In the context of a model of strategic trade, the role of public policy is instead one 
of supporting the domestic firm(s) against its foreign rivals. The government’s 
objective is still to maximise domestic welfare. In this case, however, under the
* A final result of the Brander and Spencer (1983b) paper is that, in the case where countries 
are allowed to set both R&D and export subsidies, the noncooperative international equilibrium 
involves both countries imposing export subsidies and R&D taxes. Export subsidies increase 
exports while the R&D tax forces firms to operate at levels of R&D that minimise costs, thus 
achieving overall production efficiency. Once again however, noncooperative behaviour 
reduces the total rent over which the two countries compete relative to the collusion case. 
Given that the focus of this thesis is on the effects of inappropriability of research, we do not 
discuss export subsidies in this chapter. For a criticism however of the results by Brander and 
Spencer that focuses on implications of assumptions on parameters such as the elasticity of 
demand on the results, see Collie and de Meza (1986). Another line of criticism focuses on the 
strategic variable assumed. In the Brander and Spencer international duopoly, output is the 
strategic variable. Eaton and Grossman (1986) have demonstrated that in the case where 
instead the strategic variable is price, an export tax, rather than an export subsidy is called for; 
de Meza (1989) has shown price controls to be at least as attractive as export subsidies in 
maximising domestic benefits.
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assumption that all domestic output is exported, domestic welfare consist of producer’s 
suiplus only; consumer’s surplus is absent. The objective of the subsidy is thus one of 
profit-shifting only; in setting subsidy rates the government is concerned exclusively 
with the interests of the domestic firm. Policy is thus guided by strategic considerations 
of profit-shifting, not efficiency considerations 3.
This introduction to the results obtained by Brander and Spencer serves as a 
backdrop for the examination of government policy in a framework of international 
competition through cost-reducing R&D where R&D is subject to spillovers. In this 
chapter we extend the Brander and Spencer framework to take account of the possibility 
that some of R&D is not appropriable by the originating firm.
The extension to the case with spillovers is a natural one in the following sense.
In the "new trade" literature there are two types of arguments which are invoked for the 
justification of departures from principles of free trade. There are first the arguments 
that are grouped under the "strategic trade" heading. The main point made here is that 
in imperfectly competitive international environments characterised by persistent excess 
profits intervention allows governments to "shift" some of these profits to their 
domestic firm(s): this is a "beggar-thy-neighbour" struggle over rents; put another way, 
a zero-sum game.
The second type of argument is a more traditional one and is based on externa­
lities: the inability of firms to fully appropriate the results of innovations. Intervention
* In the Brander and Spencer models, "profit-shifting" is interpreted as the use of public policy in 
order to shift profits from foreign to domestic firms. The interpretation is dictated by the 
structure of their model, particularly the assumption that all the output of the domestic firm and 
of its foreign rival is exported to a third -  non-producing -  country. This is not however the only 
incentive that governments have for intervention in strategic trade models. As Norman (1989) 
notes, through active policies that impact on production and trade, governments can attempt to 
shift profits from foreign firms to domestic consumers or to the home government, or they can 
attempt to improve the terms of trade by policies that make domestic exporters compete less 
aggressively with each other or make foreign suppliers move down their marginal-cost curves.
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here is a positive-sum game: the support of R&D can have beneficial effects beyond the 
borders of the intervening country. The argument is therefore a reformulation in the 
context of international trade of the basis for R&D subsidies developed in chapters two 
and three above.
These two arguments tend to be sharply separated in attempts at modelling trade in 
imperfectly competitive environments and are often confused in policy debates 4. This 
chapter develops a framework that allows the treatment of both and the examination of 
possible conflicts in the nature of public policy based on the different starting points and 
nature of the two arguments5.
The starting point of the theory developed here is that the existence of spillovers 
implies that national innovation policies which subsidise the research expenditures of 
"national champions" can no longer be considered in isolation. To the extent that part 
of the knowledge generated by an R&D subsidy is available to a domestic firm’s 
foreign competitor, such a policy of subsidising R&D has an important externality 
attached to it, not previously present when research was fully appropriable. In an 
analogous fashion, when a foreign firm cannot appropriate part of its R&D investment, 
a foreign government’s subsidisation of the research of its national champion cannot be
4 Spence (1984a) has referred to the fact that in environments where governments invest in 
R&D, the benefits will spill across national borders as "a second level of the free-rider problem 
at the country level" (p. 360). He suggests that this complicates the evaluation of strategic 
policies and that differences across countries in dealing with these externalities will lead directly 
to shifts in relative competitive positions. The objective of policy in such an environment would 
be to "internalise" R&D externalities internationally, implying that certain forms of cooperative or 
quasi-cooperative behaviour among firms and countries are required in order to achieve 
dynamic efficiency.
• Another reason why the extension for the case of spillovers is a  potentially useful one is that 
with full R&D appropriability there is nothing to distinguish R&D from any other type of 
investment. By extending the model for the case of spillovers in R&D, we come closer to 
justifying such a  distinction, based on the unique public good features of R&D. This also allows 
to distinguish more credibly R&D subsidies from any other type of subsidies.
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"contained” within that country’s national borders. This has important implications 
(through the spillover rate) for the level of production costs of the domestic firm, its 
strategic response and for the appropriate policy of the domestic government.
The chapter is organised as follows. In the next section we develop a three-stage 
model of international competition with spillovers in general form. This framework 
will allow us to address the question of whether the same incentives for subsidising 
R&D carry over in the situation where part of R&D is not appropriable by the 
originating firm. We first examine the effects of a domestic R&D subsidy on the levels 
of R&D investment of the domestic and foreign firms and. This leads to a discussion of 
the determinants of the optimal R&D subsidy rate and the conditions under which R&D 
should be taxed. We then examine the determinants of the rate of return to government 
intervention, and how this is affected by conditions of appropriability and the nature of 
technology, in the sense of the ease of substitutability between the R&D of the domestic 
firm and that of its foreign rival. The characteristics of a joindy optimal policy are then 
briefly reviewed. Concluding remarks are in section HI.
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II. A duopoly model of International competition with spillovers
In order to address the question of the implications of R&D spillovers for the 
nature of public policy in the context of international trade, we extend the framework 
first developed by Brander and Spencer to the case where R&D is only partially 
appropriable by the firm that originates it. We examine the impact of an R&D subsidy 
and the optimal subsidy rate when the government of one country attempts to help its 
"national champion" capture a bigger slice of the world market and to increase profits 
and rent to the domestic country, net of the cost of the subsidy. We then examine the 
rate of return of such intervention and investigate the characteristics of the equilibrium 
that prevails when both governments attempt to jointly maximise rents.
a. The basic model
Rather than thinking of a duopoly amongst firms i and j  in the domestic market as 
in chapter four, firm i now represents the domestic firm and firm j  the foreign firm *. In 
the good that they produce, each is the sole supplier of the country it represents (a 
"national champion") and both sell to a third market7. Furthermore, the structure of the 
game is different. Rather than firm rivalry being represented by a three-stage game, 
where firms successively choose basic research expenditures, development research 
expenditures and production levels, we assume instead that R&D is homogeneous. 
Firms therefore choose R&D levels in one stage that preceeds the choice of output
*Katz and Shapiro (1990) note the difficulties that often surface in attempting to distinguish 
between "domestic" and "foreign" firms. These difficulties are related to institutional 
arrangements such as extensive linkages among firms, location of production and shareholding 
in many countries etc. and complicate the formulation of social welfare functions that serve as a 
basis for policy. In what follows we assume that the identity of firms is well-defined so that 
these problems do not arise.
7 For simplicity we assume that all of the output that each firm produces is exported to the third 
market where the two foreign firms compete. This third market has no domestic production of 
its own in the good in question. The possibility of domestic consumption would generally 
increase incentives for subsidisation (since it would lead to lower prices and higher quantities).
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levels. Before R&D levels are chosen however, governments set R&D subsidy rates 
that are communicated to both firms. Subsequent decisions on the levels of R&D and 
output therefore reflect the level of public support of R&D.
In the last (output) stage of the game, with R&D expenditures sunk and known to 
each other, and with a subsidy s per unit of its R&D, the domestic firm chooses the level 
of output ql (ie its exports to the third country) that maximises:
(5.1) n \q ' ,q 2? v xJ  = E \q i,q2) - C \ q ' , x v x2) - ( l - s ) x l
As before, we assume that the good produced is homogeneous and that increasing 
the output of good j  decreases the total and marginal revenue of firm i\ We therefore 
have that dE'/dqj = E] < 0 and (fE'/dq'dq1 = E\} < 0. Marginal cost is taken to be 
independent of output so that C  = c'q with dC'/dq‘ = c‘ and dc'/dq' = 0. Variable total 
and marginal costs decline with a firm’s expenditures on R&D ie dC73bti- = CJ < 0 
(dc'/dxj = c; < 0), but at a declining rate ie cfC'/dx? = > 0 (cPc'/dx? = cXfXi > 0).
Because of the existence of spillovers however, they also decline with the R&D of its 
rival ie dC'/dxj = C'Xj < 0 and cPC'/dxf = > 0 (dc'/dxj = < 0 and
cfc'/dxj = c‘x^  > 0). Finally we leave open the possibility that the effect of borrowed 
basic research on a firm’s marginal cost reduction due to own basic research 
expenditures be positive or negative so that the sign of <fC'/dx;dXj = CXfXj (and similarly 
of cfc'ldxtdxj = ) is not predetermined.
The first-order conditions for a maximum are then given by:
(5.2) n[ e  dll'/dq1 s  E\{q \  qz) -  c \ x v x2;s) = 0
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where E{ = dE l/dq1. The second-order conditions are satisfied for
n}, = tfU '/dq1 b Eh < 0 and for A s  n'nI%2 -  n j2r&  = EhEh -  E\2Eli > 0. In 
symmetry, this implies II;{’,(= Ejj) < ££).
The subsidy does not affect directly the resolution of the output game when R&D 
levels are given, although it does indirectly affect production through its effect on R&D 
levels committed by each firm. Given therefore that from the last (output) stage we 
have that q1 = q l[c 1(xi,x2), c2{xux^j\ and q2 = q2[c 1(jc1,jc2), c2(xlfxji], profit for the 
domestic firm is given by:
(5.3) g \ x vx^,s) a  n ‘{<7 '(x„*,;*), q \x v x»s)} a
= E '{q '(c \x„ x2) ,(c \x v x2)),q2(c \x l,xl) ,(c \x t,xt)} -  
- C 1(9 ,(cl(j:1,x!),(c2(j:1,^ )y :1,A ^ ))-(l-j)!t1
At the second stage, each firm chooses the level of its R&D expenditures. In 
choosing its xu the domestic firm balances two considerations: on the one hand, higher 
R&D expenditures reduce production costs and raise its market share; on the other, they 
increase its fixed costs and result in a lower industry price. Given the R&D 
expenditures of its rival therefore, and with diminishing returns to R&D, each firm 
chooses an optimal xx in order to maximise profits. The Nash equilibrium of the 
strategic game then occurs where each firm is maximising its profit with respect to its 
R&D expenditures, given the level chosen by its rival. For the domestic firm, therefore, 
benefiting from an R&D subsidy, the first-order condition for a maximum is:
(5.4) g,' a dg '/dx, a  ^ + n ' C '  + 1 ^  = 0
= > £ ,V + £ '?,2, - ^ - ( 1 - ^  = 0 
1 -*
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since II] = £,' = 0. The second-order conditions are given by:
(5.5) g,\ s  d g fix , = + l lW l /d x J  -  c ^ f l  ‘ -  < 0
and by D = g lg ^  -  ghgf, > 0.
The levels of R&D expenditures of the domestic and the foreign firm in 
equilibrium are determined at the intersection of the R&D reaction functions for each 
firm. These reaction functions describe for each firm its best response in terms of 
expenditures in R&D to different levels of R&D by its rival. Taking the case of the 
domestic firm as an example, the slope of the reaction function will be determined by 
the domestic firm’s reactions to different levels of R&D expenditures by the foreign 
firm. Starting with a particular combination of domestic and foreign R&D 
expenditures, the question is whether, as a response to higher foreign R&D, the profits 
of the domestic firm are maximised with a higher or with a lower R&D budget.
In the situation where R&D is fully appropriable by the firm that originates it, an 
increase in R&D expenditures by the foreign firm implies that its marginal costs are 
lower than before. It will therefore tend to produce more as a result. This implies that 
the expected market size for the domestic firm is now lower than before. Since this 
reduces the marginal returns to research, it is reasonable to suppose that the domestic 
firm’s best reply is a lower level of R&D expenditures, implying a negatively sloped 
R&D reaction function. In a symmetric situation, the same will be true for the reaction 
function of the foreign firm.
When however R&D is no longer fully appropriable by the originating firm and is 
instead subject to spillovers, this assumption is no longer clear-cut. The R&D 
externality implies that an increase in the foreign firm’s R&D expenditures, while still
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lowering its own costs, will also have the external effect of lowering the costs of the 
domestic firm. While therefore the increase in the foreign firm’s production implies a 
fall in the expected market size for the domestic firm, tending to reduce the marginal 
return of research, the externality effect associated with R&D spillovers tends to 
increase it. In the situation where this latter effect is strong, the net marginal return of 
the domestic firm’s R&D will increase. It will then be reasonable to suppose that the 
domestic firm’s best reply to a higher level of R&D expenditures by its foreign rival is 
to increase its own R&D, giving (in a situation of symmetry) upward-sloping R&D 
reaction functions *.
The slope of the R&D reaction functions can be derived by the total differentiation 
of g/ = 0 and g* = 0 with respect to xl and x2 to obtain:
(5.6) d x i/dx2 = - g li2/gin and dx2/dxl = -g ljg n
From the second-order conditions for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium 
we require that g/j < 0 9. The sign of d x l/dx2 is therefore determined by the sign of gu­
l f  an increase in the foreign firm’s R&D reduces the effect of the domestic firm’s own 
R&D on its own profit (g}2 < 0), then the R&D reaction function is negatively sloped. If
*d’ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) have developed a  duopoly model with spillovers, 
parameterized with linear forms, in order to compare the R&D and production levels of the 
noncooperative equilibrium with those of two equilibria that result from different forms of 
cooperation (in R&D only, or in both R&D and output) and with the socially optimal levels. 
Henricques (1990), in a  short note, undertakes stability analysis of the d' Aspremont and 
Jacquemin model and comes to conclusions regarding the shape of output reaction functions 
that are similar to ours. She concludes that for "large spillovers" (greater than 50% in her case) 
R&D reaction functions cross correctly (thus ensuring stability) but are upward-sloping.
• As was noted earlier in this chapter, an inspection of (5.5) shows that at least one of the terms 
of g,1, can be positive (E\ql^J even in the absence of spillovers. With spillovers in R&D a  second
term can also be positive {q^QEl/dxJ since we can have q ] >  0), making it all the more possible
that the second order conditions will not hold. While this is not a  trivial problem, we restrict our 
attention to the cases where there are sharply diminishing returns to own R&D (ie where cj  is
positive and relatively large), so that this effect is dominant and ensures well-behaved 
second-order conditions.
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instead an increase in the rival’s R&D increases also the effect of own R&D on own 
profit (g,2 > 0), the R&D reaction function is positively sloped. In a symmetric 
situation, this is true for the R&D reaction functions of both firms.
The question that arises here is under what conditions g\j might be positive ie 
when would an increase in the R&D of a firm’s rival also raise the effect of its own 
R&D on profits. Take first the case where R&D is fully appropriable, so that a firm’s 
production costs are a function solely of its R&D investment. Brander and Spencer 
acknowledge that at least one of the terms of g',y is positive19. Since however in the 
case where spillovers are absent we have that = 0 and also that < 0, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the effect of the negative term is outweighed, giving g}2 < 0.
In the situation where R&D expenditures are subject to spillovers, differentiation 
of the expression g! with respect to x2 gives g}2 = E ^ q ^ +qtfiE 'jdxJ -  1 -  c ' ^ .
A number of terms in this expression are now of an ambiguous sign. As was discussed 
in chapter four above in the context of a three-stage model in general form (with R&D 
broken down into basic and development research), with spillovers it is possible to have 
= (cx^h ~ Cx,^2i)/A > 0 (and similarly for ql2 > 0). This can be because cost 
reduction through R&D benefits a firm’s rival more than the firm itself (c*t < cj(); it can 
also occur however when R&D reduces the costs of the originating firm more than that
10 When spillovers are absent, g{2= + qlf$E\ldx^ -  c^q .^ The first term of this expression 
can be positive, since E\ < 0 and we can have < 0. In the second term, dE\ldx2= E\xq]^+ 
is positive since£}, <0, < 0 ,q ^  = c\E \xlA > 0 and E&2.0 (ie an increase in q2
reducing E x but at a  diminishing rate). Together with < 0 this m eans that the second term is 
negative, as is the third term (q^ < 0 and cx\  < 0). We will then have gx\  < 0 as long a s  Elql^  is not 
too positive.
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of its rival (c2 > c 1) as long as c2 r  > > c * e 2 u * Similarly c 1 can be negative n , with
X | Xj  X |  1 1  X |  2 1  x ix 2
the implication that it is possible for all terms in g\2 to be positive, giving (in symmetry) 
unambiguously upward sloping R&D reaction functions for both firms.
b. The effect of a domestic R&D subsidy
We now want to examine the effect of the R&D subsidy given to the domestic 
firm on R&D expenditures in an environment where R&D is characterised by 
spillovers. The comparative statics of an increase in the R&D subsidy to the domestic 
firm on the R&D expenditures of both the domestic and foreign firms can be 
determined by totally differentiating g}(xuX2,;s) = 0 from (4.37) and g2(xux2) = 0 with 
respect to x u and s. This yields the system:
g}ldx'+g}2d y 2+ ds= 0
(5.7)
g2ld x l +g22dx2 = 0
From this system by a simple application of Cramer's rule we conclude that the 
effect of the subsidy on the firm’s own level of R&D is given by x) = dxl/ds = -g lJD , 
while the effect on the rival's R&D is given by x] = dx2/ds = -g 2i/D . Since g&< 0 by
11 Note that the conditions for which we can have > 0 are more general than the conditions for 
which reverses sign and becomes negative. In the latter case  for an increase in a  firm’s R&D
to lead to a  decline in its output it is a  necessary condition that its R&D expenditures reduce the 
cost of its rival by more than its own ie c* < c[{. In the former case, for an increase in a  firm’s
R&D to lead to an increase, rather than to a  decline, in its rival’s R&D it is sufficient that cJXi < c[.
This aggressive response from rivals can also come about however in the "normal" case  where 
R&D expenditures reduce the (marginal) cost of the initiating firm by more than that of its rival 
(ie where c' > cl).
12 For a  functional form of the R&D production function and of the corresponding (marginal) cost 
function a s  that given in expression (4.11) of chapter four, the R&D of a  firm’s rival increases 
the rate of marginal cost reduction due to a  firm’s own R&D ( ^  < 0) when a <  p, that is when
the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to knowledge is greater than the elasticity of 
substitution between a  firm’s own R&D and that of its rivals.
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the second-order conditions, the domestic subsidy expands the R&D expenditures of the 
domestic firm 13. The effect on the rival’s R&D effort depends on the sign of g \ I f  
£ 2 1  < 0, the subsidy reduces the R&D outlays of the rival firm. In the case on the other 
hand where due to spillovers g lx > 0, the subsidy to the domestic firm induces an 
aggressive response and higher R&D expenditures on the part of its rival.
This outcome is illustrated in Figure 1. With upward sloping R&D reaction 
functions (ie under the assumption that due to spillovers gj; > 0) and an initial 
equilibrium at point A, the subsidy to the domestic firm shifts out its reaction function. 
The new equilibrium at point B involves higher R&D levels by both firms.
Figure 1: Effects on R&D expenditures of an R&D subsidy
x2
firm 2 R&D reaction function
firm 1 R&D reaction functions
x1
13 Note that the relationship betw een the effect of the subsidy on the R&D of the d om estic firm 
and on that of its rival is given by x ]  =  -x ^ ig ^ /g n )  =  -x ^ (d x -J d x x).
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Proposition 1: With spillovers in R&D, a domestic R&D subsidy increases
domestic R&D and, provided g221>0, increases foreign R&D as well. 
If foreign R&D falls.
c. Optimal R&D subsidies
By "precommitting" to a subsidy of the R&D expenditures of its firm, the 
domestic government attempts to put the firm in a better competitive position. The 
subsidy aims at achieving lower marginal production costs, higher market share and 
profit than the foreign competitor. With spillovers however, we have seen that a 
domestic subsidy, while inducing higher R&D levels domestically, can also induce 
higher R&D levels abroad. The natural question that arises in this context is whether 
the optimal subsidy rate is positive or negative ie whether the incentives for the 
government to subsidise R&D remain in place or are reversed.
The optimal subsidy s* is the rate that maximises welfare in the domestic country 
net of the cost of the subsidy; this is simply equal to the profit of the domestic firm 
minus the cost of the R&D subsidy14. The government therefore chooses s so as to 
maximise:
(5.8) W V) = g \ x vx& ) -  sxt
From (5.8), the first-order condition for the welfare maximising subsidy is:
(5.9) dW'lds =g\x) + g tf+ g !  - A T ,  -  sxj = 0
=> x'(gl(dx2/dxl) - s )  = 0
14 In chapters two and three we derived optimal subsidies in the one-stage game with n 
domestic firms under the assumption that the government attempted to subsidise total domestic 
surplus TS = CS +nT l-sX  (consumer surplus plus producer surplus minus the cost of the 
subsidy). The difference between that maximand and (5.8) is that here consumer surplus is 
zero since all output is exported and that producer surplus Is the profit of the (unique) domestic 
firm.
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since g/ = 0, x) -  - x 2(g2l/g%2 ) = - x 2{dx2!dx^) and g] = xv The optimal subsidy rate is:
(5.10) j* = g}(dx2/dxl) = -g M jg li )
From expression (5.10) it can be seen that the optimal subsidy rate is equal to the 
change in the domestic firm’s own profit brought about by the effect of an increase in 
the domestic firm’s R&D on the foreign rival’s R&D. The sign of the subsidy rate 
therefore will depend on two effects: the effect of an increase in own R&D on the R&D 
of the rival firm ie dx2/dxl; and the effect of the change in the R&D of the rival on a 
firm’s profitability ie g2. Since dx2/dxl = -g ljg h  and gh<  0 by the second-order 
conditions for a maximum in the R&D game, the foreign rival’s response to higher 
domestic R&D levels will depend on the impact of domestic R&D on the marginal 
profitability of foreign R&D. We can label this first effect a (marginal) R&D produc­
tivity effect; g2 is then an R&D profitability effect15. Their respective signs, and their 
interaction, determine whether optimal subsidies are positive, or whether instead R&D 
should be taxed.
In order to establish the conditions that determine the sign of the optimal subsidy 
rate, it is necessary to look more closely at the conditions that determine the sign of g2 
and of dx2/dxl. From (4.36), we have that g2 = Since IlJ = 0 from (4.35),
this reduces to g2 = E2q^. Since n j  = E2 < 0, we will have g2 < 0 when q22 > 0 and 
g2 > 0 when q2^ < 0. The conditions for which we can have this latter possibility were 
explored at length in section H a of chapter four above. It was established that for 
ql2 < 0 a necessary (though not sufficient) condition is that c22 > c^. In order therefore 
for an increase in the foreign firm’s R&D to have the potential to lead to higher profits
"Jaffe  (1986) makes a  similar distinction in an empirical investigation of the effects of 
spillovers. In his paper, the productivity of a  firm’s  R&D is increased by the R&D of "techno­
logical neighbours”; the R&D of rivals however also lowers the profits and market value of firms 
with low R&D intensity.
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for the domestic firm, the foreign firm’s R&D expenditures must, because of spillovers 
and substitutability conditions, decrease its production costs at the margin by less than 
they decrease the production costs of the domestic firm. For a spillover rate less than 
unity, this can occur with a knowledge production function of a CES form such as the 
one in (4.28’) of chapter four above, and where in addition the R&D of the foreign firm 
is not easily substitutable with that of the domestic firm 16.
The effect of the domestic firm’s own R&D on the marginal profitability of the 
foreign rival’s R&D (g22X) determines the slope of the reaction functions and therefore 
the response of the foreign firm to a higher level of domestic R&D. The conditions 
under which g2l > 0, giving upward-sloping reaction functions, are less straight-forward 
and were explored earlier in this chapter (section in.a). It was established that for this 
to happen it is sufficient for q2Xy -  [elfin "  Ci,^2i)/A > 0, ql2 > 0 and < 0.
From the variables that determine the signs of gl2 and g22i, it can be seen that the 
R&D productivity effect and the R&D profitability effect are related to the conditions 
for appropriability of R&D, as well as to conditions relating to the ease of substitut­
ability between the R&D of the domestic firm and that of its foreign rival.
Consequently, the interaction of these conditions determine whether the optimal subsidy 
rate is positive or negative. On this basis, it is possible to distinguish between three 
cases, corresponding to different conditions relating to appropriability and to substitut­
ability of research inputs. This taxonomy can be interpreted as corresponding to three 
types of international oligopolistic industries.
1# With spillovers in R&D, q]2= [clE{x -  c ]E l^ D . Since D>0, in order to have q^< 0 a  necessary 
and sufficient condition is that c]E\x < c j£2,which, given that E\x < E%v implies cXi > cXj as a  
necessary condition. With 0 < 1, this condition is satisfied under an R&D production function of 
a  CES form as in R, Pand when in addition 0_p> 1 ie when p > 0  giving an
elasticity of substitution between own and borrowed R&D that is less than one.
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In the first case (first type of industry), the increase in the domestic firm’s R&D 
due to subsidies reduces the R&D outlays of the foreign rival {glx < 0, leading to 
dx2/dxl < 0). With a larger expected market, own profits increase as a result (g} < 0) 
and the optimal subsidy is positive. This is the result obtained by Brander and Spencer 
(1983a) in an environment where R&D was fully appropriated by the originating 
firm(s). The result may however also stand in the situation where appropriability of 
R&D is not perfect, as long as the spillover rate is not high. With moderate spillovers, 
an increase in the R&D expenditures of the domestic firm may still reduce the marginal 
profitability of the foreign rival’s R&D, despite the fact that some of the domestic R&D 
expenditures cannot be fully appropriated. The foreign rival’s best response to a higher 
level of domestic R&D would in that case still be to reduce its own R&D outlays, 
leading to higher domestic profits. In terms of the specifications of the knowledge 
production function presented in section H.a of chapter four above, this type of situation 
can arise both with domestic and foreign R&D being perfect substitutes as in (4.28) and 
in the case where we have a CES form as in (4.28’), as long as domestic and foreign 
R&D are easily substitutable with each other.
The other two cases both relate to an environment where R&D is subject to 
spillovers. In the first, higher domestic R&D expenditures increase the marginal profit­
ability of the foreign rival’s R&D expenditures (g2i > 0). This gives upward-sloping 
R&D reaction functions, with the result that higher R&D levels by the domestic firm are 
matched by higher R&D outlays by the foreign firm (dx2/dxx > 0). If a higher level of 
rival R&D reduces a firm’s own profits, the effect of this aggressive response from the 
foreign rival will be to reduce the profits for the domestic firm (gj1 < 0). Put another 
way, the (negative) effect due to spillovers dominates in this case the cost reduction 
achieved by R&D. In that event, the optimal subsidy rate is negative: R&D should be 
taxed.
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The same assumptions about technology and spillovers that resulted in a positive 
subsidy rate in the first case examined above can also deliver a negative optimal subsidy 
rate. Both a parameterization of the knowledge production function where domestic 
and foreign R&D are perfect substitutes as in (4.28) and one with a CES form as in 
(4.28’) — as long as domestic and foreign R&D are easily substitutable with each other 
— can result in g2i < 0 or g21 > 0, leading (with g2 > 0 in both cases) to a positive or a 
negative subsidy rate respectively. The difference between the two rests on the degree 
of appropriability, with higher spillover rates reversing the benefit for the domestic firm 
and making the case of taxing R&D. This suggests that a successful government policy 
needs to be sensitive to both the technological characteristics of industries (that 
determine the ease of substitutability of own with borrowed R&D) and to the degree of 
inappropriability involved.
The final case relates to a situation where g22i>0, leading to d^/dxl>0, and where 
in addition g\> 0 17. The increase in the domestic firm’s R&D outlays increases, 
because of spillovers, the marginal profitability of the foreign firm’s R&D. Here 
however, the increase in the rival’s R&D expenditures induced by higher domestic 
R&D, leads to higher, rather than lower, profits for the domestic firm. The key to the 
explanation is this: for #^>0, we need ql2 < 0; a necessary condition for this is that 
<  > or that the foreign firm’s R&D expenditures reduce its production costs at the 
margin by less than they reduce those of the domestic firm. Because of this, the higher 
foreign R&D (as a response to the higher level of domestic R&D) leads to lower foreign 
production and consequently to higher domestic profits. This can occur with a
17 A fourth case where p^cO , leading to dxVdx1 <0, and where In addition g12>0 can be ruled out 
because of inconsistency. This is because g\>0 when q ^<0; a  necessary condition for this is
that c* > c .^ This however implies q]2 > 0 (and equivalently <£ > 0) and leads to p ^ O .
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knowledge production function of a CES form as in (4.28*), where domestic and foreign 
R&D are not easily substitutable with each other. In this situation therefore, the subsidy 
rate is again positive18.
We can summarise these points in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: With spillovers in R&D, the optimal domestic subsidy rate will be:
(i) positive, when higher domestic R&D reduces foreign R&D which 
in turn increases domestic profits (g22i<0 and £^<0) or when higher 
domestic R&D increases foreign R&D but still increases domestic 
profits (g\i>0 and g \>  0);
(ii) negative, when higher domestic R&D increases foreign R&D 
which in turn reduces domestic profits (g*21>0 and g12<0).
d. Rates of return to Intervention
One question that is often raised in the context of the evaluation of 
''profit-shifting" strategic policies is whether the rate of return to such intervention is 
anything near the "normal" rates of return that governments could obtain in capital 
markets. Assume that a government policy that subsidises the R&D investment of its 
domestic firm can actually achieve higher profits for it and that it does not invite
1tln a  recent paper, Beath, Katsoulakos and Ulph (1989) develop a  model of an R&D race that 
has many similarities to ours. Their model accounts for two effects the determine R&D 
expenditures: the profit incentive and the competitive threat A major determinant of the relative 
magnitude of the two effects is the ease  of imitation. If imitation is impossible or difficult, the 
incentive to do R&D in order to prevent the rival from winning exceeds the profit incentive to 
invest in R&D. In such a  case, if the rival increases R&D spending, the competitive response 
for the firm is to increase its own R&D effort, giving an upward-sloping reaction function. If 
instead imitation is easy and the rival’s  R&D is a  very good substitute of one’s  own, the 
competitive threat virtually disappears. The optimal response to an increase in the R&D of the 
rival is then to spend less on R&D, giving a  downward-sloping reaction function. These two 
effects determine also the nature of R&D subsidies. The authors conclude that R&D subsidies 
are only beneficial when the two countries differ \n the relative importance of the forces that 
determine their R&D. If instead in both countries either competitive threats dominate profit 
incentives or if profit incentives dominate competitive threats, then R&D should be taxed.
These results mirror ours: we conclude that an R&D subsidy is appropriate when the R&D 
productivity effect and the R&D profitability effect go in the sam e direction; in contrast, it should 
be taxed when the two effects go in opposite directions.
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retaliation by the foreign government. Based on a cost-benefit calculation, and taking 
into account the existence of alternative investments to R&D subsidies, is it still 
worthwile asking whether such R&D subsidies are the best policy alternative.
The framework that we have developed in this chapter allows us to address this 
question directly. By specifying functional forms for cost and demand functions, we 
can first calculate the optimal subsidy rate s* that will maximise domestic welfare 
W1^ )  = g \ x ltX2',s) -  sxlf as defined in (5.8). On the basis of this optimal subsidy rate, 
we can then calculate the rate of return to the government of its policy of subsidising 
R&D. These calculations can be performed under the assumption the R&D is perfectly 
appropriable, so that the spillover rate 0 is zero, and for the case where R&D is subject 
to spillovers at the rate 0 £ 0 ^  1. In that latter case, we will use the two functional 
forms of the cost function developed in the chapters above in order to investigate the 
effects of alternative assumptions about technology on the rate of return of a policy of 
R&D subsidies.
We start by assuming that before any R&D subsidy, the domestic firm spends x x 
on R&D and earns profits II1 =P(Q)q1 - c xq x-Jt,. The government now introduces a 
subsidy s* to R&D. As a result, the domestic firm will now be spending , on R&D 
expenditures. The cost of the R&D to the firm is however only (1 -  s*)£u giving profits 
equal to f t1 =sP(<tl,q 2)41 — — (1 -  s*)£i- The change in the profit of the domestic
firm due to the subsidy is thus equal to All1 = n 1 - I I 1 = {£l - E 1) — (jC, -.x,) + s*fx; this 
is the total real gross return from the policy. The subsidy costs the government an 
amount s*J£x so that the total real net return is AE1 -  Ax,. The per-unit net return then is 
(AE1 -  A w e  call this R.
Assuming that the government can raise the amount necessary for the subsidy 
(s*£,) without any welfare costs, it is faced with two options. The first is to invest
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in the capital markets, earning a net payoff of r5*^i, with r  being the rate of return. The 
second option is to invest in its domestic firm by subsidising its R&D outlays and 
recoup the investment from the additional profits that this intervention will generate at 
the expense of the profits of the firm’s foreign rival. From the above, it follows that this 
second option should be followed if its net excess return is positive ie if R>r.
Examining first the situation where R&D is fully appropriable, the introduction of 
the optimal subsidy s* induces the domestic firm to increase its R&D expenditures by 
Ax, =s t x- x v This implies that the expected market share for the foreign rival is now 
lower, and consequently so are the potential returns to R&D expenditures. With 
downward-sloping R&D reaction functions therefore, the foreign rival will decrease its 
R&D outlays by dx2ldxl. This in turn will cause the profits of the domestic firm to 
increase by g}. The total net gain to the domestic firm/government is thus 
g}(dx2Idxl) , -  jc,)19. From (5.10) however we have that s* = g}(dx2/dxl) so that the 
total net return can be rewritten as s*(i, -  *,). The per-unit net return then is 
R = s*(jf, -*,)/$‘A  = 1 - x xt t v
For iso-elastic demand and cost functions of the form assumed in chapter four 
above for the case where spillovers are absent ie P(Q) = cQ~* and c' = pxf® (where a  
and 1/p are the size of the market and the scientific level of the industry redspectively), 
and from (5.10) we can explicitly derive s* and R. With complete R&D appropriability, 
both depend exclusively on the elasticities of demand and of cost reduction with respect
10 Calculating the net gain due to the R&D subsidy is equivalent to calculating the gain to the 
domestic firm of moving from the original point on its reaction function to what would have been 
the Stackelberg leader-follower point in the absence of subsidies. The subsidy in effect shifts 
the R&D reaction function of the domestic firm so that it intersects the reaction function of the 
foreign firm at the Stackelberg point.
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to R&D, l/e and a  respectively. For a given l/e, both s* and R increase with the 
elasticity of cost reduction with respect to R&D expenditures. Conversely, for a given 
a, both rise as demand becomes more elastic 20.
Empirical research suggests that the elasticity of cost reduction with respect to 
R&D is in the order of 0.1 to 0.221. In our model, for cc=0.1 we obtain s*=0.06 when 
demand is inelastic (l/e=.8) and $*=0.05 when demand is slightly elastic (l/e=1.25). For 
ot=0.2 we obtain s*=0.11 when l/e=.8 and $*=0.12 when l/e=1.25. On the basis of these 
optimal subsidies, we can calculate the net per unit rate of return R = 1 - jq /i , .  For the 
functional forms assumed here, this simplifies to R = 1 -  (1 -  $*)~€M 22. For a=0.1, this 
gives R=0.06, a figure that is not sensitive (to the third decimal point) as we vary the 
elasticity of demand from l/e=.8 to l/e=1.25. For a=0.2 we obtain R=0.11 when l/e=.8 
andR=0.12 when l/e=1.25.
A number of conclusions can be drawn for the case where spillovers are absent. 
The first is that optimal subsidies rates are relatively low. This is due to the absence of 
a consumer surplus in the maximand of the government and in the strategic nature of the 
environment, with firms investing heavily in R&D to begin with. Secondly, net rates of
20 Before we derive s ' and Ft, some remarks on second-order conditions are in order. For the 
functional forms assum ed and for e-0 , = cfE^/A > 0 for e<3 and = -c lE \jA  < 0 for e<1.
Collie and de Meza (1986) have already noted that in this type of strategic model, results 
depend on demand being elastic. Furthermore, from (5.10) s*= g}(dx2/dx'). We have first that
gl = -(1 -  j*) (3 -  e)/(5 -  3e)<0 for e < 5/3. Calculating g l  and g\2 we then get 
j* Ie=a= aa)(3 -  e)/[(5 -  3e)+ aoo(3 -  e)] where oo = p/v and where p = [-2(1 -  e)+(1 -  2e) (1+e)/4] and 
v = (a[(5 -  3e) (3 -  e)/4+ (1 + e) (2 -  e)/4] -  e ( l+ a) (5 -  3e)/2}. For the second-order conditions to hold 
(gx<0) we need to restrict v < 0 and for positive profits we need to restrict a  < 2e/(5 -  3e).
21 Stoneman (1987) provides a  summary of these studies.
“ For P(Q) = crQ  ^and c* = pixf*, for the case with no subsidies we obtain 
jtf=0 = [a(a/2)£pe_1(l -  e/2)](1M} {(5 -  3e)/[2(2 -  e)]} (eM); when R&D is subsidised at the optimal rate s ' 
we have £ \“° = [ o ( a {(5 -  3e)/[2(2 -  e) (1 -  j ‘)]}(f/>i). This Implies that R = 1 -*,/■*! 
simplifies to R = 1 -  (1 -s*)~*A where A = e -  a(l -  e) > 0.
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return to public intervention through R&D subsidies in this setup are much more 
sensitive to the ease by which costs respond to R&D expenditures than to variations in 
the demand elasticity. Finally, and on the basis of the criterion that we must have R>r 
in order to justify intervention, in an environment of complete R&D appropriability the 
decision seems to be a marginal one that will rest critically on how easy it is to achieve 
cost reduction through R&D.
Turning now to the case where R&D is subject to spillovers, we first assume that 
the R&D of the domestic firm is a perfect substitute for the R&D of its foreign rival, so 
that the cost function is given by c' = P(jc, + We keep the assumption of the 
iso-elastic demand function. On this basis, we can derive the optimal subsidy rate s* 
which now depends on the appropriability conditions, in addition to the elasticities of 
demand and of cost reduction with respect to R&D 23.
We saw earlier that with positive spillovers, R&D reaction functions could be 
positively sloped and subsidies could then turn negative in the case where the domestic 
firm’s R&D increases the marginal profitability of the rival’s R&D (g22i>0) and this in 
turn decreases the domestic firm’s profits (g!2<0). In the case in question, this can occur 
with an inelastic demand and as the spillover rate increases. For example with oc=0.1 
and l/e=0.9 we obtain j *=0.03 for 0=0.1 and s*=-0.02 for 0=0.3; with cc=0.2 we obtain
23 With c' = P(jcf+0jc;r  we have g\ = -(1 -  j*) [2(0 - 1 + e) -  (1+e) (1+0)]/(5 -  3 e - 39+ e0). For 
jf#>0 > 0 we need 5 -  3e- 30+e9 > 0; it follows that g} < 0 for all 0 < 9 £ 1. For the second-order 
conditions to hold (g£<0) we need op < e(l + a)v where v = (1 + e) (1 + 02)/2 -  2(0* - 1 + e) and 
p = 2(0 - 1  + e)2 -  2(0 - 1 + e) (1+e) (1 + 0 )+ (1+ e) (1 + 0)2/4. The sign of s* -  gl(dx2/dx’) is then 
determined by the sign of g\x which in turn depends on the sign of the expression 
cty -  e(1+ a)0(l -  e) where
\|f= [l-0 (l-E )][2 (0—1+ e) - ( 1+ e)(1+ 0)] - (0 - 1+ e)(1+ e)(1+ 0) + (1+ e)(1+ 2e)(1+ 0)2/4. For 
positive profits, we also need to restrict Se(1 + 0 ) /[ o( 2 - e)] > l where 
& = 2(2-  e )/[4(1 -  e -  0)+(1+ 0) (1+e)]. On this basis and from (5.10) we can calculate 
s*= —<m/(l -  on) where x = [2(0 - 1  + e) -  (1+ e) (1 + 0)]/(5 -  3e  -  30+ e0) and 
© = [a\|/-£(l+a)0(l -  e)]/[ap -  e( 1 +a)v].
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j*=0.08 for 0=0.1 and j*=-0.04 for 0=0.4. In general with inelastic demand, optimal 
subsidies fall as the spillover rate increases and turn negative at moderate or high 
spillover rates. They remain positive for a larger range of 0 when the elasticity of cost 
reduction with respect to R&D is larger. Similarly, rates of return to intervention 
decline as appropriability falls and are negative when R&D is taxed.
For an elastic demand, both s* and R increase with the spillover rate, in addition to 
increasing with the ease of cost reduction with respect to R&D. For a slightly elastic 
demand (l/e=1.25) and oc=0.1, we obtain s*=0.08 and R=0.09 for 0=0.25 and s*=0.33, 
R=0.34 for 0=0.75; with a=0.2 we obtain j*=0.12, /?=0.13 for 0=0.25 and $*=0.35, 
R=0.31 for 0=0.75. Thus in environments where spillovers are pervasive, and as long as 
demand is elastic, a good case can be made for a policy of R&D subsidies of the type 
discussed here on the basis that its net rate of return largely exceeds the ’’normal" rate of 
return in capital markets.
We turn finally to the case where R&D is subject to spillovers but where "own" 
and "borrowed" R&D are imperfect substitutes. We assume that the knowledge 
production function is of a constant elasticity of substitution form so that the 
corresponding cost function is c' = + (0xy)~p]a/p. The elasticity of substitution
between the R&D of the domestic firm and that of its rival is then given by 1/(1 + p). 
The optimal subsidy rate s* and the rate of return R now depend on this ease of substi­
tutability, in addition to depending on appropriability conditions and on the elasticities 
of demand and of cost reduction with respect to R&D 24.
24 With c‘ =  + (9xj)~p]a'p we have &1 =  -(1 - s*) [2(0^- 1 + e) -  (1+e) (1+ er* )] /(5  - 3 e -  30^+ eO-*).
For i e >0 > 0 we need to restrict 5 -  3e -  30_p+ e0"p > 0 or < (5 -  3e)/(3 -  e); it follows that gl > 0 for 
0“p > (3 -  e)/(l -  e), which is only possible when p > 0. For the second-order conditions to hold 
(g£<0) we need op < e [(a -p )+ (l + p)(l+0^)]v where v = 0_2p( l + e)/2 -  2(0_Jp - 1 + e) and
p = 2(0-p - 1 + e)2 -  2(0“p - 1 + e) (1+e) (1 + 0-^ + (1+e) ( 1 + The sign of s* ■ gl{dx*ldx’) is then 
determined by the sign of g\x which in turn depends on the sign of the expression 
a \ j / - e ( a - p)©" !^ -  e) where
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For an elastic demand, both $* and R increase with the spillover rate, as before. 
Ceteris paribus, they decrease as the elasticity of substitution between the firm’s R&D 
and the R&D of its rival declines. Thus when "own" and "borrowed" R&D are almost 
perfect substitutes (p = -0.9) and for l/e=1.25 and oc=0.1, we obtain $*=0.08 and ft=0.09 
for 0=0.25 and $*=0.33, ft=0.34 for 0=0.75; with oc=0.2 we obtain $*=0.12, R=0.13 for 
0=0.25 and $*=0.34, R=0.35 for 0=0.75. In the situation however where the elasticity 
between own and borrowed R&D is lower (p = -0.1, giving an elasticity of 1.11) we 
obtain $*=0.06 and R=0.01 for 0=0.25 and $*=0.13, R=0.14 for 0=0.75 (with a=0.1); 
with a=0.2 we obtain $*=0.05, R=0.06 for 0=0.25 and $*=0.09, R=0.10 for 0=0.7525.
These results suggest that with research inputs imperfect substitutes, rates of return 
to intervention may be low, even in environments characterised by widespread 
spillovers. Whereas under the perfect substitutability assumption for R&D high 
spillovers implied that the rate of return to intervention was significantly higher than 
any "normal" rate of return, the introduction of imperfect substitutability generates rates
Y=2(0“p- l + e ) [ l - 6 rP(l-e )]--(0 '1,- l+ e ) ( l+ e ) ( l+ 0 " p) - [ l - G '1,(l-E )]( l+ e )(l+ 0 "1,)+ ( l+ e )( l+ 2 e )( l+ 0 " ,,)2/4 
. For positive profits, we also need to restrict $e(l+0"p)/[a(2-e)] > l where
$ = 2(2 -  e )/[4 (l-e -0 -p)+ ( l+ 0 -p) ( l+  e)]. On this basis and from (5.10) we can calculate
j* *  -  m )  where x = [2(0_p - 1  + e) -  (1+ e) (1+G^MS -  3e -  30_p+ e0_p) and
© « [a\y -  e(a -  pJG^l -  e)]/{ot|x -  e[(a -  p) + (1 + p) (1 + G^ XJv}-
“ The case with inelastic demand and p < 0 gives the sam e pattern as the case  with perfect 
substitutability. Rates of return fall as the spillover rate increases and can turn negative when it 
becomes optimal for the government to tax R&D. Beyond a  certain spillover rate, R&D taxes 
become in this case appropriate because an increase in the domestic firm’s R&D increases the 
marginal productivity of its rival’s R&D (£2,>0) and thus reduces the domestic firm’s profits
te2<0). The case for p > 0 (inelastic R&D inputs) is more complicated because under most
spillover rates and demand/cost elasticities, either the second-order conditions or the conditions 
for a  positive level of output are not satisfied . It is however possible to generate appropriability- 
/demand conditions where an increase in the domestic firm’s R&D increases the marginal 
productivity of its rival’s R&D (g2,>0) but still increases the domestic firm’s profits (g2>0). In that 
case, ft can again be large and positive and increasing with the spillover rate.
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of return much closer to "normal" levels. This implies that decisions to intervene are 
once more of a marginal nature, and similar to the case with full appropriability of 
R&D.
This analysis and the numerical results that are based on it are subject to certain 
caveats. First, it was assumed that the government can raise the funds necessary for the 
R&D subsidy without incurring any welfare cost. To the extent that this is not true, 
ignoring this deadweight loss implies that the calculated net rates of return R are 
overestimates. Secondly, all output was assumed to be for export. This means that 
there is no domestic consumer surplus so that all gains from lower prices benefit 
consumers of third countries. If part of domestic production is in fact consumed within 
the country’s borders, this will tend to increase the incentives that the government has to 
subsidise the R&D of its domestic firm. The net rates of return that we calculated then 
underestimate the true rates of return.
Finally, there is the "asset" aspect. The gains due to intervention may be 
cumulative and may be manifested in a number of ways: higher productivity of own 
future R&D, lower learning costs in the "next round", etc . If this cumulative aspect is 
important enough so that it outweighs the decay of existing knowledge due to its 
commercialisation, the calculated rates of return will once more be underestimates26. 
The net effect of all these factors is thus hard to ascertain a priori. They are bound 
however to affect the calculations and the policy decisions where these appear to be 
marginal.
M In effect it is this "asset" aspect that provides the intellectual backing and underlies the active 
government intervention in areas such as semiconductors where there are repeated rounds of 
competition, as over 16K and 256K memory chips. I am grateful to Mark Schankerman for 
making this point.
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e . Jointly optimal policy
A final issue concerns the characteristics of a jointly optimal policy, whereby 
governments act together in maximising total welfare W=W1+W2. and the nature of 
R&D subsidies in this equilibrium. Total welfare can be written as:
The first-order conditions for a maximum can be obtained by differentiating (5.11) 
with respect to s1 and s2. Since gl = gl = 0, dxj/ds' = (dxj/dx^dx'/ds' and dg’/ds1 = jt, 
we have:
dW'lds1 = \gl(dxjdxt) - s ' +gf -  s \d x jd x ,)] (dx'lds1) = 0
(5.12)
3W2/ds2 = [gl -  s '(d x jd x j+g fa x jd x j  -  i 2] (dx2/ds*) = 0
Rearranging terms, we obtain:
s l + s\dx2/dx j) = g\{dx2ldxx)+ gl
(5.13)
s \d x jd x d + s1 = g x2 + gl(dxl/dx2)
Solving the system (5.13) simultaneously for s1 and s2 we obtain:
(5.14) 51 = gf and s2 = gl
Brander and Spencer have shown that in an environment with fully appropriable 
R&D, we will have gl < 0 and g\<  0; a jointly optimal policy will therefore involve 
both governments taxing R&D so as to offset the negative effect of each firm’s R&D on 
the other frim’s profit. When R&D is subject to spillovers, we demonstrated earlier in 
this chapter that there are circumstances where g) > 0. In particular, since g] = E]qJXj and
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Ej < 0-we wil1 have g‘ > 0 when qi. < O- Given that q> = - c‘xE j^D  
D>0, a necessary and sufficient condition for ql < 0 is that c'Eu < c^Eji. Since in 
symmetry E ‘u < Ejh this implies cl. > c'x. as a necessary condition.
Of the two functional forms that we have examined, and for a spillover rate o £ 0 £ l 
, it is possible to obtain c{, > c'x, only with the CES cost function that allows for the 
possibility that the R&D of the domestic frim is not easily substitutable with the R&D 
of its rival. We will then have > cx, if (F* > 1. Since the limit value of the spillover 
rate is one, this can occur only in the situation where p>0, so that the elasticity of 
substitution between own and borrowed R&D 1/(1 +p) is less than one. If in addition 
c}xE\{ < cxEJjh then qi. < 0 leading to g) > 0. In that situation, the jointly optimal policy 
will involve positive subsidies to R&D expenditures. Thus:
Proposition 3: With spillovers in R&D, the jointly optimal policy will involve 
positive domestic subsidies when cl > c'x and where in addition 
c'El; < ciEj;. This can only occur in an environment where "own” 
and "borrowed” R&D are not easily substitutable with each other.
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III. C o n c lu s io n s
The issue explored in this chapter concerned the characteristics of public policy in 
support of "national champions" through R&D subsidies. The multi-period model of 
oligopolistic rivalry of chapter four was recast in a setting where competition occurs 
amongst firms located in different countries. Public policy then consists of 
governments subsidising the R&D expenditures of their domestic firm in an 
profit-shifting attempt that operates by altering firms’ strategies. The question that was 
addressed was whether the incentives for such a policy survived in an environment 
characterised by research spillovers.
The first step in answering this question consists of determining the effect of a 
domestic R&D subsidy on the R&D levels of the domestic and of the foreign firm. It 
was established that while a domestic R&D subsidy increases the R&D expenditures of 
the recipient firm, it may decrease or increase the R&D outlays of its foreign rival. The 
effect on the rival’s R&D will depend on two factors: the extent of spillovers and the 
substitutability between own and rival R&D.
Under conditions of fully appropriable R&D, it has been established that the 
international noncooperative equilibrium involves positive subsidies. This was shown 
not to hold in general when R&D is subject to spillovers. In particular, it was shown 
that government behaviour with respect to subsidising R&D should take into account 
two effects: that of the impact of domestic R&D on the marginal profitability of foreign 
R&D (labelled an R&D productivity effect) and that of the impact of domestic R&D on 
the profits of the foreign rival (a profitability effect). Positive subsidies are appropriate 
when domestic R&D reduces foreign R&D which in turn increases domestic profits or 
when domestic R&D increases foreign R&D but still increases domestic profits. In the
235
situation however where, because of spillovers and of the nature of technology and 
strategic interaction, domestic R&D induces higher foreign R&D which in turn reduces 
domestic profits, the appropriate policy involves taxing R&D.
From the framework that was developed in this chapter and from the analysis of 
R&D subsidies in chapters two and three above follows an important implication for 
public policy. Positive R&D subsidies can only be justified in the context of the 
particular cost, demand and appropriability conditions facing individual industries. 
They cannot be generalised to apply to all cases where R&D is less than fully 
appropriable. This is especially true in the case of subsidies to domestic firms that are 
competing in an international oligopolistic environment. In that case, in the absence of 
the indirect benefit to domestic consumers from lower prices, present only when 
subsidising firms that are competing domestically, a policy of subsidising R&D has an 
important externality attached to it which may thwart its aim of putting the domestic 
firm in a better competitive position.
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